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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Kahnawake Iroquois were a group of Iroquois Indians 
converted by Jesuit missionaries and invited to emigrate from 
their homeland to a mission community just outside of Montreal 
starting in 1667. This dissertation focusses on them from 
that beginning to the Seven Years' War and closes in 1760 with 
the demise of the French in North America. Kahnawake history 
from 1667 to 1760 is tied to the colonial and imperial 
struggle in the colonial Northeast between the English, the 
Iroquois, and the French, so the defeat of the French meant 
that their subsequent history differs dramatically and is not 
in the scope of this study. While there have been community 
studies written by Jesuit apologists about these Indians, the 
Kahnawakes have never been studied in the context of the 
diplomatic-military struggle between the English, the Iroquois 
League, and the French, but have been dismissed as probably 
being under the heel of the French.1 The purpose of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate that they were not mere puppets 
of the French, but that there was a real power struggle 
between the Kahnawakes and New France, as well as between the 
Kahnawakes and New York, and even between the Kahnawakes and 
the Iroquois League.
Although the Kahnawake people originated in an era of 
struggle and warfare, they survived and developed as a
1Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune (New York: Norton, 
1987), p. 190.
v
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distinct group. They maintained their identity in the face of 
strong pressure from both the Iroquois League and the French. 
Although overseen by Jesuit missionaries, the Kahnawakes 
managed to retain much of their independence and self- 
determination. They also held their kinfolk of the Iroquois 
League at arm's length when it suited their purposes. Even 
with their factional splits, the Kahnawakes forced the French, 
the English, and the Iroquois League to deal with them as a 
separate power in the geopolitics of northeastern North 
America. They are an example of a native group which adapted 
to changing circumstances but kept control over the 
adaptations they made and changed in ways which kept their 
identity and automony intact.
This argument alters the interpretation of colonial 
history in the Northeast because the Kahnawakes have never 
been studied as a separate group. A few community studies 
have been written about the community of Kahnawake, either by 
Jesuit apologists, antiquarians, or activists who havee 
ignored pertinent evidence and have not subjected their 
findings to critical analysis.2 Moreover, the Kahnawake 
people have never been analyzed within the context of the
2E. J. Devine, Historic Cauqhnawaqa (Montreal: Messenger 
Press, 1922); Henri Bechard, The Original Cauqhnawaqa Indians 
(Montreal: International Publishers, 1976); David Blanchard, 
"Patterns of tradition and change; the re-creation of Iroquois 
culture at Kahnawake," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1982).
vi
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politics of the colonial Northeast.3 The assumption has been 
made that since they emigrated to a Jesuit reserve within New 
France, they did the bidding of the French, and were 
mercenaries for them when hostilities between the French and 
the English broke out. But more than a superficial reading of 
the documents reveals that the situation was more complicated, 
and this dissertation examines those complications.
The significance of my findings impinge on the existing 
picture of power relationships in the colonial Northeast. If 
it is true that the Kahnawakes were a force to be reckoned 
with, then power was more widely shared than past 
interpretations have shown. Within the past few decades, 
scholars have shown that the Iroquois League was not just a 
mercenary force for the English against the French.4 
Likewise, other Indian groups were important as independent 
players and at times pivotal. The Kahnawakes were an
3Thomas R. Agan made a start in this direction with his 
Master's thesis, "The Caughnawaga Indians and their influence 
on English-Indian relations to 1763," (Unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1965).
4For instance, see Richard Aquila, The Iroquois 
Restoration: Iroauois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier.
1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983);
Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Empire: The Covenant Chain 
Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its 
beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: Norton, 
1984); Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change 
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984); 
Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., Bevond the 
Covenant Chain: The Iroauois and Their Neighbors in Indian 
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press, 1987).
vii
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indispensible fighting force for the French, but the French 
had to send embassies to their village to convince them to 
participate in expeditions. Once on the warpath, Kahnawake 
warriors often determined the strategy and outcome of the 
fighting. For instance, they singlehandedly decided the 
outcome of the Battle of Lake George in the Seven Years' War 
by sabotaging the French effort. Therefore, we must refigure 
our interpretation of power relationships in the period of 
English-French-Iroquois conflict in the late seventeenth and 
the eighteenth centuries to take other groups into 
consideration; the Kahnawakes were a group which, although 
small in number, cannot be overlooked when writing the history 
of the colonial wars. Also, they are significant in their 
project of cultural re-genesis. They successfully developed 
a distinct sub-culture which was a mixture of traditional 
Iroquoian and European Catholic traits. And they creatively 
manipulated their situation instead of surrendering their 
autonomy to European overlords.
One reason why no scholars of the colonial Northeast have 
isolated these Indians for study is that they appear in the 
historical documents, both in English and in French, by a wide 
variety of names and therefore are difficult to trace or even 
notice as a distinct group. For the first few years of their 
existence as a group separate from the Iroquois proper, they 
were known as "praying Indians," "French praying Indians" (by 
the English only), "domiciliated Indians," "mission Indians,"
viii
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"mission Iroquois," or other variations.
They soon came to be known by their geographical 
location, however. Their first destination on leaving
Iroquoia was La Prairie, a tiny outpost settlement south of 
Montreal. After nine years, the mission village moved two or 
three miles west to a place called Sault Saint-Louis, or the 
St. Louis Rapids. After one more move of the village site a 
few miles west again but still near these rapids, the Indians 
developed a name in the Mohawk language for Sault Saint-Louis 
—  "Kahnawake," or "Caughnawaga," with many variations on 
these spellings. Most nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
antiquarians used the "Caughnawaga" orthography but the modem 
reserve community has chosen "Kahnawake" as the name of their 
place and their people. In seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century documents the French came to call them "Sault (St.- 
Louis) Indians" or "Sault (St.-Louis) Iroquois," to be more 
specific than "mission Iroquois" since by the 1720s there was 
a neighboring mission village inhabited by Iroquois as well as 
Nipissing and Algonquin Indians. I use the terms "Kahnawake" 
and "Sault Iroquois" interchangeably, and "mission Iroquois" 
when it is possible that some of these neighboring Indians 
were included.
All translations of documents in French are mine.
The first chapter provides background on Iroquois history 
and culture to 1667, the second chapter traces the exodus of 
Iroquois people to the new mission community, and the third,
i x
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fourth, and fifth chapters trace Kahnawake relations with the 
Iroquois League (Five/Six Nations), the French, and the 
English from the 1680s to 1701. Chapter Six continues with 
the history of Kahnawake foreign relations to 1760. Chapter 
Seven outlines and analyzes the role of Kahnawakes in trade 
from the 1680s to 1760. As a concluding chapter, Chapter 
Eight analyzes the extent of cultural change among the 
Kahnawakes in the eighteenth century and summarizes their 
effect on the diplomatic, military, and economic landscape of 
the colonial Northeast.
This study could not have been undertaken without the 
assistance of many people. Professor James Axtell provided 
much leadership, advice, and editorial help from beginning to 
end. Professor Cornelius Jaenen of the University of Ottawa, 
and Professors John Selby, Kevin Kelly, and Thomas Sheppard of 
the College of William and Mary, undertook thoughtful and 
helpful critiques. Other people who generously provided 
information and expertise were Professor Louise Dechene of 
McGill University, Shirley Scott of the Kanien'kehaka 
Raotitiohkwa Cultural Center at Kahnawake, Rev. Laurent 
Tailleur of the Archives du Seminaire de Quebec, Michel 
Wyczynski of the National Archives of Canada, Bill Gorman of 
the New York State Archives, and Gil Kelly and Frederika Teute 
of the Institute of Early American History and Culture. I 
profitted greatly from giving a colloquium paper at the
x
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Institute of Early American History and Culture. Thanks to 
Michael McGiffert and Frederika Teute for including me in the 
schedule and to them and others who attended the session and 
provided constructive comments and helpful insights. The 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and 
the College of William and Mary were generous with their 
financial support. Carol Linton of Interlibrary Loan at Earl 
Gregg Swem Library at the College of William and Mary and many 
at the Computer Center at the College of William and Mary 
never failed to fulfill my requests, no matter how tired they 
had grown of seeing me at their doors. Darlene Crouch in the 
History Department at the College of William and Mary was 
always ready to fix administrative problems and make life 
easier for graduate students. Many friends in Williamsburg, 
too numerous to mention, have provided moral support as well 
as critiques of chapters. My parents, Paul and Sarah Green, 
have lent every kind of support imaginable with large doses of 
patience. And finally, Dave Cozad made sure that my feet are 
firmly planted on the ground, made me ask the tough questions, 
and was always ready to listen.
x i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES
Map Following page
1. Iroquoia, New York, and New France
in the Eighteenth Century ....................  2
2. Canadian Settlement in 1692 and 1760 ............28
3. Native Settlements Near Montreal after 1667 . . . 28
4. Removals: Sault St. Louis Village,
or Caughnawaga (Kahnawake) ..................  67
5. Plan of Fort at Caughnawaga (Kahnawake), 1754 . 270
Table Following page
1. Native Population Trends, 1630-1800 ...........  67
2 - Native Age and Sex Profiles......................67
Xll
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
This study focusses on the Kahnawake Iroquois Indians, a 
collection of individuals who emigrated from the Iroquois 
homeland to a Jesuit mission community, or reserve. outside of 
Montreal, starting in 1667.
Their history and development as a people is traced from 
the beginnings in 1667 up to the end of the French power in 
Canada, at the end of the Seven Years' War in 1760. Through 
the topics of diplomacy, warfare, and trade, these Kahnawake 
Indians are examined and it is determined that they were 
important players in the power politics and military balance 
between the English, the French, and the Iroquois proper from 
the 1680s to 1760.
They became a pivotal group within the French military 
machine in northeastern North America, but forced the French 
to meet them on their own terms, refusing to become subject to 
French authority. They initiated and sustained an illegal but 
highly important trade in furs and European blankets, defying 
the mercantilist rules of both the French and the English 
imperial authorities in New France and New York.
Culturally, the Kahnawake people developed a distinct 
identity, successfully blending elements of both traditional 
Iroquois and European Catholic culture. B o m  in an era of 
struggle, they thrived and maintained their distinct identity 
and culture in the face of imperial powers and the designs of 
their Iroquois relatives.
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CHAPTER ONE 
IROQUOIS HISTORY TO 1667
Centuries ago, across what is now New York State, five 
Iroquois nations, the "people of the longhouse" or the "Ho-de- 
no-sau-nee," formed a League which aided them in becoming a 
powerful people.1 These five tribes were the Mohawks, 
Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and the Senecas. The political 
center of the League was at Onondaga. The Onondagas would be 
the keepers of the council fire, since they were at the center 
of the longhouse (the longhouse representing the geography of 
Iroquoia, along an east-west axis across what is now central 
New York State), the Mohawks would be the keepers of the 
eastern door of the longhouse, since they were the easternmost 
nation, the Senecas the keepers of the western door. Younger 
brothers to these doorkeeper and firekeeper nations, the 
Cayugas and Oneidas, would take their place on either side of 
Onondaga and help to keep the balance between the three older
1 Dates assigned to the founding of the League vary from 
1400 to 1600. William N. Fenton says that Horatio Hale and 
Lewis Henry Morgan judged it to be in the mid-fifteenth 
century, and that William Beauchamp and J.N.B. Hewitt revised 
it to the late sixteenth century. Fenton argues that 
archaeological evidence increasingly supports an earlier date. 
(William N. Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," in Eleanor 
Burke Leacock and Nancy 0. Lurie, eds., North American Indians 
in Historical Perspective (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 
133. See also Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," 
in Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1978- ) [William Sturtevant, ge.
ed.], Volume 15, Northeast. Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (1978), pp. 
418-422; and James W. Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga 
Iroauois: Accommodating Change. 1500-1655 (Syracuse University 
Press, 1987), pp. 43, 105-106.)
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3brothers of the longhouse. These two "sides" or moieties of 
Elder and Younger Brothers were the mechanism by which the 
longhouse people worked out problems and condoled each other. 
When a Mohawk chief died, his "side” (the Mohawks, Onondagas, 
and Senecas) became the mourning side, and their opposite, the 
Younger Brothers, became the clear-minded side, so-called 
because their minds were not clouded with the grief of a 
kinsman's death. The clear-minded side condoled the mourning 
side in a ritual which became the identifying ceremony of the 
Great League. The spirit of the deceased chief was 
requickened in a newly installed chief, and the "requickening 
address" was made to the mourning side by the clear-minded one 
as part of the condolence ritual. The Great League was not 
strictly a political institution, but partly a religious and 
cultural one as well.2
The ritual of the condolence was the main mechanism by 
which the League would function. Chieftainships were to pass 
through groups of families (clans) but their titles did not 
belong to the men who bore them. The right to choose them was 
hereditary, and heredity was traced through the female line. 
Therefore, a man's son did not belong to his father's family 
or even clan. Men were identified through their mothers' 
families, and therefore the chiefly titles —  of the Great
2See Christopher Vecsey, "The Story and Structure of the 
Iroquois Confederacy," Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion LIV (1986), p.90.
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League of Peace as well as at other levels of political 
organization —  belonged to the women of the family or clan. 
In fact, the word in Mohawk for family, ohwachira. translates 
as maternal family, or as some have interpreted it clinically, 
the uterine family.3 When a League (federal) chief died, the 
women in his ohwachira met together to appoint a candidate, 
submitted the nomination to the council of male elders, and 
the latter either agreed or vetoed the choice. When the 
choice was finalized, a condolence ceremony took place to 
condole the "side" of the League from which the deceased had 
come and in the requickening address to "raise up" or install 
the new chief who would take his place.4
With all of its chiefly offices filled, the Great League 
could carry on the business for which it was formed: the 
mediating of disputes between member tribes or villages. 
However, this political forum differed from its counterparts 
in European cultures. Since Iroquois society was tribal and 
not a "state society," the Longhouse people had neither the
3J.N.B. Hewitt, "A Constitutional League of Peace in the 
Stone Age of America: The League of the Iroquois and its 
Constitution," Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution 
for 1918. p. 530.
4George S. Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace: A
Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare," (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1948), pp. 11-18; 
Tooker, "League..." in Handbook of North American Indians 
15:426; A.A. Goldenweiser, "Iroquois Work, 1912," in Elisabeth 
Tooker, ed., An Iroauois Source Book 3 vols. (New York: 
Garland, 1985), Vol. 1, p. 468; William N. Fenton, ed., 
Parker's "Constitution," in Fenton, ed., Parker on the 
Iroauois (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 
pp. 91-92.
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5technical ability nor the inclination to coerce or enforce any 
policy, and held a different concept of leadership.5 A person 
installed in a political position guided rather than ruled. 
He or she had only the prerogative to speak, deliberate, and 
cajole his or her peers, but never to decide anything on their 
behalf.6 Iroquois politics worked by consensus; a motion 
stayed on the floor until every person present agreed, or the 
motion was dropped. The Longhouse people tended to minimize 
conflict, because reaching unanimous agreement was so 
difficult. Instead of remaining in disagreement, a group 
might rather split off and physically leave their home to 
start a new community, as happened numerous times in Iroquois
^William N. Fenton, Introduction to Lewis Henry Morgan, 
League of the Iroauois. pp. 67-73; Daniel K. Richter, "The 
Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 33.
^se of "she" here is guarded; there is much debate over 
the actual role of women in politics, and the disagreement is 
partly due to a change over time. Ethnologists in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries noticed that women were 
only marginally involved in politics, whereas Father Joseph 
Frangois Lafitau, the French Jesuit, in the 1710s observed a 
prominent presence in politics for women. (Joseph -Frangois 
Lafitau s.j., Customs of the American Indians Compared with 
the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols. [William N. Fenton and 
Elizabeth Moore, trans. andeds.] (Toronto; Champlain Society, 
1974-77) 1:71, 293-295. This is significant, especially since 
he was observing at Sault Saint-Louis, the Jesuit mission 
community, which one can assume was heavily influenced (forty- 
odd years old at that point) by French Catholic gender role 
models, and he still found women to be very prominent. There 
has been a great change since; see David Blanchard, "Patterns 
of tradition and change; the re-creation of Iroquois culture 
at Kahnawake" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1982) on twentieth-century Kahnawake Iroquois women 
in politics. Twentieth-century ethnologists find no overt 
involvement for women in ceremonies, speaking, etc. (George S. 
Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace— ," p. 16.
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history.7 Lafitau noticed this attitude among the Iroquois: 
"Each one, regarding others as masters of their own actions 
and themselves, lets them conduct themselves as they wish and 
judges only himself."8
When the League of the Five Nations was first formed, the 
business conducted at the council fire concerned internal 
disputes between tribes or nations. But by the seventeenth 
century, the Iroquois had to develop a policy toward 
outsiders, native and European. The European newcomers posed 
a diplomatic challenge to the longhouse people.9 From the 
beginning they had caused conflict among the five tribes of 
the Ho-de-no-sau-nee. The first information that the Five
Nations had of them came in the form of the strange materials
7William N. Fenton (in "Locality as a Basic Factor in the 
Development of Iroquois Social Structure," in Elisabeth 
Tooker, ed., An Iroauois Source Book. Vol. 1, p. 52) mentions 
examples of this, such as the Oneida split in the nineteenth 
century over religious issues. Some Oneidas went to Wisconsin 
and some to the Thames River in western Ontario. The 1838 
Buffalo Creek Treaty split the Senecas —  Complanter1 s group 
left for Pennsylvania. The American Revolution brought about 
a split between those who sided, however nominally, with the 
Loyalists and removed to Canada, and those who stayed in New 
York. The small Gibson reserve near Owen Sound, Ontario was 
the result of a split among the Oka Iroquois near Montreal.
8Lafitau, Customs... 1:300. Snyderman also mentions the 
Iroquois respect for individual freedom to either abide, or 
not to abide, by decisions taken by the group. (In "Behind the 
Tree of Peace...," p. 13.)
9Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroauois. p. 187; 
Fenton, Introduction to Morgan, League of the Iroauois. p. 66; 
Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 27; Snyderman, 
"Behind the Tree of Peace," p. 27.
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7they used for tools, trinkets, and textiles. Iron, European 
copper, and glass beads were known to the Iroquois long before 
the first white person ever set foot on their soil. They were 
psychologically prepared for the intruders by the advance 
information they received from coastal peoples and by their 
own experience using European materials which they traded for 
with their neighbors to the east.
These eastern tribes were the Algonquins, Montagnais, 
Micmacs, and the Abenakis, peoples situated at or near the 
North Atlantic coast. They were the first North Americans to 
absorb the shocks of cultural contact, the first to be shot at 
with firearms, the first to taste liquor, the first to suffer 
from European diseases, the first to see and trade for 
trinkets, iron and copper ware, and European cloth. They were 
also the first to deal with the pretensions of the bearded 
Europeans to their land; they observed the cross being planted 
in the ground in the Gaspe by Jacques Cartier, the profession 
of sovereignty by Cartier at Stadacona (Quebec City), and this 
nervy Frenchman's kidnapping of Donnacona's sons in 1534. The 
Iroquois were shielded by geography from these first contacts. 
Aside from these occasional intrusions, most of the sixteenth 
century was a period of relative stability among tribes of the 
eastern woodlands. Most groups were locally self-sufficient, 
with little need for external trade for subsistence materials. 
Long-distance trade was limited in most cases to luxury items 
such as marine shell and Great Lakes copper, and intertribal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8warfare was common but mostly symbolic. Casualty rates were 
low. The aim of warfare was to display one's bravery and to 
keep the numbers of wounded and killed at a minimum. Surprise 
was everything; to frighten the enemy, not to kill him, was 
the goal. Warfare was to change greatly within the next 
century.10
The chief exception to the rule of local self-sufficiency 
and limited trade was the Huron Confederacy. This group of 
Iroquoian-speakers (linguistically and culturally related to 
the Iroquois tribes) native to the area north of Lake Ontario 
and east of Georgian Bay had been entrepreneurs for several 
centuries before Europeans came to North America. Situated at 
the northern edge of the horticultural belt, they took 
advantage of their position between agricultural and hunter- 
gatherer peoples on either side of them and developed a 
broker's role between the two types of economies. They 
exchanged the products of the northern hunter-gatherers 
(Algonquins, Ottawas, Nipissings, and Montagnais) to the 
farmers further south (Eries, Westoes, Petuns, Neutrals, 
perhaps the Iroquois as well).
The Hurons were well-placed, both geographically and by 
inclination, to take advantage of a broker role in the trade 
which was to develop once the French established themselves on
10Bruce G. Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with 
Europeans," in Handbook of North American Indians 15:344; 
Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace," p. 7.
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the St. Lawrence River.11 But at the turn of the seventeenth 
century, the groups benefitting from direct contact with the 
French and able to drive the hardest bargains in peddling the 
novel items to inland groups were the Montagnais and 
Algonquins who lived along the northern shore of the St. 
Lawrence. Around 1600, Iroquois raiding parties were able to 
penetrate as far downriver as the spot where Quebec City would 
soon be built, but could not get all the way to Tadoussac, 
where the French had established a seasonal trading post. 
Montagnais Indians were blocking their way. Therefore, the 
Iroquois began to resort to violent raids. They made it 
difficult for St. Lawrence Valley Indians to fish in the river 
for fear of a Mohawk attack. More contact and travel, but 
also more warfare, were the results.12
When Samuel de Champlain, the French explorer and 
venturer, decided to settle permanently on the St. Lawrence in 
1608, he envisioned furs as the prime commodity in the 
colony's economy. He therefore cultivated his existing 
relationship with the Montagnais and Algonquins in order to 
tap their hinterlands for furs, knowing that the Iroquois
11Bruce G. Trigger, "Settlement as an Aspect of Iroquoian 
Adaptation at the Time of Contact," American Anthropologist 
LXV (1963), pp. 90-97.
12Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History 
of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1976), passim; Trigger, "Early Iroquoian 
Contacts with Europeans" in Handbook of North American Indians 
15:347; Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," in Leacock and 
Lurie, eds., North American Indians in Historical Perspective, 
pp. 140-142.
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would bring neither the number nor the quality of peltries 
which their adversaries to the north could provide. Champlain 
inadvertently plugged himself into the rivalries already
established between these groups and became a natural enemy of 
the Iroquois when the Montagnais, Algonquins, and their
recently allied neighbors, the Hurons, suggested an expedition 
against the foe to the south. Champlain had an interest in 
making the St. Lawrence safe as a highway for trade. Since 
among the Five Nations the Mohawks were the main -foes of these 
easterly people, the war party was to attack just the Mohawks, 
and in the summer of 1609 a group of Mohawks met musket fire 
for the first time, on recently renamed Lake Champlain. They 
were easily and quickly routed, more because of the
psychological effect of the firepower than its actual damage.
The noise and smoke from the muskets were no doubt 
disorienting and the standard wooden armor was instantly 
outdated.13
If Champlain had travelled a few miles farther south to 
the confluence of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, he would have 
met fellow Europeans Hendrick Hudson and his crew sailing for 
the Dutch. Hudson and his mate Robert Juet were having their 
own cross-cultural experiences with the Mahicans, neighbors of 
the Mohawks to the east. The latter did not meet any Dutch 
newcomers face-to-face until the following Dutch visit in
13H.P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain. 6 
vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-1936) , Vol. 2, pp. 82- 
101.
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1614, but also did not succeed in becoming preferred trading 
partners with these entrepreneurs of the Hudson River area. 
The Mahicans became the primary trading partners of the men at 
the Castle Island outpost (at a site now in modern Albany, New 
York). The longhouse people, particularly the Mohawks, were 
obstructed from trading with both European powers recently 
established on nearby soil.
The Iroquois response was to continue raiding and 
blockading, so they turned the Ottawa River into a war zone by 
attacking Hurons or any other Indians who came down that river 
with peltries headed for the St. Lawrence. By 1615, Champlain 
and his allies again decided to humiliate the Iroquois and 
travelled south of the St. Lawrence along the eastern shore of 
Lake Ontario, attacking a large Onondaga, or possibly an 
Oneida, village. This was not as successful as the earlier 
ambushes of the Mohawks; the Iroquois had prepared and were 
able to withstand the assault. The psychological advantage 
which firearms had given Champlain and his allies a few years 
earlier had evaporated. These Indians were ready and forced 
the invaders to withdraw after only three hours of fighting. 
The advantage of guns was not so great after all. Champlain 
himself was wounded twice in one leg and had to be carried 
back to friendly territory.14 This victory for the Five 
Nations was a much needed boost after the unfortunate events
14Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain 3:63-77; 
Bruce G. Trigger, "Champlain Judged by his Indian Policy," 
Anthropoloaica XIII (1971), pp. 85-114.
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of 1614. In that: year, the Dutch returned to the Hudson River 
and established formal trade relations with the Mahicans. 
This Mahican monopoly was a great disadvantage to the Mohawks, 
who set about a policy of near-incessant hostilities against 
their eastern neighbors until in 1628 they finally drove them 
out of the Hudson River Valley into the Connecticut Valley.15 
Understandably, the Dutch were not happy with this outcome 
because they had supported the Mahicans against the Mohawks; 
they had to tread lightly around the latter for years to 
come.16
In 1624, the Five Nations enjoyed a short truce with the 
French and concentrated on developing trading ties with the 
Dutch. The latter offered goods which the French did not 
have, such as wampum, manufactured on Long Island and along 
Delaware Bay. Copper kettles, iron hatchets, hoes, and 
duffels (which were becoming standard sources of attire in 
Iroquoia) were important trade items at the Dutch post. That 
year the trading post became an outpost of permanent 
settlement as well when the first shipload of settlers sent by
15J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland. 
1609-1664 (New York: 1909), p. 89; Allen w. Trelease, Indian 
Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, 
N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 32, 47; Bruce G. 
Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624-28): The Establishment 
of a Pattern," Canadian Historical Review 52 (1971), pp. 276- 
286.
16Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, trans. and 
eds., A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country: The Journal of 
Harmen Mevndertsz Van den Bogaert (Syracuse, N.Y.; Syracuse 
University Press, 1988), pp. xvii-xviii.
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the West India Company arrived at Castle Island and renamed it 
Fort Orange, six years later, these strange newcomers began 
farming, although not with methods familiar to the Iroquois, 
on the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. This was a manor on 
which the owner, Nicholas van Rensselaer, installed tenant 
farmers. The people of this patroonship soon became involved 
in the Indian trade and much friction was to develop because 
of unfair trading practices and brutality to the Indians who 
did business with these people. Two particularly potent trade 
items which became important in the next few decades were guns 
and liquor. Technically these commodities, especially 
firearms, were not to be sold at all to Indians, but abuses 
and illegalities were rampant.17
At least officially, however, Dutch-Iroquois relations 
were friendlier because the Iroquois were able to trade with 
the Dutch unobstructed by other native groups. Nevertheless, 
Europeans saw the Iroquois as hostile because the policy of 
the Longhouse seemed to be one of sustained hostility toward 
all neighboring tribes from at least the 1610s on. Father 
Lafitau's observation made just after the turn of the 
eighteenth century could just as well have been made by a 
European observer a century earlier: "War is a necessary
exercise for the Iroquois, for, besides the usual motives 
which people have in declaring it against troublesome
17Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The
Seventeenth Century, pp. 93-97.
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neighbours..., it is indispensible to them also because of one 
of their fundamental laws of being."18 In the mid-eighteenth 
century Cadwallader Colden also remarked that "it is not for 
the Sake of Tribute...that they [the Iroquois] make War, but 
from the Notions of Glory, which they have ever most strongly 
imprinted on their Minds."19 Numerous Jesuits echoed these 
impressions in the Jesuit Relations throughout the seventeenth 
century; whether true or not, European newcomers perceived 
the Iroquois as the fiercest tribe on the continent.
In the 1630s the Five Nations abandoned their brief peace 
with the French and their native allies and once more 
assaulted all comers to the St. Lawrence.20 Trade patterns 
caused anxiety within the Iroquois confederacy as well; the 
Oneidas were angry at the Mohawks for monopolizing the Dutch 
connection. They wanted equal access to Fort Orange, despite 
the fact that the Mohawks were geographically in a position to 
dictate the upper tribes' access to the Dutch trading post. 
This was the underlying problem found by a Dutch barber- 
surgeon in 1634 who was sent into Iroquois territory by his 
colony to learn more about these tribes. Harmen Meyndertsz 
van den Bogaert found that the Oneidas (and probably the 
Onondagas as well, although he never visited them) had been
18Lafitau, Customs... 2:98-99.
19Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian 
Nations of Canada... 2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922,
reprinted from the London 1747 ed.), Vol. 1, p. xix.
20Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain 6:3-6.
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trading with the French before 1634 and had developed a 
habitual place of meeting with them downriver from Lake 
Ontario, in Onondaga country.21 The Mohawks could not have 
looked kindly on this arrangement but could do nothing to stop 
it, short of declaring war on fellow kinsmen of the League.22 
Despite the lack of documentation, this was probably a 
situation in which the League was a major force in keeping the 
longhouse alliance intact under great pressure. The Dutch did 
not encourage the upper Iroquois trade with the French, but it 
was ironically advantageous to the French that the Mohawks had 
eliminated their Mahican competition for the Dutch trade and 
were now controlling access to Fort Orange, even though the 
French were enemies of the Mohawks. It meant that the Mohawks 
would not allow any northern tribes such as the Algonquins, 
Montagnais, Hurons, or Ottawas (recent additions to the 
French-Indian alliance) to do business with the Netherlanders. 
The French trade had already reached a profitable level, with
10,000 to 12,000 pelts changing hands each year.23
In addition to his observations on trade, Van den Bogaert 
noticed the effects of devastating epidemics on the longhouse 
people. The early 1630s had brought much death, probably
21Gehring and Starna, eds., A Journey into Mohawk and 
Oneida Country, pp. 13, 19.
22Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York; The 
Seventeenth Century, p. 54.
^Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans," in 
Handbook of North American Indians 15:349-351.
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through smallpox, to the eastern Iroquois, as well as to the 
Hurons.24 By the early 1640s, the population of the Five 
Nations was halved by the diseases Europeans had unwittingly 
imported.25 This nightmare brought on a sense of spiritual 
crisis within all the tribes affected. For the Huron people 
the crisis was exacerbated or highlighted by the advent of 
Jesuit missionaries, who first entered Huronia in 1625 and 
opened permanent missions among them in 1634. The 
religious/cultural crisis which the death of so many people 
caused was aggravated by the simultaneous intrusion of the 
religious revolutionaries from France.26
No Jesuits visited the longhouse people this early, but 
the Ho-de-no-sau-nee went through their own traumas in dealing 
with the large loss of population, in addition to their 
political rifts over trade policy. Epidemics had brought the 
"mourning war" (war in which the deaths of kinsmen were 
avenged by replacing them with adopted captives) new meaning. 
The period of severe epidemics coincided with the era of 
massive Iroquois war against both traditional and recent
24Gehring and Starna, eds., A Journey into Mohawk and 
Oneida Country, pp. 4, 32; William A. Starna, "The Oneida 
Homeland in the Seventeenth Century," in Jack Campisi and 
Lawrence M. Hauptman, eds., The Oneida Indian Experience; Two 
Perspectives (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1988), p. 16.
^William A. Starna, "Mohawk Iroquois Populations: A
Revision," Ethnohistorv XXVII (1980), pp. 371-382; Richter, 
"The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 73.
26See Trigger, The Children of Aatentsic. Ch. 8.
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enemies. The sporadic attacks on Indians laden with furs for 
the French market gave way to comparatively large-scale 
warfare in which the Five Nations proceeded to try to 
annihilate, not just cripple, their enemies: the French, the 
Algonquins and Montagnais, the Hurons, Petuns (Tobacco 
People), Neutrals, Eries, Ottawas, Susquehannas, and others. 
For the first time in 1642, the Iroquois set about to 
completely destroy an entire village rather than just surprise 
it, take a few prisoners and some booty, and perhaps claim a 
few casualties on the way. Jesuit observers were shocked at 
the extent of hostilities: " a band of...Iroquois having
surprised one of our [Huron] frontier villages, spared neither 
sex, not even the children, and destroyed all by fire, except 
a score of persons.”27
This series of serious wars waged by the Iroquois have 
traditionally been called the "Beaver Wars" by historians and 
anthropologists because they believed the hostilities were 
economical motivated.28 Recently, however, it has been 
suggested that the wars were not motivated by the need for 
hunting territory for peltry procurement, nor by the desire to
27Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 86-87;Reuben 
Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 
73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901) (hereafter cited as 
JR) 24:271-273, 26:175 (quotation), 181.
28See George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroouois (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1940) ; Charles Howard Mcllwain, 
"Introduction," in Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian 
Affairs in the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles 
Howard Mcllwain (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint).
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take over the role of middleman between the French and remote 
Indian groups in the trade. Rather, they were the result of 
the loss of population from the epidemics and from the past 
few decades of warfare in which casualty rates had escalated. 
The Iroquois people needed to bolster their numbers, so they 
waged war, it is argued, in order to take captives for 
adoption into families by the matriarchs of each ohwachira. 
This vast increase in adoption, according to the new 
interpretation, caused additional social and political change. 
The position of women in politics and village events expanded 
in the first half of the seventeenth century because of their 
role in deciding whether to adopt captives, which had become 
an important occupation in Iroquois society.29
The Mohawks declared a truce with the French in 1645 amid 
the escalation of war with Indian groups. In the following 
year Jesuit Isaac Jogues ventured into Mohawk territory to 
confirm the armistice and to survey the possibilities of 
founding a mission among these belligerents. Unfortunately, 
he got himself involved in a Mohawk-Onondaga feud and, by 
insisting on visiting the more friendly Onondagas on his way
29JR 45:207; Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse," in 
Beyond the Covenant Chain, pp. 19-21; Snyderman, "Behind the 
Tree of Peace," pp. 17-19, 80; Colden, History of the Five 
Indian Nations 2:xix-xxi.
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back from his Mohawk trip, he incurred the wrath of the latter 
group and they killed him.30
The Mohawks then returned to a war footing with the 
French and joined other longhouse brethren, mainly the 
Senecas, in destroying whole nations of neighbors. The first 
nation to suffer this fate was the Huron, and the Senecas and 
Mohawks accomplished the annihilation in 1649-1650 largely out 
of defiance of the Onondaga attempts (motivated by hatred of 
the Mohawks) to establish an alliance with the Hurons in 1647 
and 1648.31 The destruction of Huronia probably involved 
more captive-taking (which provided numerous adoptees) than 
outright killing. The Huron nation was almost destroyed; the 
few refugees who had escaped with their missionaries took 
asylum at first on an island in Georgian Bay and later in a 
small settlement near Quebec City called Lorette. Other 
Hurons survived in large numbers to be adopted into Iroquois 
families so that they lost their identity as a separate 
people, but often constituted a sizeable faction (often pro-
30Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroouois. pp. 
182-183. The Onondagas were much more pro-French at this 
point than their eastern neighbors, and were leaning toward 
actual alliance with both the French and their Huron allies in 
the 1640s.
31Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroquois, p. 184? 
Trigger, The Children of Aatentsic. Volume 2.
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French and pro-Christian/Jesuit) in a number of Five Nations 
villages.32
The demolition of Huronia was followed in 1651 by the 
same fate for the Neutral Indians who lived southwest of Huron 
territory. The Petuns, or Tobacco People, also were 
eliminated and the survivors absorbed into Ho-de-no-sau-nee 
families as individuals. In 1655 came the end of the Erie 
people as a distinct group, two years after a large-scale 
attack on the Iroquois by the Ottawas, Nipissings, Sauteurs, 
and remnants of the Huron people. These Indian groups were 
fighting back against the massive hostility of the longhouse 
people. In 1653 the Onondagas had concluded a genuine peace 
with the French authorities, after which this tribe warned the 
French of a Mohawk attack —  an indication of seriously 
strained relations between these two brother tribes as well as 
the sincerity of the peace agreement. Jesuit missionaries 
came to Onondaga territory (what is now central New York 
State) following the rapprochement and established a mission 
complete with craftsmen near present-day Syracuse, New York in 
1656. Two years later, however, this along with fledgling 
establishments among the Oneidas had to be abandoned by the 
Black Robes because of overwhelming hostility from the
32JR 44:151; Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: 
Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642- 
1686," Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), pp. 1-16.
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Mohawks. Mohawk-Onondaga tensions ran high in the late 
1650s.33
Conflicts between member nations, hostilities with 
virtually all surrounding peoples, and on-going epidemics 
throughout the 1650s exhausted the Five Nations by 1660. Only 
two years later they were to suffer from an unprecendented 
smallpox epidemic, which wiped out a thousand people in one 
year alone.34 Fortunately, they were able to withstand this 
decimation of their population (which was about 10,000 to
11,000 in 1660)35 largely because of their policy of adopting 
conquered peoples. In 1668, fully two-thirds of the Oneida 
population were Algonquins and Hurons who had been captured in 
war.36 Other nations with which the Iroquois or various 
tribes of Iroquois had been in conflict since the 1650s were 
their eastern neighbors the Abenakis, the Sokokis, the 
Maliseets, and the Mahicans (again). These were mostly Mohawk 
conflicts. The Senecas had been busy with tribes to the west 
of Iroquoia, in the upper Great Lakes region and the Ohio
33JR 40:165, 44:149-151.
34Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans," 
Handbook of North American Indians 5:352; Starna in Campisi 
and Hauptman, eds., The Oneida Indian Experience, p. 16.
35Based on Jerome Lalement's estimate in 1660 of an 
Iroquois warrior population of 2,200. (CTR 45:207.) Fenton 
suggests a multiplication of five times from a warrior 
population to find the total population of Iroquois people. 
(In "Problems Arising..." in Tooker, ed., An Iroouois Source 
Book Vol 1, p. 233.)
36JR 51:123, also 43:265, 45:207, 51:187.
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Valley. The Susquehannas to the south had been a favorite 
target of all five longhouse tribes, although by 1655 this 
southern nation had made peace with the Mohawks and 
concentrated its efforts on the four upper tribes.
One of the reasons the Iroquois were able to carry on all 
of this military activity in addition to the conquest of other 
groups was their initial comparative advantage in weaponry; 
throughout the 1640s and 1650s they were more heavily armed 
than other Indian groups. But by the 1660s, other tribes were 
obtaining guns in greater numbers from the Dutch, French, or 
English, and the Iroquois technical advantage evaporated. 
Proof of the chink in Iroquois armor was the flight of Cayuga 
communities north of Lake Ontario in 1663, fleeing the 
depredations of the Susquehannas who were now armed with 
muskets. Also in that year the upper nations of the Ho-de-no- 
sau-nee wisely made a formal peace with New France, steered by 
Garakontie, the Onondaga diplomat. This policy was prudent 
because the French colony that year was taken over by the 
royal government (it had formerly been under the management of 
a company) and was now managed with an eye to its long-term 
welfare. The French government's main goal was to make the 
settlement along the St. Lawrence safe from Iroquois attack, 
and a crack regiment of government troops soon arrived to 
attempt to solve the Iroquois problem and to make the colony 
permanently stable. Government control of the colony meant 
much greater intervention, and the Five Nations could no
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longer afford to attack at will. Still defiant of the new 
regime in New France, however, were the Mohawks, who refused 
to make peace with the French in 1663-1664.
At the same time, a change of administration occurred in 
New Netherland along the Hudson River. The fledgling colony 
was taken over with the arrival of English ships in the harbor 
off Manhattan Island, and Dutch officials returned to their 
motherland, replaced by English administrators. But most of 
the Dutch settlers remained in the colony and watched it 
become a strategic part of the English empire in North America 
over the next few decades. Within two years, changes in the 
type of government of New Netherland (now New York) and New 
France signalled the shift from a primarily economic emphasis 
in colonial development and Indian diplomacy to a 
predominantly imperial frame of mind.37
Although the four upper nations sent representatives to 
Quebec to conclude peace talks in 1665 and even to talk 
optimistically of the possibility of inviting Frenchmen to 
live among them, the Mohawks remained unimpressed by the 
French. Instead they continued raiding French outposts and 
Algonquin bands and waited until Daniel de Remy de Courcelles 
arrived with six hundred French troops at Schenectady to react 
to French power. The Dutch community offered supplies to the 
French when they learned that the invaders had come to attack
37See Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710; The 
Dutch and English Experiences (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990).
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the Mohawks. Military confrontations between the French and 
the Mohawks continued through the first half of 1666, with no 
sign of Mohawk capitulation in sight (although some chiefs 
favored surrender). In September the sieur de Tracy arrived 
with reinforcements from the Carignan-Salieres regiment of 
almost one thousand troops to aid Courcelles' effort. Having 
heard of their approach, the Mohawks fled their villages and 
the French army satisfied itself with burning all the Mohawk 
villages and fields and destroying stockpiles of food.38
The June 1667 negotiations between the eastern Iroquois 
tribe and the French went smoothly. Having been humbled, the 
Mohawks agreed to all of Tracy's terms, which involved 
returning hostages and preparing to accept Jesuit missionaries 
among their people as soon as possible. Two decades of 
peaceful Iroquois-French . relations followed the 1667 
capitulation, but it was not a pax Irocruoia. The Five Nations 
now had to accept the shift in power relations which existed 
in the 1660s and after; the upper nations had merely acceded 
to it earlier, taking the path of least pain. The new era was 
to involve more direct contact —  both friendly and hostile —  
between the Iroquois and Europeans. Other tribal groups were 
no longer their main concern in external relations. The 
period after 1667 was to be that of the French peace and of 
growing English power adjacent to the longhouse people. Most 
immediately important, the path was now open for serious
38Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 122-125.
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Jesuit proselytizing of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee and for Iroquois 
Christian migration to the south shore of the St. Lawrence 
River.
The Jesuits had many zealous converts in the Oneida 
village in 1667, and Gandeaktena was one of these. Flushed 
with the spirit of the new religion brought by the Jesuit 
"Black Robes," she and a few others at Oneida decided to seize 
the opportunity to see the settlements from whence the Jesuits 
had come. Gandeaktena was ready to leave Iroquoia. She had 
not been b o m  among the Oneidas anyway, as had several of her 
companions on the winter 1667 trip. When the Iroquois had 
destroyed Gentagega, the main village of the Erie nation, in 
1655, they had spared many of their captives' lives, including 
hers. Adopted into the Oneida nation involuntarily, she now 
chose to be adopted by the Catholic Church and perhaps by the 
French colony.
Tensions between Christians and traditionalists at Oneida 
were rising and Father Jacques Bruyas agreed that the 
neophytes would be better able to pursue their prayers and 
devotions away from such hostility and temptation. Family 
members, clan members, had been growing apart from each other, 
at first calmly, as a whisper, but then much more 
vociferously, until insults escalated to stone-throwing. It 
looked as if the clans would disintegrate, with mothers and
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daughters, sisters and brothers, husbands and wives, wrenched 
apart by these disagreements.39
Although it was late 1667 and time for the first snow, 
the small group of Oneidas set out with Father Bruyas' 
assistant, Charles Boquet. If the travellers took the Lake 
Champlain route rather than the Lake Ontario route to New 
France, they would have passed by Mohawk villages on their way 
east. The Mohawks now had a population of about two thousand, 
half of what it had been thirty years earlier. They had 
barely rebuilt their longhouses, inside still charred skeletal 
palisades, since the fierce attack of the French the preceding 
year. The travellers then would have by-passed the confluence 
of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers to avoid the Dutch-English 
settlements of Schenectady, Albany, and their hinterland 
outposts and finally turned north toward the lakes named 
Saint-Sacrement and Champlain.40
Eventually, after many days of travel past the Adirondack 
Mountains, the travellers reached the plain, with its scrubby, 
squat trees. Montreal then lay only a few days' journey to 
the north and La Prairie was even closer. This aptly named 
stretch of plain lay directly in the path to Montreal, 
situated along the bend in the St. Lawrence River which seemed 
to curve in order to make room for the island of Mont Royal,
39See Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," Ch. 5.
40JR 51:147; Starna in Oneida Indian Experience, p. 20; 
Fenton, "Problems Arising..." in Tooker, ed., An Irocruois 
Source Book Vol. 1, p. 207.
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on which French men and women had settled in 1642. it was to 
be the western edge of French settlement for most of the 
seventeenth century.
On the south side of the great river at La Prairie, there 
had been as yet no white men or women willing to settle the 
land, for the French fear of the Mohawks had been an 
impediment to habitation until the military blow was struck 
from which the Mohawks were still reeling. But Father Bruyas 
and many of the other Black Robes who had been in Montreal in 
the summer of 1667 had known that Father Pierre Raffeix was 
going to examine La Prairie and its surrounding lands, which 
had been granted to the Jesuits decades earlier. The Jesuits' 
plan had been to provide a retirement place for their 
missionaries as well as a seigneury for French habitants 
(censitaires). But Father Raffeix also extended an invitation 
to Indian converts to stay on the south shore. Concessions on 
the seigneury were being parcelled out to the habitants. many 
of whom, soon to arrive, were ex-soldiers in the Carignan- 
Salieres regiment, fctmed for taming the Mohawks in 1666.41
In the winter of 1667-1668, the small group of Oneidas, 
having arrived with Charles Boquet safely to the St. Lawrence, 
wintered at La Prairie with Father Raffeix and a few French 
families who would soon settle down on farms. Just as Father
41JR 48:295, 50:215-217, 51:149, 167-169, 55:33-35;
Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la Nouvelle-France au 
XVIIe siecle d'aores beaucoup de documents ineditsr —  1 3
vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1895), Vol. 2, pp. 418-419.
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Bruyas had done at Oneida, Father Raffeix instructed the 
natives in the mysteries of Christianity and the priest, 
habitants, and Indians shared a hastily constructed shed 
through the months of snow and cold. These pioneers of the 
plow and the cross waited together for spring and its promise 
of warmer weather and the chance to start building their 
respective communities. This was the inauspicious beginning 
of the Iroquois mission which would later develop a few miles 
west at Kahnawake.42
42JR 63:151, 153. Some details of the 1667-1668 founding 
of the mission at La Prairie are unclear, as various Jesuit 
accounts (the only evidence available) contradict each other. 
This account is composed from the most trustworthy sources —  
those written most recently after the event —  and using only 
details which could be verified in at least two accounts.
Gandeaktena and some or all of her companions on the 
pilgrimage may have picked up interested Mohawks along the 
way, and may have gone to Quebec some time in the winter or 
early spring to be baptized, returning to La Prairie later. 
This could not be verified, however. It is difficult to 
separate myth from fact in the Jesuit accounts of the 1667 
founding. See also Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," 
pp. 179-180. Richter suggests that accounts of these events 
written in 1679 and in 1686, twelve and nineteen years after 
they took place, may have changed because of a tendency to 
exaggerate the zeal and saintly character of Gandeaktena, whom 
the Jesuits designated as the foundress of the mission 
community.
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CHAPTER TWO
"OFF TO LA PRAIRIE:"
LIFE AT THE NEW COMMUNITY
"Among the iroquois, this saying became a proverb, 'I am 
off to la prairie,' - that is to say, 'I give up drink and 
polygamy.'"1 So Father Claude Chauchetiere, the Jesuit 
superior, explained the massive exodus of Five Nations people 
from their homeland to the Christian community in New France. 
But what had become a flood by the time Chauchetiere commented 
on it in 1686 started nineteen years earlier as a small 
trickle with Gandeaktena and her group of a dozen or so, and 
did not increase significantly until the 1670s. Only a 
handful of converts appeared each year after the initial group 
had arrived at Father Pierre Raffeix's threshold, but they 
were zealous. The Jesuits who planned the new settlement as 
a vacation spot and retirement home for missionaries began to 
see that there might be another use for this outpost 
development. The French in general would come to like the 
idea of an Indian village at this place, nearer than any other 
French soil in North America to their potential and real 
enemies.2 The Indian community could serve as a buffer 
protecting the Montreal region from neighboring belligerents,
1Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 
63:167. (Hereafter cited as JR.)
2Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and General 
Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and 
trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872), Vol. 3, p. 164. Later 
on, the French court thought this Indian reserve advantageous 
for imperial reasons. (Vol. 3, p. 193.)
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either Indian or white.
As early as 1668, Father Raffeix was given official 
charge of the fledgling group of Indians at La Prairie, and he 
reported that pilgrims who came in these early years were 
baptized as soon as possible.3 Children and adults on their 
deathbed were also baptized.4 These first few years were not 
only a sort of utopian religious experience for the neophytes, 
but also an experiment in cross-cultural living. Since 
Indians and French combined numbered fewer than a hundred and 
accommodations were scant, close quarters were inescapable and 
cooperation necessary.5 With only one building in 1667-68, 
everyone stayed under one roof. It was not until 1669 that 
Pierre Tonsahoten, Gandeaktena's husband (who took the 
baptismal name Frangois-Xavier) built a house, and began the 
separation of the two communities. The following year, a 
makeshift chapel was built to serve the entire community, and 
the placing of individual dwelling buildings was determined by 
the central location of this chapel: Indians built longhouses 
on one side, and French built European-style houses on the
3There was no mention of extensive catechetical 
preparation in these accounts; emphasis was placed on the 
haste with which these inductions into the religion were made.
4JR 63:155, 51:145. By 1675, however, criteria for 
baptism were much more stringent. Two to three years of 
catechism were necessary before baptism, according to Father 
Fremin, who was at La Prairie in the mid-1670s. JR 59:259.
5JR 55:33.
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other.6 In 1672 the little church was divided into two
sections, one for the French and one for the Indians. 
Chauchetiere, who reported this change, did not explain why it 
was done. He only disclaimed any problem between the two 
groups by saying that the church was separated "although the 
french and savages all acted as one body, as was seen in the 
public rejoicings, and in the visits and the little services 
that they rendered one another."7 It is unclear whether the 
practice of separating worship facilities for French and for 
Indians was a Jesuit policy, or the result of pressure tactics 
by the French or the Indians at La Prairie. And linguistic 
considerations may have been involved in the decision. The 
Jesuits had long believed in segregating their Indian converts 
from French settlers in New France, but this has always been 
seen as an attempt to shelter Indians from the negative 
influences of Europeans, especially from their eau-de-vie. It 
may have been the reason for an early separation in the chapel 
of Indians and whites.8
^enri Bechard, The Original Caughnawaga Indians 
(Montreal: International Publishers, 1976), p. 81.
7Later in the same Relation. Chauchetiere revealed 
evidence of a segregationist policy: the Indians "formerly 
held mass, or rather were merely present at mass and at 
vespers, which were sung by the french; but now they do 
everything themselves in their chapel." JR 63:209. (1679) See 
also E. J. Devine, Historic Caughnawaga (Montreal: Messenger 
Press, 1922), p. 43.
8Already in 1672, some French settlers at La Prairie were 
attempting to profit from a ready-made and growing market 
among Indians for brandy. The Jesuits there frowned on the 
establishment of taverns so close to the Indian utopian
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In addition to the complications of interracial 
relations, the native community itself was a mosaic of ethnic 
origins. Oneidas and some Mohawks from the lower Mohawk town 
were the first arrivals, but even they were more ethnically 
diverse than they appeared. Many were captives who had been 
adopted into Iroquois families after wars of conquest over the 
Hurons, Eries, Neutrals, Petuns, Susquehannas, Ottawas, 
Montagnais, Algonquins, Nipissings, Mahicans, Abenakis, and 
other peoples. Thus the Jesuits noticed right away that the 
mission contained a mixture of over twenty tribal groups.9 
Some Iroquois people came to La Prairie not from their native 
land at the instigation of Jesuit missionaries there, but from 
the Ottawa River where some Iroquois had moved to hunt. In 
1669 many of these Ottawa River hunters heard of the new 
community and came to find out what it was like. They stayed 
and converted to Christianity and in turn went out on hunting 
trips with the added motive of meeting non-Christian hunters
community. JR 63:175. The French habitant population was 
growing each year; by 1668, forty concessions had been 
parcelled out on the Jesuit tract of land at La Prairie. JR 
51:149. On Jesuit segregationist policy, see James L. Axtell, 
The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures on Colonial North 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) Ch. 4, and 
John Webster Grant, Moon of Wintertime: Missionaries and the 
Indians of Canada in Encounter Since 1534 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1984), Ch. 2-3.
9JR 58:75, 57:73, 55:35, Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs 
of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive 
Times ed. and trans. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, 2 
vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77), l:xxxi.
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and convincing them to come to the mission south of 
Montreal.10
The early years at La Prairie were known for the extreme 
devotion practiced by native zealots. Hunting trips were not 
a chance to escape from the liturgical and devotional rigor of 
the chapel; prayers were said on the trail, and daily mass was 
still celebrated whenever possible. The women were known for 
their piety, for saying prayers and devotional exercises in 
the woods.11 Some women formed the nucleus of a society for 
the particularly devout led by Father Philippe Pierson. The 
purpose of this society was spiritual guidance of others, the 
promotion of piety among each other, and works of charity done 
in the community. The Confraternity of the Holy Family became 
a large organization, whose membership grew over the 
decades.12 The mission Iroquois sent at least one of its 
daughters to Montreal to become a nun.13 Prayers and psalms 
were patiently memorized by the neophytes - Jesuit
10JR 63:159, 58:249; F. de Montezon and F. Martin, eds., 
Relations inedites de la Nouvelle-France 2 vols. (Paris, 1861) 
1:185.
11Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change 
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984), 
pp. 171-172, 190.
12Confrerie de la Sainte Famille du Sault St. Louis, in 
Caughnawaga parish registers, Vol. 2. (Archives de Quebec a 
Montreal). Membership lists of this group attest to the 
mixing of cultural identity; names such as Marguerite 
Tiia8eton (first name Christian, last name Iroquois) are the 
norm.
13JR 62:179.
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catechetical techniques did not include teaching Indians to 
read and write. Pictures and mnemonic devices such as 
rosaries were ideal tools for teaching by rote, and music was 
also important. The atmosphere was that of a "religious 
hothouse.1,14 In the village, each day was defined by the 
observance of religious exercises; prayers were said in the 
chapel at morning and at night, as well as in each longhouse 
by individual families, and mass was said daily in the chapel. 
Several catechism classes for adults were held every day, as 
well as religious instruction for children. Even a Jesuit 
priest judged the rigors of everyday religious life at La 
Prairie to have been excessive.15
In 1670, after only three years, there were eighteen to 
twenty Indian families at La Prairie, and Father Claude Dablon 
realized that the mission was a great success even without 
much effort by the Jesuits. He spoke of the "throng" of 
Indians at La Prairie and the great demand for priests who
14JR 55:35, 63:175, 231, 58:77-83; William Ingraham Kip, 
trans. and comp, The Early Jesuit Missions in North America 
(New York: 1847), p. 107; Axtell, Invasion Within, pp. 120, 
124-127; Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada: 
Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.), 5:49v
(hereafter cited as C11A); Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, 
Journal of a Vovaae to North-America 2 vols. (Reprinted from 
the London 1761 edition: Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 
1966), 1:269-272; Grant, Moon of Wintertime, p. 59 (quote); 
John G. Shea, History of the Catholic Missions Among the 
Indian Tribes of the United States. 1529-1854 (New York: P.J. 
Kennedy, 1854), p. 300.
1SJR 55:35; Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la 
Nouvelle-France au XVIIe siecle d'apres beaucoup de documents
inedits r 1. 3 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1895), Vol.
3, p. 379.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
could speak Iroquois languages and say mass for the neophytes. 
But he also recognized that some may have been "attracted by 
the beauty and advantages of the site [as well as] by the 
facilities for receiving the instruction necessary for their 
salvation."16 Another Black Robe admitted in 1674 that La 
Prairie was strategically located, "a real crossroads - hardly 
a band of Indians stops at it without some of them being 
induced to stay." Within fifteen months in 1673 and 1674, the 
mission welcomed more than 180 newcomers.17 But not all of 
them could have come expressly to live in a Christian 
community. Father Fremin, now residing at the mission, 
explained in 1672 that "upon the arrival of a stranger, the 
first thing our Indians do is to instruct him, and urge him to 
ask for Baptism." If an Indian had come with conversion in 
mind, she or he would not need to be convinced of the need for 
baptism. Fremin also said that "all Indians who come here, 
either to dwell or to visit their friends, resolve to become 
Christians, or pretend to be such, well knowing that otherwise 
they would not be welcome."18
The La Prairie Jesuits had some help from their 
colleagues in the Mohawk Valley and in other missions across 
Iroquoia. Father Jean De Lamberville wrote from La Prairie in 
1673 of "the coming of nearly Fifty persons, who started from
16JR 55:35.
17JR 58:249.
16JR 56:21.
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a single Iroquois village on The faith of a promise given Them 
by Father Bruyas, on behalf of monsieur de Courcel and 
Monsieur Talon,19 that They would be in want of nothing when 
they should have reached here,11 and marvelled that "The mere 
promise to take care of them here upon Their arrival has had 
such an effect upon Them." Lamberville attributed the 
swelling ranks of Indians at La Prairie in 1673 to "The 
prayers of good people, And the slight assistance which we 
lead Them to hope for."20 This "slight assistance" may have 
been as powerful a motivator as the lure of the gospel. The 
Jesuits at La Prairie provided food and clothing on arrival at 
the Mission of Saint-Frangois-Xavier-des-Pres (the official 
name of the mission) and also provided land and housing for 
newcomers so that within a year or two they were able to 
provide for themselves. La Prairie was also closer to 
bountiful hunting and trapping areas than most localities in 
Iroquoia had been. Clearly, religion was only one motivation 
for moving.21
19The governor and intendant of New France respectively.
20JR 57:71.
21See also the comments of Father Lamberville in JR 57:71. 
Later Jesuit clerics writing about Jesuit missions admitted 
that there were always ulterior motives for converting to 
Christianity. (See Father Nicolas Lancilloto's comments in 
Manfred Barthel, The Jesuits: History and Legend of the 
Society of Jesus. trans. and adapted by Mark Howson (New 
York: William Morrow, 1984), p. 178; John G. Shea, "The 
Jesuits, Recollects, and the Indians," in Justin Winsor, ed., 
Narrative and Critical History of America 8 vols. (Boston, 
1884-1889), Vol. 4, p. 285.)
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Another was freedom from the drunkenness which plagued 
the Five Nations. Frangois Dollier de Casson and Rene de 
Brehant de Galinee noticed in 1669 that whenever a cask of 
liquor arrived at an Iroquois village from some Dutch source, 
domestic disasters such as murder followed.22 Indeed, by the 
1670s, alcohol abuse was the premier social problem of the 
longhouse people.23 Since it was well known to the Five 
Nations people that the Jesuits frowned severely on the use of 
alcohol by Indians, they could be fairly sure that the 
community of the devout would be dry. Indeed, some testified 
to viewing the mission as a detoxification center. A 
contemporary commented that this was "so well known that when 
any one says, "I have made up my mind to go and settle at 
Saint Xavier des Praiz," it is as if he said, "I have resolved 
never to get drunk again."24 Kryn, or "The Great Mohawk" as 
the English knew him, was a chief who was converted by his 
wife and brought forty people with him to La Prairie in 1673. 
He later told some New York provincial officials that one of 
the reasons many Iroquois left their homeland for the New
22James H. Coyne, ed. and trans., "Exploration of the 
Great Lakes, 1660-1670, by Dollier de Casson and Brehant de 
Galinee," Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records IV 
(1903), p. 29.
^Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian 
Nationsr...1 2 vols. (Reprinted from the London 1747 edition, 
New York: Allerton, 1922), Vol. 1, p. xl.
24JR 55:37.
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France reserve was the policy of temperance practiced 
there.25
This policy was self-enforced, not imposed by the 
Jesuits. When, in 1671, there were enough Indians at the 
Jesuit outpost of La Prairie that it was decided to make the 
settlement permanent, the Indians set about governing 
themselves, using a mechanism of appointing chiefs based on 
the political tradition of their homeland. Of the two chiefs 
elected in 1671, one was delegated to deliberate over matters 
of war and community sovereignty, and the other was to watch 
over Christian practice and behavior. This included some 
general social guidelines such as abstinence from alcohol, the 
prohibition of divorce and of traditional religious practices 
such as dream observance and healing rituals. The community 
decided that no one would be permitted to live there without 
promising to abstain from all of these, as well as without 
promising to seek the Christian god and baptism in the 
Catholic Church.26 To anyone who had been terrified by the 
social consequences of alcohol in Iroquoia, La Prairie offered
25Edmund B. O’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: 
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887) (hereafter cited as NYCD), Vol. 
3, p. 436. Sept. 1 1687. New York: Examination of
Adandidaghkoa. Kryn contributed to the flood of migrants from 
Iroquoia to the south shore of the St. Lawrence. In less than 
two years (1672-73) two hundred souls were added to the 
population of the reserve. In 1673, in less than seven years 
since the mission had first begun, there were more Mohawk 
warriors at La Prairie than in their own country. (JR 63:179.)
26JR 55:37, 63:163, 60:145-147, 58:75; Shea, History of 
the Catholic Missions, p. 300.
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a safe haven from the drunken rages which resulted in flashing 
knives or smashed heads.27 Father Vincent Bigot admitted 
that many Iroquois came to the St.-Frangois-Xavier-des-Pres 
mission because there was no drinking there. However, such an 
admission was probably unselfconscious because seventeenth- 
century Jesuits saw an Indian's decision to abstain from 
liquor as a sign of Christian conversion. The two issues were 
inextricably related in the missionary mind.28
Indeed, Jesuits used the degree of temperance at an 
Indian reserve as a yardstick of piety. One lamented in 1673 
that alcohol had ruined the Sillery community (no doubt 
because of the close proximity to whites who sold liquor to 
Indians) but not the La Prairie Iroquois.29 Father Fremin 
boasted in the preceeding year that "since I have been here, 
there has not come into their cabins, so far as I know, a 
single drop of the liquor which causes so many disturbances 
among the Indians." He was also proud of their will power in 
the face of temptation: "For more than three weeks the people 
here have had a dramshop at their very doors, but not a man
27 JR 56:21, 57:73; NYCD 3:436. The mission community may 
generally have been much more stable socially than Five 
Nations villages in the homeland, in which traditional social 
norms seemed to be breaking down. (Richter, "The Ordeal of 
the Longhouse," p. 196.)
28 JR 61:239-241. See also 63:131, 175, and Cornelius 
Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural 
Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 110-116.
29JR 58:83.
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has thought of setting foot inside it," a not inconsiderable 
feat, given that, according to Fremin, fifty or sixty of these 
teetotalers had once been hard drinkers.30 However, three 
weeks was not a very long time to have gone dry to prove one's 
long-term abstinence. The habitants of La Prairie did not 
help; it was they who set up dramshops under the Indians1 
noses. The chapel segregation may indeed have been initiated 
in order to minimize contact between thirsty Indians and 
peddlers of liquor. La Prairie whites wanted a tavern by the 
mid-1670s, by which time their numbers would have supported a 
public meeting place. But the Jesuits had succeeded 
temporarily in convincing the current governor, Count 
Frontenac, to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor 
at La Prairie. But this only lasted two or three years. 
Since Frontenac despised Jesuits on principle and conspired 
against them with the Recollects and Sulpicians, his 
protection against the traffic of alcohol was short-lived.31 
Shortly after repeal of the ordinance, a tavern was opened in 
the village of La Prairie. This situation may have been a 
reason for the Jesuit decision to move their Iroquois mission
30JR 56:19-21.
310n Frontenac versus the Jesuits, see Jean DeLanglez, 
Frontenac and the Jesuits (Chicago: 1939), pp. 20, 129-133; 
Henry Horace Walsh, The Church in the French era from 
Colonisation to the British Conquest (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 
1966), pp. 144-165. Also, Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la 
Nouvelle-France au XVIIe siecle d'apres beaucoup de documents 
inedits r.. . 1 3:389-391; Charlevoix, History. 3:192-193.
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in 1676, although the ostensible cause was soil exhaustion.32 
Father Chauchetiere gleefully reported that Father Fremin 
stopped the brandy traffic at La Prairie from ruining his 
charges at the mission, but less than a decade later liquor 
had become a severe problem at the Saint-Frangois-Xavier 
mission, even after moving the site to the west away from the 
growing white population of the south shore.33 At the new 
village, a Frenchman offered his services as a gun repairman 
for the mission Indians. In 1679 they gave him a corner of a 
longhouse in which to set up his workspace and equipment. He 
also set up a store in this space, in which he planned to deal 
in brandy as well as more benign commodities. Alarmed at this 
situation in the midst of the village, the missionaries 
succeeded in petitioning Intendant Jacques Duchesneau to order 
the man to leave after only one winter.34
32JR 63: 175, 181; Charlevoix, Journal 1:219. In
Montezon, Relations inedits... 2:167, Father Claude Dablon 
reported that the soil was bad, that the Indians had been 
complaining about it. However, in 1670-71, he had seemed 
unqualifiedly optimistic about the soil, saying it was 
wonderful and highly productive. (JR 55:33.) The claim was 
that it was too damp, but that would have been obvious enough 
by 1671. In 1673, the La Prairie Indians had saved up two 
years' worth of corn. (JR 58:81.) Therefore, poor crop yield 
because of the soil could not have been a reason for moving 
only three years later.
33JR 63:181, 62:183.
34JR 63:215. Similar enterprises by local whites were 
initiated in New York; farmers sold liquor, among other goods, 
to Indians, because it was a lucrative venture compared to 
most in the limited colonial economy. These whites pursued 
such trade without thought of the consequences in terms of 
inebriated Indians wreaking havoc on neighboring communities. 
(See Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York.
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Political problems plagued the Indians of La Prairie 
during the 1676 move. These involved the various blocs of 
ethnic groups within the community. The early immigrants were 
mainly Oneidas. some Mohawks, and a few Onondagas, but with 
the coming of Kryn, the high-profile Mohawk headman, in 1673, 
many more Mohawks than any other group started migrating 
north. Another reason that so many Mohawks moved was that the 
Christian/anti-Christian factionalism and violence was much 
worse among the Mohawks in Iroquoia than among tribes farther 
west. Soon the Mohawks and the Onondagas were the two largest 
ethnic groups, while the Hurons, most of whom had been 
captives among the Iroquois, constituted a third. These 
Hurons were able to stand as a separate group, and they seemed 
to find they had little in common with the Ho-de-no-sau-nee 
politically.
When chiefs were first elected or appointed35 in 1671, 
the Hurons elected one and the Mohawks and Oneidas the other. 
By 1676, the Mohawks, Onondagas, and Hurons each chose their 
own chief. But during the deliberations in that year for 
chief selection, the Hurons stalled, refused to decide on a 
candidate, and finally announced that they were leaving the 
Jesuit mission. They were negotiating with the Sulpicians to 
set up a new reserve at the foot of Mount Royal on Montreal
1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p. 
69.)
35It is unclear exactly how these chiefs were chosen.
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Island.36 Clues as to the nature of the dispute lie in 
Father Pierre Cholenec's letter in the Relation of 1676-77 in 
which he stated that bad feelings existed between the Huron 
captain and the other captains, or chiefs, of the original 
mission. Cholenec hinted that the Huron chief had once been 
preeminent but had lately failed to gain the respect and 
deference of the other chiefs.37 There had been little love 
lost between the Huron people and the Black Robes since the 
latter failed to defend their native refugees in the 1650s at
36JR 63:181 This mission was known as the Mission of the 
Mountain, and was moved to the other side of the town of 
Montreal at the Sault au Recollet in the 1680s. Finally in 
1717, the village moved again, incorporating some other Indian 
groups such as a refugee group of Nipissing Indians, to Lake 
of Two Mountains on the northwest side of Montreal. The 
mission was then also known as Kahnesetake, Oka, or "the 
Mountain mission." (See Olivier Maurault, "Les Vicissitudes 
d'une mission sauvage," Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne XVI 
(1930), pp. 121-149; and William Fenton and Elisabeth Tooker, 
"Mohawk" in William C. Sturtevant gen. ed., Handbook of North 
American Indians Vol. 15 Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger 
(Washington, D.C.: 1978), p. 472; William Henry Atherton, 
Montreal. 1535-1914 2 vols. (Montreal: S.J. Clarke, 1914), 
Vol. 1, p. 267; E.R. Adair, "The Evolution of Montreal Under 
the French Regime," Canadian Historical Association Annual 
Report XXIII (March 1942), p. 37.) Some convert/refugees from 
Iroquoia were to come to this Sulpician mission after it 
opened, and some went to the (predominantly Huron) Jesuit 
mission at Lorette near Quebec. The St.-Frangois-Xavier 
mission was only one of several possible destinations for 
Iroquois migrants. This makes Iroquois depopulation even more 
striking; not just one but several missions were being 
populated at the expense of the homeland population in the 
late seventeenth century. (Richter, "The Ordeal of the
Longhouse," pp. 183-188.)
37JR 60:277-287.
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lie d'Orleans near Quebec from being abducted by the 
Iroquois.38
A modern Jesuit historian of the Kahnawakes claims that 
the real bone of contention may have been a dispute over the 
allocation of space at the new site for the St.-Frangois- 
Xavier mission one and a half leagues west cf La Prairie. 
(The new site was near the Sault Saint-Louis (St. Louis 
rapids) about ten miles up the St. Lawrence River from 
Montreal.) The Huron Indians apparently were not given enough 
arable land at the new site to grow their maize.39 The 
separation was a painful one and not all Hurons joined the 
dissenting group; some of them remained among the Iroquois 
Christians. At the new site at the Sault, there were twenty- 
two longhouses, some of them inhabited by Iroquois and some by 
Hurons. There was still one Huron chief at Sault Saint-Louis 
as well. The old community attempted to mend fences and 
invited the splinter group's chief to a feast in his honor.40
The Indians now at Sault Saint-Louis were having their
38Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History 
of the Huron People to 1660 2 vols. (Montreal; McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1976) pp. 806-814.
39Bechard, Original Caughnawaga Indians, p. 51. He cites 
Discours Des Hurons qui demandent des terres dans l1Isle de 
Montreal ou ils Demandent que l'on ne leur traitte point De 
Boissons, 1676. Photostat of an early copy of the original 
document in Huron and French. Archives du Seminaire de 
Quebec. The title of this document indicates that the old 
problem of the liquor traffic was a sore point among the 
Hurons as well.
40JR 60:277, 287.
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own problems at the new location. They had difficulties 
getting title to their new site from their old adversary, 
Governor Frontenac. The intendant, Duchesneau, finally went 
over Frontenac's head and appealed to the king for the grant 
of land, but not before the governor threatened the Jesuits 
and Indians at the Sault with imprisonment for occupying lands 
illegally.41 Moreover, the Jesuits' accommodations in the 
first few years at the Sault were meagre. The superior of the 
mission had to sleep in a corner of the small bark hut which 
served as a makeshift chapel. Yet Frontenac tried to prevent 
them from building a substantial church of stone. Although he 
did not succeed, his constant hounding, combined with the 
attacks of Five Nations people on their c o m  stores to try to 
starve them out, must have given a sense of siege to the 
community of Indians.42 An outbreak of smallpox in 1678 and 
a severe storm two years later in which lightning struck the 
chapel did little to dispel this feeling.43 However, the 
pens of the Jesuit Relations continued to report in glowing 
terms the piety of the converts at the Mission of Saint-
41C11A 5 : 2 1 4 v ;  Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F5A 
(Missions Religieuses, 1639-1782, 3 vols.) 2:12? JR 63:195; 
Charlevoix, History 3:192; Delanglez, Frontenac and the 
Jesuits, p. 32. See also William J. Eccles, Frontenac. The 
Courtier Governor. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959) , p. 
57. Frontenac may not have been wrong here; the Jesuits had 
retained title to La Prairie de la Madeleine, despite the rule 
that when Indians abandoned a mission site the title to the 
land should revert to the Crown.
42JR 63:191-195.
43JR 63:205, 219.
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Fran<?ois-Xavier-du-Sault. People were instructed daily by 
their own doaioues. or lay spiritual leaders, instead of 
always by Jesuits. The latter claimed this as an enlightened 
policy of cultural relativism; dogicrues could be trusted to 
teach each other.
A Mohawk woman later noted as being particularly devout 
and capable of miracles, Kateri Tekakwitha, had emigrated to 
the mission in 1677. Well-known among Indians and whites 
alike, she took a pledge of lifelong chastity setting an 
example which many young women at the Sault followed. Kateri 
also practiced extreme forms of penance, including the wearing 
of sharp iron bands around her body, fasting for long periods, 
and flagellating herself with leather rods. Although the 
Black Robes at the reserve frowned on these excessive 
penitential practices, they were encouraged by her piety and 
used her example to spur on the religious devotion of her 
neighbors.44 When Kateri died in 1680, her death spurred on 
a religious revival among the mission Iroquois. Father 
Chaumonot reported in the following year that "the fair mirror
44JR 62:175-179. (Kateri Tekakwitha has recently been 
beatified and her canonization is being petitioned. See 
Claude Chauchetiere, La vie de la b. Catherine Teqakouita... 
(New York: 1887); Nicolas-Victor Burtin, Vie de Catherine 
Tekakwitha. vierqe iroouoise decedee en odeur de saintete a 
l'ancien village—  (Quebec: 1894); Ellen Hardin Walworth, 
The life and times of Kateri Tekakwitha. the Lilv of the 
Mohawks. 1656-1680 (Albany, N.Y.: 1929); F.X. Weiser, Kateri 
Tekakwitha (Montreal: 1971); Beatifications et canonizations 
servae Dei Catharine Tekakwitha virqinis Indianae f168Of 
(Publication of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, Historical 
Section, No. 38, Vatican City, 1938).)
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of chastity is so clean at the Sault that people there cannot 
endure the least spot on it."45 A few years later, Bishop 
St. Vallier visited the Indians of the Sault and remarked that 
"the lives of all the Christians of this mission are very 
extraordinary, and the whole village would be taken for a 
monastery."46 But by "all the Christians," St. Vallier may 
not have meant all of the inhabitants; this may have been a 
way to avoid mentioning that not all Sault Indians were model 
Christians. The early historian of New France, Pierre 
Charlevoix, himself a Jesuit, indicated that there was cause 
to doubt the piety and good behavior of at least some of the 
mission Iroquois.47
In the first few years of every mission there is a 
"honeymoon" period, and certainly La Prairie had one; the true 
belief of the first few pilgrims such as Gandeaktena is 
unquestionable. Jesuit analogies to the early Christians and 
the primitive church were undoubtedly apt in 1669.48 This 
pattern mirrored Father Paul Le Jeune's glowing reports of the
45JR 63:227.
^Charlevoix, Journal 1:272.
47Charlevoix, History 4:198. (He implied that the 
behavior of some at the mission differed little from that of 
non-Christians in Iroquoia.)
48JR 58:77, 87-89. Even the stories of later "martyrs" 
(of the 1680s and 1690s) among the Sault Iroquois are not 
questioned, only that these people were representative, or 
that all Sault Indians had the same motivation for living at 
the mission. For some later martyr accounts see Kip, trans. 
and comp., The Earlv Jesuit Missions in North America, p. 120- 
131.
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early years of Sillery; he could report in 1638 that that 
reserve was such a utopia that there had been as yet no 
disputes of any kind among the Indian converts. (This was 
taken as a sign that they were all true Christian believers.) 
But as James Ronda points out, Sillery's fall from grace was 
not far off, and by 1663, the mission had entirely fizzled 
out, the land occupied by French farmers.49 Christian 
Indians were never a majority at Sillery; in 1646, the Jesuits 
counted 120 Christians there, but the number of non-baptized 
natives went discreetly unrecorded.50 The same approach can 
be seen in reports on the Sault Indians in the Relations. 
Father Cholenec announced that "all the neophytes belonging to 
[this Mission], with the exception of two or three small 
bands, had assembled in the village [for a Christian 
festival]."51 The number involved in the two or three small 
bands is unknown. The public relations value of this report 
was high, since the Relations was a serial publication in 
France put out by the Jesuits, one of whose purposes was to 
solicit financial donations for their mission work. Cholenec 
made the statement in such a way that it was technically true 
but actually misleading, giving the impression that the 
neophytes were the vast majority of the community when there
49James P. Ronda, "The Sillery Experiment: A Jesuit-Indian 
Village in New France, 1637-1663," American Indian Culture and 
Research Journal III (1979), p. 5.
50Ronda, "The Sillery Experiment," pp. 8-11.
51 JR 61:63.
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is no evidence for such a claim.52 A report in the same 
volume of the Relations of a Sault Indian delegation which 
went to proselytize in the Mohawk Valley was similarly sly; 
the effort was judged to be highly successful in that the 
preachers "changed the aspect of our little church" in Mohawk 
country. Nothing was said of numbers converted.53
Daniel Richter has studied the Jesuit missions to the 
Iroquois and found that there was an unmistakable link between 
peace negotiations following an Iroquois defeat at French 
hands and the desire of longhouse people for Jesuits to come 
to their communities. One party's missionary could be 
another's hostage; the Five Nations may have wanted Black 
Robes in their villages as a safeguard against any ill 
treatment of Iroquois people in New France.54 Moreover, 
success in warfare bred confidence in one's own cultural 
values; the Iroquois may have shunned European religion as 
long as they were winning battles but wondered if the gods 
were really with them, or if theirs were the right gods, when 
defeated. It may be no coincidence that it was the Mohawk 
tribe alone which was humiliated by the Carignan-Salieres
52See Richter's calculations (in "The Ordeal of the 
Longhouse," pp. 165-167). He concludes that only twenty 
percent of the League Iroquois could have been sincere 
converts to Christianity.
53JR 61:65.
54Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit 
Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686," 
Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), p. 4.
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regiment in 1666-67, and also had a much greater proportion of 
its people swayed by the Jesuits than any other of the Five 
Nations.55 In the early to mid-1670s, the Black Robes in 
Iroquoia were encouraging tribesmen and women who had 
converted to leave their homeland for the reserve because of 
violence from the traditionalist faction among their people. 
The more people the Jesuits sent north, the more encouraging 
the success of their missions appeared.
The Jesuits had retreated from the optimism of earlier 
days; they were worried that the fragile conversion of many 
Indians would easily be eroded in the face of traditional and 
non-Christian influences in Mohawk villages, whereas at the 
mission by the St. Lawrence the prevailing influence would be 
Christian and the temptation to backslide into "sin" and 
"heathenism" would be minimized. Gone were the days when the 
Jesuits believed that their converts could in turn save the 
rest of their kinsmen and neighbors from evil; they now 
considered their new Catholics as likely to regress 
themselves. The Jesuit order was weary from their heroic 
battles of the first half of the seventeenth century; they
55Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois," pp. 6-11, and 
Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 158-160. The 
proportion of Mohawks among the mission Iroquois became so 
great that the Sault St.-Louis Indians were often referred to 
as the "praying Mohawks," or the "French Mohawks," (see for 
example, NYCD 3:437) and Mohawk quickly became the dominant 
language of the community.
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lowered their expectations accordingly.56
The most disheartening aspect of the Black Robes' battle 
was their struggle against alcohol. Despite Bishop St. 
Vallier's glowing praise of the Sault mission in 1688, other 
evidence suggests cracks in the armor of piety and sobriety. 
A letter to the government of New France on the negative 
effects of alcohol indicated a need to "end the disorder which
is going on among the Coch[nawagas], other people of _____
[illegible] at the door of the churches during divine 
services, which scandalize foreigners."57 Alexandre Berthier 
and Pierre de Sorel, two seigneurs, made dishonorable mention 
of the mission Iroquois in the consultative assembly of 
notables on the question of brandy trafficking of 1678.58 
Some time in the 1680s an Indian from the Sault named 
Tegaraoueron became drunk at Lachine (the small town directly 
across the St. Lawrence from Sault St.-Louis), raped a small
56Charlevoix Journal 1:269-270; Richter, "Iroquois versus 
Iroquois," p. 11.
57Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F3 (Collection 
Moreau de Saint-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.) 2:274v Letter on 
the subject of the negative effects of alcohol. (Anonymous) 
"Cochnawagas" referred to the Sault St.-Louis Indians; the 
Mohawk name by which these people called themselves 
(originally, the name they gave to the place by the rapids to 
which they moved in 1676) was Kahnawake, Caughnawaga, and a 
host of other spellings of the same. This name was taken from 
the name of a Mohawk village site built after the 1667 
demolition of the Mohawk towns by Tracy and the French troops.
58W.B. Munro, "The Brandy Parliament of 1678," Canadian 
Historical Review II (1921), pp. 174-175. The liquor traffic 
to Indians had become such a social problem by the 1670s that 
a special assembly was held in Quebec to discuss the problem 
and possible legislative solutions.
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girl and murdered her to prevent her from testifying. When 
the girl's father wanted the Indian prosecuted, the 
authorities told him this would be unwise; the danger of a 
revolt of the Sault Indians was too great to risk stirring up 
resentment among them.59 In 1685, Father Jacques Bigot 
reluctantly reported that "9 or 10 Cabins [longhouses] left 
the Sault mission last year, because they said that they had 
withdrawn there solely to live in peace, far from the 
disorders caused by intemperance; but that they found 
themselves as greatly annoyed by drunkards as they were in 
their own country."60
Governor Denonville's memo ire to the king in 1685 smacked 
of public relations gloss, as he claimed that the Indian 
village at the Sault, among other missions, "are a pleasure to 
behold. There are not, most assuredly, any towns or cities in 
France so well ruled, than in all these places."61
59Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., "[Frangois Vachon de] Belmont's 
History of Brandy," Mid-America XXXIV (1952), p. 54. William 
J. Eccles also found instances of the authorities ignoring 
major crimes such as murder, committed by Sault Indians, out 
of fear of revolt or exodus; therefore they were free to act 
however they wished. Not a few French cadavers were found, 
with hints of Indian involvement, in Montreal and environs in 
the late seventeenth century. (Eccles, "Sovereignty 
Association, 1500-1783" in Essays on New France (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 214, ns. 52, 58. See also 
C11A 5:344v-345; Louise Dechene, Habitants et Marchands de 
Montreal au XVIIe siecle (Montreal and Paris, 1974), pp. 38- 
39.)
60JR 63:131. (Note again the mention of an advantage for 
moving to the mission community from Iroquoia other than a 
desire to live a Christian life.)
61C11A 7:9 Ov.
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Denonville may have toured these towns only on a sparkling 
Sunday afternoon after mass; soldiers who saw the Sault people 
in the heat of a night following the arrival of a cask found 
"drunken [Indians] howling.. .and doing all the damage they can 
on the road. Some kill the stock which they find. Others 
break into the houses on the road to the Sault,.. .still others 
violate French women."62 By 1721, Charlevoix reported that 
Indians from the nearby missions made horrible spectacles of 
themselves in the streets of Montreal, a far cry from the 
"veritable monastery" of which Bishop St. Vallier spoke.63
Much of the fall of the Sault Iroquois from at least the 
appearance of grace took place because of a single event in 
1689. The town of Lachine and surrounding area was attacked 
by the League Iroquois in that year; the Sault St.-Louis 
Indians were moved to a compound inside the city of Montreal 
for their own protection against the invaders during this year 
of siege. Living in close proximity to the French of Montreal 
and all the attendant vices (not the least of which was openly 
available brandy), the Kahnawakes altered their behavior in 
unappealing ways. "In the seven or eight months that the 
Iroquois of the Sault...spent at Montreal, after the massacre 
of Lachine, they became unrecognizable, both as regards moral 
piety, and there is no one who does not admit that if their
62Donnelly, ed., "Belmont's History of Brandy," p. 52.
^Charlevoix, Journal 1:219. Even the Jesuits admitted 
in 1710 that alcohol had ruined the Sault St.-Louis Indians. 
(JR 66:171-173.)
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fervour is no more than it was for so long, the edification 
and admiration of New France, it is because they have had too 
many relations with us."64 Small wonder it was that the 
Jesuits preferred to keep their Indian charges away from their 
own Christian countrymen.65
After returning from their stay in Montreal, the 
Kahnawakes moved their village site again, but only a short 
distance, less than half a league to the west. They were to 
move again six years later, again to the west and only a short 
distance, and finally in 1716, they moved again no more than 
half a league, where they have stayed to the present day. 
Various reasons were cited in the written records as to why 
these sites were in turn abandoned, and the modern historian 
Louise Dechene suspects Jesuit development of their holdings 
for habitant seigneuries had much to do with it.66 But 
through all these moves, traditional village layout and 
housing materials and styles were maintained. The bark 
longhouses of the 1716 site resembled those of the Mohawk
^Charlevoix, History 4:198; Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur 
les moeurs coutumes et religion... (Leipzig and Paris, 1864), 
pp. 311-313.
65See Axtell, Invasion Within. Ch. 4-6 on Jesuit strategy. 
For opposition opinion in this debate, see NYCD 9:55; C11A 
5:13, 8:44v; Charlevoix, History 4:197-198. See also
Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits. Ch. 2. Lachine itself, 
directly across the river from the Sault, was perhaps a worse 
influence than the town of Montreal. (See Robert-Lionel 
Seguin, "Le Comportement de certains habitants de Lachine aux 
environs de 1689," Bulletin des Recherches Historioues LX 
(1954), pp. 187-193.)
^Dechene, Habitants et Marchands. p. 33.
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Valley, and traditional agriculture was still practiced, with 
women sowing, planting, and harvesting crops of maize, beans 
and squash grown in hills, instead of rows tilled European- 
style with farm animals. There was some livestock at Sault 
St.-Louis, but horses were apparently more of a nuisance than 
anything else to the Indians and were used only by the Jesuits 
in the 1600s, although they were in widespread use by the 
1750s. When Father Joseph Frangois Lafitau wrote of 
conditions at the Sault mission in the 1710s, the Kahnawakes 
were still using pre-Columbian methods of clearing fields; 
having been shown the European method, they preferred their 
own. Stone axes were still in use in 1710.67 A few had 
decided to try the French method of ploughing at Father 
Chauchetiere' s suggestion in 1682; they harvested French wheat 
although it was foreign to the native palate and enjoyed it. 
But despite the high yield which it produced, they decided to 
return to maize cultivation because the amount of labor 
required for wheat was too great.68
The sexual division of labor was still traditional at 
Kahnawake, despite the presiding Black Robes whose cultural 
baggage included the habits of patriarchalism and male 
supremacy. An obvious reason for Jesuit success in making 
their mission community a popular place to live was that they
67Lafitau, Customs 2:70, 71; Dechene, Habitants et
Marchands, pp. 33-35.
68JR 62:169.
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did not force complete cultural change on the newcomers. 
Women tended the fields and collected firewood in the nearly 
forests, while men cleared fields, built longhouses, and 
continued their pattern of seasonal habitation at the home 
base, with fall and winter hunting trips. The rhythm of the 
seasons remained as it had been in Iroquoia.69
Extended family longhouses persisted, a good gauge of 
adherence to the old ways. Father Chauchetiere counted sixty 
longhouses in 1682, with a population of 120 to 150 
families.70 The popularity of the place was evident in its 
growing population; by the late 1680s, its numbers had grown 
to almost 700.71 There was little contact with the 
surrounding community, except for some unfortunate incidents 
involving violence. Occasionally, Sault Indians went to 
Montreal, a town "more like a hell than an orderly town" and 
once in 1683, a group of them reported to have been drinking 
for the past ten days committed "extraordinary disorders." 
The intendant took this incident seriously, ordering that any
69JR 63:235; Dechene, p. 36.
70JR 62:173.
71This was an increase from around 200 fifteen years 
earlier. (NYCD 3:394; Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits, 
p. 195 fn.) Frontenac reported to the King in 1679 that the 
population of the mission was great, and Duchesneau had words 
to the same effect for the minister in the same year. 
(Rapport de L'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 1926-27, p. 
108; C11A 5:49v.)
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repetition would be cause for jailing the Indians involved.72
Although mission Iroquois occasionally went to Montreal, 
they did not learn to speak much French. The Jesuits did not 
encourage them to do so, learning their languages instead, and 
any schooling which Christian Indians had was conducted in 
their own village in their own languages. Even the liturgy of 
the Mass was in a native language, Huron. (Ever since the 
Jesuit mission to the Huron people in the 1630s and 1640s, 
Huron had de facto become the language of the liturgy in 
eastern woodland Catholic missions.) The Sault St.-Louis 
Indians communicated with French officials on a few occasions, 
in a pidgin common to the northeastern fur trade, a 
combination of Algonquian and French expressions and some 
gestures. Indians who used it believed it was the French 
language (and vice versa); when Father Lafitau first arrived 
from France, Kahnawake Indians spoke this hybrid dialect to 
him thinking he would understand it.73 The Sault Iroquois 
maintained ties with their kin and clan relatives in Iroquoia, 
and the Mohawk language, which became the dominant language at 
the Sault because of Mohawk predominance in the population, 
was retained and strengthened by this contact with the
^But the fact that he kept repeating this demand suggests 
that it was not enforced by the local police. (Archives de 
Quebec, Ordonnances des Gouverneurs et Intendants. 1639-1706 
2:39, 77-78. Quoted in Adair, "Evolution" p. 37.)
^Lafitau, Customs 2:261.
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homeland.74
Dress style at the Sault followed a pattern common among 
tribes in fairly frequent contact with Europeans; the 
materials for clothing were borrowed from European sources and 
incorporated into everyday use, but the styles remained 
traditional, as did functions. Iroquois Indians wore European 
shirts over their traditional garb instead of underneath —  
they used them to shield their bodies from snow and rain, a 
different function from that of Europeans. Similarly, they 
used shirttails as breechclouts.75
A nun noticed a distinctive dress style among Mission 
Indians who came to Montreal in 1730; as opposed to other 
Indians who walked the town virtually naked, they were vain of 
dress: "the Iroquois [Christian Indians] put the shirt over 
their wearing apparel, and over the shirt another raiment 
which encloses a portion of the head."76 Lafitau noticed the 
Kahnawake adoption of new materials as an elaboration of a 
traditional style: "in place of their fur robes, they use
blankets of wool, doghair, or fine red and blue cloth," 
confirming that they "have changed only the material of their 
clothing, keeping their former style of dressing."77
74There are still some Mohawk speakers today at Kahnawake.
^Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 68-69.
76From a manuscript letter of Soeur Ste. Helene quoted in 
Atherton, Montreal 1:350.
^Lafitau, Customs 2:30.
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Clearly, Kahnawake material culture had been only minimally 
altered as a result of Jesuit oversight of the community.
Questions of moral code, ceremonialism, and religious 
adherence were another matter. The missionaries did forbid 
certain practices which had been taken for granted among the 
Iroguois from time immemorial. Even some converts themselves 
questioned traditional practices and rituals, and probably 
many of them were forbidden at Sault St.-Louis. In Iroquoia, 
Garakontie, the Onondaga zealot, refused to participate in 
condolence councils, healing rituals, and the Midwinter 
Ceremony at his Onondaga village which were an integral part 
of the Iroquois identity. He stated plainly that this was 
because of his newfound beliefs; his old habits he now 
considered idolatrous and sinful.78 If such a bold stand was 
taken within Iroquoia, the status quo at the mission community 
along the St. Lawrence must have been one in which most 
traditional ceremonies were officially banned. The only real 
source, the Relations. reveals little on this subject, 
although one Black Robe claimed that traditional burial 
customs (burying bodies sideways instead of upright in the 
grave, and placing grave goods and prized possessions with the 
corpse) had been eliminated at Kahnawake.79
Some Christians in the Five Nations homeland lost their 
political status because of their beliefs; one woman was
78JR 50:61-63, 60:193.
79JR 63:183.
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stripped of her agoiander status because she converted.80 
From this, it is difficult to say how politics operated among 
the Christian Iroquois community; the ceremonial side of 
politics seems to have been called into question, but no 
Jesuits suggested that the Indians at Sault St.-Louis had to 
find new ways of conceptualizing their political offices and 
means of appointing chiefs, matrons, agoianders, and others. 
Lafitau's comments on political structure and function in the 
1710s suggests nothing markably different from what is known 
of League Iroquois politics at the time.81 Therefore, aside 
from the (predictable) outlawing of shamanism and any form of 
ritual with a religious connotation, it is difficult to guess 
the extent of cosmological/cultural change. Traditional 
reciprocity seems to have survived the conversion intact; in 
fact the mission Iroquois were famous for this, to the point 
that the Jesuits in the community were distressed at the 
amount of food and other commodities which were freely offered 
to any comers to the village, even to groups as large as eight 
hundred, which seemed to pauperize the inhabitants.82 Kin 
relations seem also to have remained intact, despite the lack 
of traditional ceremonies to reinforce these. (They may have 
been modified in conformity with Christianity.) Longhouses
80Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 177. (An 
agoiander was a political office in Iroquois society.)
81See Lafitau, Customs 1:69-70, 285-300.
82JR 58:81.
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were still the standard form of housing, indicating that 
traditional ways of viewing kin relationships persisted.83
Many longhouse people were accustomed to going back and 
forth between the Sault village and their homeland, and 
families were often only physically divided between the two 
areas, although at times they were also separated by the 
Christianity issue.84 But secular political changes in the 
early 1680s did not bode well for the Iroquois as a united 
people. Relations between the Five Nations and the French 
were becoming strained, and the Jesuits were less welcome in 
Iroquoia. They were literally driven out of some Five Nations 
villages. The French had been flexing their muscles in the 
Ohio and upper Mississippi valleys; the Iroquois League saw 
this as an encroachment on their sphere of influence, where 
they too had recently been active. Rumors of war between the 
two powers swirled in Kahnawake ears - what would they do? 
Mission Indians were considered by the French (including the 
Jesuits), to be subjects of the French king, as any inhabitant 
of New France would be.85 But they had built up their 
community along the St. Lawrence during a period of peace. A 
war footing between their own people and those among whom they
“on Sault St.-Louis generosity, see also JR 55:35, 
61:201, 63:195; Kip, trans. and comp, The Early Jesuit
Missions, pp. 92-93.
^Kip, trans. and comp, The Earlv Jesuit Missions, pp. 
120-129.
85Dechene, Habitants et Marchands. p. 28.
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now lived was a new and cruel twist in their lives. The 
Relations reported that their fidelity to the French cause was 
beyond doubt, and that a palisade around their village was 
erected in 1684-85 to protect them against possible Iroquois 
attack. (It was unclear, however, whether the fortification 
was a Jesuit undertaking or one originated and pursued by the 
Indians themselves.)86 The League Iroquois made their 
mission counterparts' status clear at a war council held by 
both groups at La Famine (on the southeastern shore of Lake 
Ontario) in 1684. According to the Jesuits, they denounced 
the Catholic Iroquois and jeered them. Chauchetiere indicated 
that it was after this meeting that construction of the 
palisade was begun.87
The Black Robes reported that an open meeting was held at 
Sault St.-Louis to decide a policy on the growing hostilities. 
They were given three choices, Chauchetiere said. They could 
all return to Iroquoia, or remain at their new village by the 
rapids but maintain a state of isolation from the surrounding 
French colony —  a sort of neutral zone, or they could join 
the French-Catholic cause. According to the Jesuit source, 
they rejected the first option because they felt they would 
jeopardize their new religion, and likewise rejected the 
second out of fear, not unfounded, that the French would
86JR 63:241, 245.
87 JR 63:245; William N. Fenton's introduction to Lafitau, 
Customs (l:xxxii).
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become suspicious of them.88 Chauchetiere proudly
interpreted the decision to join the French cause as being 
made because "having but one and the same faith with the 
french, they wished also to run the same risks together."89 
No matter how the decision was made, or even if there was a 
group decision as Chauchetiere suggests, the Sault St.-Louis 
community took on a new dimension after 1683. Hostilities 
were brewing and the inhabitants of the mission village were 
caught in the middle.
The Jesuit missions in the Iroquois country effectively 
ended four years later and the only remaining Black Robe after 
that time in the territory adjacent to New York Province was 
Father Pierre Millet, taken prisoner and held for years as a 
hostage among the Oneidas.90 Relations continued on a 
personal level between the Sault and the League Iroquois but, 
at the same time, the mission village was becoming a bulwark 
of the French defense against the Five Nations. Some 
Kahnawakes started to serve the French, giving advice and 
important information about the geography of Iroquoia and
^Governor Frontenac had long regarded them as a fifth 
column threat to New France.
89JR 63:241-243. His is the only record available on 
these events, so without confirmation, it must be viewed 
sceptically. There may have been pressure from the priests 
and/or colonial officials to choose the pro-French option, 
although some Sault Indians freely chose it.
90Shea, "The Jesuits, Recollects, and the Indians," in 
Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History, p. 285; Lucien 
Campeau, "Pierre Millet," Dictionary of Canadian Biography 
2:473-474.
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environs.91 To gain Sault Indian cooperation, it helped that 
Count Frontenac was no longer the governor of New France; La 
Barre took over in 1683 and was much more positively disposed 
towards the Jesuits and their reserves than his predecessor 
had been.
Ogenheratarihiens, or Hot Powder (Cendre Chaude) as he 
was known to Europeans, was a prominent Kahnawake who 
symbolized French allegiance among his people. Baptized in 
1676 at the Sault along with his wife and other family 
members, this talented politician soon became "fourth chief" 
at the Sault, and within a couple of years had worked his way 
up to the position of "first chief." He was active in 
proselytizing trips to the homeland in the late 1670s and set 
the convert's example in 1683 of declaring, in his role as 
chief, his allegiance to the French in the impending war with 
the Iroquois.92 An indication that the Indian political mind 
is inscrutable to whites lies in the fact that after this 
time, the Oneidas in the homeland invited Ogenheratarihiens to 
become their chief, and offered very conciliatory terms - he 
would not have to renounce Christianity in order to take up 
the offer. But he chose to stay at the reserve when his 
condition that all the League Oneidas embrace the Catholic
91Charlevoix, History 4:197; JR 63:243.
92Christianity was beginning to have these other 
complicated connections; missionaries did not consider an 
Indian to be truly Christian if the convert in question did 
not actively support the French military-imperial cause, an 
issue which was to come up often in the future.
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faith was turned down.
But this Christian Oneida politician did not blindly 
support the French cause once he embraced it. Unlike other 
Christian chiefs from the Sault, in 1684 he refused to join 
Governor Josephe-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre's (aborted) 
expedition against the Onondagas at La Famine. Discriminating 
in his support, he shared the sentiments of many in New France 
that La Barre was an inept leader; when the latter was 
replaced by Governor Denonville the following year, 
Ogenheratarihiens was among the first to declare his 
allegiance to the new leader of New France.93 In 
Denonville's 1687 campaign against the Senecas, the Oneida 
headman served willingly and, along with two other Christian 
Iroquois, was killed in action in July of that year.94
Ogenheratarihiens' life serves as a reminder that the 
Jesuits' claims of mission Iroquois allegiance to the French 
was not just wishful thinking and good copy for the readers 
back in France. There were individuals who transferred their 
allegiances. Bruce Katzer suggests that many did so because 
they perceived that the hey-day of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee was 
past, and that to side with a power on the rise was a smart, 
self-preserving thing to do. Furthermore, Thomas Norton
93Regarding La Barre's ineptitude and loss of favor, see 
Perrot, Memoire sur les Moeurs. p. 138.
94Bechard, The Original Caughnawaga Indians, pp. 123-124, 
and Bechard, "Ogenheratarihiens," in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography 1:522-523.
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suggests that as early as the 1670s, Five Nations people 
perceived that they could profit from the unofficial and 
illegal trade which was developing along the Lake Champlain 
corridor if they moved to the Jesuit mission community along 
the St. Lawrence.95
The significance of Ogenheratarihiens is that an 
alternative Iroquois culture was shaped in the community on 
the St. Lawrence River across from Montreal. It had shed some 
parts of its old cosmology and view of the world, and replaced 
them with a central component of the European world view: 
Catholic Christianity. Even if all inhabitants of Kahnawake 
were not truly converted, they had accepted a certain moral 
and behavioral code which differed from their traditional one, 
significantly in some aspects while only minimally in others. 
Something in the Iroquois experience of the first half of the 
seventeenth century —  political, economic, military, 
social/cultural, or a combination of all these —  caused a 
significant number of the proud Five Nations people to 
emigrate and to join a vibrant new community in which bark 
longhouses sat next to a stone chapel adorned with a bell 
tower and crucifixes. By all appearances, the Kahnawake
^Bruce Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks: Occupations, 
Residence, and the Maintenance of Community Membership" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), 
pp. 37-38. David Blanchard echoes this argument in his 
dissertation "Patterns of tradition and change: the re­
creation of Iroquois culture at Kahnawake" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 119-154. 
(Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, p. 122; Richter, "The 
Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 200.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
community was a successful synthesis of two cultures and a new 
element in the geopolitics of the colonial Northeast.
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NATIVE POPULATION 
TRENDS, 1630-1800
These data vary considerably in quality and are sometimes 
contradictory. Overall, total native population declined. Indians 
were repeatedly decimated by European diseases and by wars, 
in which they participated, between French and English and 
later between English and Americans.
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CHAPTER THREE 
KAHNAWAKE-FIVE NATIONS RELATIONS IN THE 1680S
"When [Iroquois] Christians divorced themselves from 
ceremonies that had previously ratified their bonds to fellow 
villagers, they began to define themselves as a distinct 
people o.. Christians were no longer the traditionalists' 
kinsmen. They were, in some respects, their enemies."1 By 
1684, when the League Iroquois disowned their Sault brethren 
at a diplomatic meeting and the two groups exchanged 
threatening words and insults, the cold war which set the Five 
Nations in turmoil since the first Jesuit arrived in their 
land began to take on serious national political dimensions; 
the Sault Iroquois were now a distinct national group which 
would have separate diplomatic relations with various powers.2 
The feeling of separate communities had been growing for 
years, but this was the first overtly institutional evidence 
of it, brought on by growing hostilities between the League 
Iroquois and the French.
The Sault Indians could not help having close ties to the 
French administration in Quebec and Montreal, not only because 
they were inside French territory, but also because of their 
resident Jesuit missionaries who were looked upon by French
1Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois; Jesuit 
Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686," 
Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), p. 10.
2Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901) , 
63:245 (hereafter cited as JR) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
civic officials as the governing authority in the mission 
community. From a European perspective, it would seem a 
logical development for the Sault Iroquois to view their 
political, diplomatic, and military interests as being aligned 
with those of the French administration, because their village 
was potentially a target of hostilities by the enemies of the 
French, namely, the League Iroquois. French military 
protection, in the form of construction of a stone fort, was 
probably seen by at least some Sault inhabitants as desirable, 
but some may have seen it and its accompanying soldiers as an 
occupying force.
The Christian faction among the Iroquois proper atrophied 
when it lost its prominent leader, Garakontie, to the grave in 
1678. Opposition in Iroquoia to raids on western tribes in 
the Illinois country faded without Garakontie's strong voice, 
and the 1680 attack by some Iroquois on Fort St. Louis among 
the Illinois Indians drew the sharp reproach of the French. 
Large Iroquois armies of a thousand men (mostly Senecas) 
attacked Miami as well as Illinois hunters several times from 
1680 to 1683.3 In the summer of 1683, an extremely aggressive 
governor was appointed to New York. Colonel Thomas Dongan, 
although Catholic, was determined to erase the French Jesuit 
influence among the Iroquois and to bring a stridently anti- 
French tone to New York and her allied Indians. He worked
3Louis Armand de Lom D'Arce de Lahontan, New Voyages to 
North America (2nd ed.) 2 vols. (London: Bonwicke, 1735), 
2:63-65.
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among the Five Nations to heighten their hostility toward the 
French, openly encouraging them to conduct raids against the 
colony to the north and its allied Indians, attempting to 
break the French-Five Nations peace of 1665-1667. Previous 
New York governors had not done this.4
Indian-on-Indian attacks had always involved individuals 
only, and had been seen in the context of religious 
factionalism. Christian zealots were martyred at the hands of 
their traditionalist counterparts for their refusal to give up 
the new religion, not simply because they were from the 
community within New France's borders. (A League Iroquois 
could not assume that by merely residing at the Sault, an 
Indian was a convert to Christianity.) In another step toward 
all-out hostility between the two communities, small groups of 
League Iroquois had occasionally raided Kahnawake stores of 
grain in the late 1670s.
But an open state of war between the Sault Iroquois and 
the Five Nations was not yet a reality. Even in 1683, people 
still doubted that such a scenario would develop. The Jesuit 
superior in New France believed that the Iroquois had not yet 
gone to war against the French because they would not want to 
be entangled in a situation of antagonism against their Sault 
brethren. Father Thierry Beschefer wrote to his seniors that 
the French "are under great obligations to those who compose
4Allen V. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: 
The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 
253-255.
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this mission. [The League Iroquois] have often resolved to 
wage war against the french; but they have always been checked 
by those whose kindred were at the Sault."5 Beschefer noted 
that the League Mohawks had stated they could not consent to 
such a war, that their brethren at the Sault would have to be 
withdrawn first. These Iroquois may have been shocked to 
find, then, that their Catholic kinsmen offered Governor La 
Barre of New France a fighting force of 150 men when he asked 
for some in 1683, "to go to war, even against their own 
nation, if the latter undertook to break the peace with the 
french."6
The Five Nations may not have realized the subtle 
pressure that Jesuits and French officials could bring to bear 
upon Sault inhabitants; sanctions could easily be made, 
threats of punitive measures issued, doubts about a 
Christian's ability to enjoy eternal life introduced, or 
privileges within the community or the church taken away, if 
men were not promised for military support. These tactics are 
difficult to trace in historical sources, but bribery was one 
form of persuasion which was documented; Governor La Barre 
openly told the minister of marine that he "resolved to select 
four of the principal chiefs of [the Kahnawakes] to accompany
SJR 62:255.
6JR 62:255-257; Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York 15 
vols. (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:234 (hereafter 
cited as NYCD).
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Sieur Le Moyne, to whom I entrusted a number of private 
presents, to gain over the most influential, having made, at 
the same time, some reasonable ones to those Christian 
Chiefs."7 He also asked the minister for extra fronds to help 
pay for the repair of the church at the Sault which had been 
damaged in a storm, prefacing his request with the timely news 
that the Jesuits at that mission had been able to raise two 
hundred troops for the French.8 Gifts and funding were tied 
to military support.
If the Kahnawake Iroquois felt pressure from their 
position within New France, they also found positive channels 
to develop from their position. They opened up a new role for 
themselves as a quasi-independent middle group between the 
French and the Five Nations, defying a dependent status. They 
no doubt felt themselves to be an independent nation however 
much the Jesuit fathers and the French governor's officials 
might press them. They became emissaries between the French 
and the League Iroquois by relaying belts of wampum (meaning
7NYCD 9:202; Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie CllA 
(Canada: Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.) 6:134 
(hereafter cited as CllA).
8NYCD 9:209; CllA 6:244v. The New France government 
took an increasingly active role in financially supporting the 
mission community. Imperial as well as religious motives for 
this are obvious from correspondence. (CllA 5:290v-29lv; NYCD 
9:149-158.) There were numerous occasions on which 
missionaries or government officials asked for money for the 
mission from the court at Versailles. Father Fremin travelled 
to France in 1679 for that purpose. (CllA 5:12-17.)
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official diplomatic correspondence on belts made of shell 
strung together9) back and forth between the two groups. La 
Barre reported in 1684 that Father Jacques Bruyas, the 
superior at Sault Saint Louis, "furnished seven Christian 
Iroquois, friendly to the French and pretty shrewd" to relay 
wampum belts to the Mohawks and Oneidas expressing the French 
desire for the latter not to get involved in the French-Seneca 
conflict which was brewing.10 (The governor's assurance that 
these seven Indians were "friendly to the French" indicates 
that one could not be at all sure that every Sault Indian was; 
factionalism existed even in these early decades at 
Kahnawake.)
Since La Barre worded his communique in terms of Indians 
being "furnished" to him for the role of messenger, he must 
have seen these Indians as French subjects who could be called 
upon at will. The Kahnawakes, however, probably saw 
themselves as an independent third party uniquely qualified to 
run interference between two sets of belligerents because of 
their geographical proximity to the French, and because of 
their knowledge of terrain, village locations, personalities, 
and customs of the Five Nations.11 They were also present at
9See Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie, Histoire de 
l'Amerioue Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris; 1722), 1:333-334 for 
a description of wampum.
10NYCD 9:239-240; CllA 6:308-308v.
11Since Indians did not express themselves in a written 
medium, there is no direct evidence on their feelings at the 
time about such matters. However, evidence which does
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
talks held between La Barre and representatives of all five 
Iroquois nations the preceeding year, as La Barre made a point 
of noting when he described the event to the minister of 
marine.12 Sault Indians probably approached these talks as 
independent observers, regardless of French perceptions of 
their status at such meetings.
League Iroquois perceptions of their strayed kinsmen seem 
to have been that they were under the direct influence of the 
French. At the 1683 meeting, instead of addressing their 
Sault brethren directly, the League Iroquois asked Governor La 
Barre to "prevent the Christians of the Sault-Saint Louis ... 
from coming more to our territory to attract our people to 
Montreal, that they stop depopulating our land, as they have 
been doing."13 The sense is unmistakably one of 1 those 
foreign Indians invading our land.' League Iroquois speakers 
would not always put their relations with their Catholic 
counterparts in these terms; at times they claimed them to be 
just as Iroquois as someone in a Mohawk Valley longhouse. 
Their approach depended on the circumstances. Here, the 
frustration with the draining of vital human resources from 
the homeland put them in an adversarial frame of mind. La 
Barre responded with this retort: "They are not my children -
infiltrate the European documents generally indicates that all 
Indians saw themselves as autonomous peoples, regardless of 
the European legal viewpoint of their status.
12C11A 6:134-135.
13C11A 6:300—300V.
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those Indians.. .who depopulate your land, it is you who 
depopulate your land by your drunkenness and superstitions; 
there is complete freedom to come live among us, we do not 
stop anyone by force [from returning back to New York].”14 
This was a war of words between enemies over the Sault 
Iroquois, whether they were perceived as refugees or pilgrims 
or traitors or immigrants.
Nor did the New York government see the Kahnawake 
Iroquois as a neutral third party. They were a thorn in the 
side of this province which was becoming so dependent for its 
diplomatic stability on strong relations with the Five 
Nations. The Mission Iroquois were a constant reminder that 
few Indians were attracted to the religion or the national 
identity of the English, and would, if anything, shed their 
own people's blood to fight these men rather than defend an 
English colony against the possible encroachments of a foreign 
power.15 The new governor of New York, more empire-minded 
than any of his predecessors, exerted unrelenting pressure on 
the New France government, the Jesuit missionaries, and on the 
Sault Iroquois themselves as far as he could, to persuade, 
cajole, or force them into returning to their homeland. In 
the summer of 1686, a Mohawk named Jannetie was sent by 
Governor Dongan and the Mohawk sachems to the Sault to tell 
the strayed kinsmen that Dongan could give them as much land
14C11A 6:300V.
15C11A 11:186.
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as they needed at Saratoga. At this hamlet slightly northeast 
of the Mohawk homeland and about forty miles north of Albany, 
Dongan would provide land "to make their homes here" and 
pledged that they "would also have a priest there to instruct 
them in religion."16
Enjoying their popularity, the Sault Iroquois graciously 
replied that they would be "very willing" to come and live at 
Saratoga, and added that the Governor of New France "does not 
want to prevent their coming here, but says first he wants to 
see a letter from Corlaer [the New York Governor] and then 
will let them go freely." This is suspicious; La Barre had 
just said he held no Indians against their will, but with this 
statement he made their leaving New France conditional upon a 
letter from Governor Dongan. Jannitie's wording, that the 
Sault Iroquois were anxious for the letter of permission to be 
written "so they can be fully assured of his [La Barre's] 
ready inclination to let them come here" indicates their 
status as less than free. There was some coercion involved at 
the mission community.17
The issue of furnishing priests for the Kahnawakes was
16Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records. 
1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 
1956) (hereafter cited as LIR), p. 104; NY CD 3:394-395 
(Governor Dongan's report on the State of the Province, 1686.) 
In this report, Dongan also stated that part of the plan was 
to get rid of the French Jesuits in the Iroquois villages, 
because they were impeding English trade with the Five Nations 
by promoting their own. Religion and commerce were closely 
related in the seventeenth century.
17LIR p. 104.
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one which Dongan as a Catholic was uniquely qualified to 
handle. New York officials knew that Catholic priests would 
attract the Iroquois in greater numbers than would Protestant 
ministers, and a Catholic governor would have a better chance 
of finding some. Before 1664, the Dutch in New Netherland had 
only feebly attempted to proselytize the Mohawks, bringing in 
a Dutch Reformed domine. Johannes Megapolensis, in 1642 to 
convert the Iroquois nearest Fort Orange (Albany). 
Megapolensis experienced almost unqualified failure; his 
converts could be counted on one hand. New York was to make 
more efforts in 1693 with Domine Dellius, and in the 
eighteenth century with some Anglican missionaries, but these 
efforts were never as successful as the Jesuits’. Dellius 
severely tarnished his image among the Ho-de-no-sau-nee when 
he became embroiled in a shady land deal which involved a 
swindle of Iroquois land. The Black Robes were morally clean, 
visibly devout, and highly dedicated to Indian missions; 
therefore they enjoyed the most success of any Christian 
clergy among the Five Nations.18
Dongan knew that in order to attract Christian Iroquois
180n Dutch missionary efforts see Trelease, Indian 
Affairs, pp. 169-172, 327-331, John Webster Grant, Moon of 
Wintertime: Missionaries and the Indians of Canada in
Encounter Since 1534 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1984), pp. 65-66. NYCD 3:771-772. On the Dellius land 
scandal see John Rainbolt, "A ' great and usefull designe"..." 
New York Historical Society Quarterly. LIII (1969), p. 338. 
On Dellius: Hugh Hastings, ed., Ecclesiastical Records. State 
of New York 7 vols. (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1901-1916),
passim.
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from the Sault back to New York, he would have to provide 
English Black Robes for them. He promised them he would do 
this, and attempted to find some in England who would be 
willing to come over as missionaries. But Dongan may have 
been overly optimistic about any Catholic priest's desire to 
advance the cause of the English empire only a few years after 
the English Civil War and Oliver Cromwell's vicious 
persecution of Catholics in Ireland, England, and Scotland. 
Most Jesuits in England were in hiding in the mid-to-late 
seventeenth century, afraid of being hunted down; that there 
were any who came to North America in that century is amazing 
(although some came to Maryland initially because it was a 
haven for English-speaking Catholics in the New World, away 
from the persecution of the mother country).19 The Duke' s 
province, as New York was known, governed by an Irish Catholic 
no less, may have seemed an attractive destination to a Jesuit 
who had found life in England a hardship even after the 
restoration of the Catholic Stuart monarchy. Dongan sent out 
a request for Anglophone Jesuits, but none came.20 However,
190n the Maryland Jesuit missions, see James L. Axtell, 
After Columbus: Essavs in the Ethnohistorv of Colonial North 
America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch. 5.
20LIR p. 98. John M. Shea uncovered evidence that three 
English-speaking Jesuits came to North America in the late 
1680s, but although they spent some time in the province of 
New York as well as in Maryland, they never came to Saratoga 
or even to the Albany area to minister to Indians. (Edmund B. 
O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York 
4 vols. (quarto ed.) (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 1850-1851) 
(hereafter cited as DHNY) 3:73. Robert Livingston, the 
prominent Albany Indian Commissioner and future mayor of that
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the governor had his French counterparts worried; they 
reported Dongan's plan to the minister of marine in France 
under the heading "regarding the dangers that threaten 
Canada."21 It is impossible to tell if the Kahnawake 
Iroquois were bluffing when they agreed to return to the upper 
Hudson Valley, and there may have been some who would stay at 
Sault Saint-Louis even if others would leave upon the arrival 
in Saratoga of an English Jesuit. But since no priest 
arrived, the word of the Sault Iroquois (and of LaBarre) was 
never tested on this point.
Meanwhile, the war of words heated up between the New 
Yorkers and League Iroquois on one side, and the French, the 
Jesuits, and their allied Indians on the other. The Iroquois 
attacks on trading parties of Indians and coureurs de bois in 
the upper Great Lakes region, as well as down near the mouth 
of the Ottawa River at the St. Lawrence, continued and 
escalated. Governor Dongan and the Albany Indian 
commissioners22 heard of Seneca-instigated Iroquois attacks
city, lamented in 1700 that the reason the French were able to 
attract and keep so many Mohawks in New France was the neglect 
of the New Yorkers to send missionaries among these Indians. 
NYCD 4:648.)
21C11A 9:249v .
22This group was a sort of Chamber of Commerce for the fur 
trade, for which Albany had been granted a province-wide 
monopoly in 1686. See David A. Armour, "The Merchants of 
Albany, New York: 1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Northwestern University, 1965), and Thomas E. Norton, The Fur 
Trade in Colonial New York. 1686-1776 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1974).
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on Illinois and Miami Indians. For appearance1s sake, they 
reproached them for these exploits but in fact contributed a 
steady supply of weapons and told the Senecas, with a wink, to 
use them for hunting instead of warring.23 Even while 
promoting Five Nations attacks on Indians tied to the French 
trade, Dongan warned Father Lamberville in Onondaga (one of 
the few Jesuits left in Iroquoia in 1686 - the Cayugas had 
recently driven Father Carheil out of their villages) that the 
French had better not invade Iroquoia and make war upon the 
longhouse people. (He also carried on an argument as to whose 
Indians the Iroquois were - Dongan claimed that all of 
Iroquois territory was English and that its inhabitants were 
subject to the King of England, to which the Iroquois did not 
bother to object, since the natives were, de facto. still 
sovereign.)24
The French were happily escalating hostilities as well. 
When Jacques-Rene de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville arrived in 
the French colony in 1685 to replace the inept La Barre as 
governor, he started down the road to war with the Iroquois by 
reminding the Sault Iroquois of the danger which their 
recalcitrant kinsmen posed. "I sent to remind the Christian 
Iroquois...that it is necessary to destroy the Iroquois in
^Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change 
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984), 
p. 242.
24Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C U E  (Des Limites 
et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.) 10:2-3.
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order to establish religion...to destroy the Iroquois, it is 
necessary to attack them..."25 Denonville also embarked 
immediately on a project of fortifications for the entire 
Montreal area, including a large fort at Chambly a few miles 
southeast of the Sault, and made sure that Kahnawake was 
protected; the village was fortified in 1685 with a pentagonal 
structure having bastions at each corner. One bastion was 
equipped with a huge iron cannon which would serve as a 
deterrent to attacks on the village.26
There had been fear in New France of Five Nations forays 
against the Sault village after La Barre's failed expedition 
of 1684 against the Onondagas, because the Kahnawake Indians 
had sent one hundred men to fight.27 This was probably not 
all the Sault people could spare, since at least one prominent 
headman, Ogenheratihiens, refused to support the effort, but 
a pro-French war faction at the Sault had sent its complement 
to the cause. (Again, the amount of persuasion and/or 
pressure involved is unknown.) That La Barre had to give up 
the idea of attacking when the Onondaga chief Outreouti (la 
Grande Gueule) saw the sickened condition of the French troops 
at La Famine may have been a relief even to the most
25C11A 7:124v .
26JR 63:245; C11A 8:121v.
27C11A 6:267; DHNY 1:75.
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enthusiastic Sault fighters.28 In any case, it postponed the 
outbreak of gunfire between traditionalist and Catholic 
Iroquois. But the cannon installed at Kahnawake in 1685 was 
a reminder that time was running out for peaceful relations 
between the two groups, at least as far as the French were 
concerned.
It is not clear how Denonville's message of the need to 
attack and destroy the League Iroquois was received by the 
brethren at the Sault. Nevertheless, Denonville was 
determined to humiliate the Five Nations. To court mission 
Indian military support for this purpose, in 1686, he 
succeeded in requisitioning 1500 livres from the king as a 
"show of gratitude" for the Jesuit communities at the Sault 
and Sillery. He also mentioned that these Indians were of 
"such great help to us for war as well as for the trapping 
that they do."29 Just as La Barre had recognized that "the 
maintenance of this Mission (Sault Saint-Louis) is of very 
great importance," undoubtedly with fresh soldiers in mind, 
Denonville also greased their palms to prepare for his war 
against the Senecas in 1687.30 Aware of colonial politics
28Regarding the meeting between Outreouti and La Barre at 
La Famine (near Oswego, N.Y.) see Lahontan, New Voyages 1:38- 
43.
^CllA 8:132, 176; Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., "[Frangois 
Vachon de] Belmont's History of Canada," Mid-America. XXXIV 
(1952), p. 132.
30The king granted a large sum of money to the Jesuits at 
Sault Saint-Louis for construction of a church building in 
1684, the year of La Barre's call for troops. (Rapport de
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too, Denonville shrewdly invited several Jesuit priests to 
serve as his advisors. He learned from the mistakes of 
previous governors (namely Frontenac) who had alienated the 
Black Robes, and therefore had not had much cooperation from 
them when it came time to rally fighters for an expedition.31
Indians from all the missions within Laurentian New 
France had rallied for battle under La Barre; a 1684 list 
specifies that of almost 400 Indians who allied themselves
with the French to go to Onondaga country, at the top of the
list were 100 "good men" from the "Christian Iroquois of Sault 
Saint-Louis." The Christian Iroquois of the Mountain (the 
Sulpician mission near Montreal) provided sixty, the Christian 
Abenakis of Sillery provided sixty-five "good men," the
Christian Hurons of Lorette sent "40 mediocre men," the
Algonquins seventy-two, and the Nipissings and Temiskamings, 
forty.32 Clearly, the Sault Indians were the most prominent 
among these groups. They may have appeared to be providing 
more to the cause only because their population was the
l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as 
RAP01. 1939-1940, p. 255; NYCD 9:209. At a high point in 
hostilities during the Franco-Iroquois war of 1689-1701, a 
French official lamented that their Indian allies, among them 
Kahnawakes, were "influenced only by presents... in the 
vigorous prosecution of the war." NYCD 9:526.)
31 Louis Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan, The Oakes 
Collection: new documents by Lahontan. Gustave Lanctot, ed. 
(Ottawa: Patenaude, 1940), p. 27.
32C11A 6:267.
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largest.33 Comprising at least one quarter of the total 
numbers, and being the largest single group, they continued to 
be the dominant presence among the mission Indian warriors in 
the 1687 engagement. Of 353 allied Indians from the St. 
Lawrence communities in that effort, fully half of them (170) 
were from the Sault, fifty were from the Mountain mission, 
seventy-six from Sillery and fifty-seven from Arhetil 
(Lorette)Whether they would fight was not something of 
which the officers in charge were at all confident. And the 
circumstances surrounding the beginning of the trip to the 
Seneca country made many Indians wary of their French 
contemporaries.
Denonville had planned to attack the Senecas because they 
were the Iroquois nation which had instigated most of the 
attacks on western Indians trading with the French. He 
feared, however, that other Iroquois groups further east,
33Lucien Campeau, "St. Lawrence Missions,” Handbook of 
North American Indians. Vol. 4, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), pp. 468- 
469.
^Louis-Henri Baugy, Journal d*une expedition contre les 
Iroquois en 1687. redioe par le chevalier de Baucrv. aide de 
camp de M. le marouis de Denonville (Paris: Ernest Serrigny, 
1883), p. 86. (hereafter cited as Baugy.) There were roughly 
1600 Frenchmen along, both regular troops and militia, making 
a total of about 2000 who left from Fort Frontenac. They were 
met by more Indians ("pagan” Indians as distinguished from 
these Christian ones) from the upper Great Lakes once they 
reached the southern shore of Lake Ontario.
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especially the "Iroquois du nord,"35 would see the movement 
of troops at Fort Frontenac nearby and warn the League 
Iroquois of a French attack. Setting a trap, the French 
governor called for a meeting with the eastern Iroquois at 
Fort Frontenac, extending an invitation to the Onondagas as 
well as the Oneidas, Mohawks, the Iroquois du nord, and some 
Iroquois from the short-lived Sulpician mission near 
Cataraqui.36 Dongan was suspicious of this invitation and 
warned that his French adversary had better not be planning 
anything other than diplomatic talks; he threatened to capture 
any Kahnawake Iroquois who might come to Iroquoia seeking more 
converts for the St. Lawrence community.37 Little did he 
know that he would have more to fear from Sault guns than from 
their rosaries or crucifixes.
Denonville used Father Jean de Lamberville for his plan; 
he arranged for the Jesuit residing at Onondaga to invite the 
Iroquois tribesmen to Fort Frontenac, since they would trust 
him. Lamberville had no idea of Denonville's plans and 
believed himself to be promoting peace between the two groups. 
However, when the delegation from Iroquoia arrived at the 
French compound on the north shore of Lake Ontario, Denonville
35These were Cayugas who had moved to the northeastern 
side of Lake Ontario in the 1660s out of fear of Susquehanna 
attacks in their homeland.
^On this mission see“James S. Pritchard, "For the Glory 
of God; The Quinte Mission, 1668-1680," Ontario History LXV 
(1973), pp. 133-148.
37LIR p. 117.
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promptly had them seized and imprisoned, along with the 
"Iroquois du nord."38 He now had captives to send to the 
French king. Louis XIV had requested Iroquois prisoners as 
oarsmen for his galleys, but had meant prisoners taken in a 
war situation, not unwitting victims of a snare. 
Nevertheless, the governor solved both the king's and his own 
problems at the same time with this move, and ended up with 
more than a hundred Iroquois prisoners to be sent to Quebec to 
await shipment to France, and a clear path to surprising the 
western Iroquois with his troops.39
When the Sault Iroquois realized what had happened, 
having recently come to Cataraqui with the French troops and 
militia from the St. Lawrence on the way to the Seneca 
villages, they were outraged that Denonville had tricked the 
Indians into irons.40 Moreover, some of the prisoners were 
close relatives of the Sault and Mountain Mission Iroquois.41 
On learning of Denonville's treachery, one hundred of the 
Christian Iroquois refused to continue with the expedition.
“ LIR pp. 109-117, 119-123.
39See William J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV. 1663-1701 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 149-151. Also Le 
Clerc, Eccles exchange in Revue d'Histoire de L'Americrue 
Francaise (Hereafter cited as RHAF): William J. Eccles,
"Denonville et les Galeriens Iroquois," RHAF 14-1 (1960), pp. 
408-429? Jean Leclerc, "Denonville et ses Captifs Iroquois," 
RHAF 14-4 (1961), pp. 545-558.
40Baugy, Journal. p. 90.
41NYCD 9:338; Leclerc, "Denonville et ses captifs..." 
RHAF p. 551.
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Puncturing Denonville's careful leak-prevention plan, two of 
these protesters decided to run through the woods to warn the 
Senecas of the impending attack. The Chevalier de Baugy, the 
governor's aide-de-camp, haughtily dismissed this, claiming 
not to be worried about it, or about the possibility of the 
protesters harassing the returning French party. In his 
journal, perhaps to reassure himself, Baugy insisted, "I do 
not think they have the guts."42 Aside from these two 
Indians, the rest of the dissidents planned to return home to 
Sault Saint-Louis. Thus the Sault fighting force was down to 
only seventy men but was still one of the largest groups of 
French-allied Indian fighters. Since pressure may have been 
applied in getting these Indians to join the expedition, it is 
no wonder that so many of them took the opportunity presented 
by Denonville's morally questionable actions to bail out. 
Baugy had stated that the reason for bringing them along in 
the first place was to test their fidelity. Unwavering 
commitment was a bit much to expect, since some were strong- 
armed into going along.43
Two Kahnawake Indians taken prisoner by the English 
testified that they were given a choice of participating in 
the campaign or being imprisoned until the war was over.44 
Although they may have had ulterior motives for claiming this
42Baugy, Journal, p. 91.
43Leclerc, "Denonville..." pp. 554-555.
“NYCD 3:431, 433.
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when testifying to the English officials who captured them,45 
other parts of their testimony about the expedition match the 
official version, and the detailed account of Adandidaghko 
(one of the captives) seems plausible. He chronicled his 
difficult situation; he had wanted to leave his home at the 
mission village to hunt, but his relatives reasoned with him 
that if he did so, he could expect eventually to be caught and 
imprisoned. So he agreed to stay and accept the inevitable, 
despite his wish not to fight, and a few days later, the 
French came to the village, gave each Indian thirty bullets, 
two handsful of powder, and told them to be ready at the 
designated time to leave on the expedition.46
Given this scenario of strong-arming recruits, Baugy 
should not have been surprised that such a large group 
defected. He kept a close watch on the behavior of the 
Christian Indians who remained on the expedition. For 
instance, the French entourage reached an island on the way to 
Seneca country, and found that some Iroquois had been at the 
spot earlier to fish but had since left. The Christian 
Iroquois were visibly relieved that they were gone, Baugy 
noticed. Having found tracks on another island, he had 
expected the allied Indians to follow these and chase down
45Adandidaghko's earlier claim that he did not want to 
fight was in response to the opening question of the 
interrogation by the English: "Asked if he was not ashamed 
that he left his country, to the French, and to fight against 
his own brothers..." NYCD 3:433.
46NYCD 3:433.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
some Iroquois, but noted in his journal that they did not try 
very hard, implying that they wanted to lose track of the 
prey.47
Denonville himself doubted the fidelity of the Christian 
Indians, especially the Christian Iroquois, "on whom we dared 
not rely having to fight against their relatives."48 But the 
governor also recognized the tactical need for such Indians in 
battle. He explained to his superiors that although Indians 
generally were not skilled at military formation, he would 
need to tolerate the Christian Indians, "some of whom we want 
with us; for if we had none of them. ..the enemy's Indians 
would continually harass us on our flank and rear."49 He was 
willing to put up with some discipline problems for this 
advantage. But they were useful not only as fodder. 
Denonville claimed that the order in which they were to march 
was not prescribed, as it was for militia and regular troops, 
so "they might serve as scouts or in detachments which we 
should send out, or to facilitate the passages" over rapids, 
at which the Kahnawakes were highly skilled.50 But 
Adandidaghko and Kakariall both told a different story - that 
the governor ordered the Christian Iroquois and some other 
Indians to be positioned in the middle of the entourage of
47Baugy, Journal, p. 91; Leclerc, "Denonville...," p. 555.
48NYCD 9:338.
49NYCD 9:342.
50NYCD 9:359.
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boats and canoes, with Frenchmen before and behind them, so 
that they could not escape.51 These Indians may have felt as 
much under siege as those they were assigned to attack.
But somehow those who stayed with the expedition lost 
their reluctance to fight. While the French and allied 
Indians were building a makeshift fort and boat shelter upon 
landing at Irondequoit,52 a few Senecas appeared to taunt 
them. The Kahnawakes, being the most adept at the Seneca 
language, were called upon to translate the exchange of words 
which followed. They did not hesitate to tell the Senecas 
that they had come to their country to kill them, either 
relaying the sentiments of others who could not communicate 
with the Senecas or expressing their own feelings towards 
them.53 This must have set the mood, despite both 
Kakariall's and Adandidaghko's claims that up to the last day 
before the battle the allied Indians wanted rather "to boil 
their pots" than to continue marching, the governor bidding 
them to walk on.54
When the battle finally started, the Kahnawakes fought 
exceptionally bravely whereas the "pagan" Indians (Ottawas and
51NYCD 3:431, 434.
520n the southwest shore of Lake Ontario, at the edge of 
Seneca territory, near present-day Rochester, N.Y.
53Baugy, Journal. p. 97; NYCD 3:434, 446. It is unclear 
from this account whether they were merely relaying French 
sentiments or declaring their own.
54NYCD 3:431, 434.
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Hurons from Michilimackinac) fled in the thick of the action. 
The courage of the former was notable since the Kahnawakes 
were positioned way out on the right and left flanks, in front 
of more than beside the French troops and militia.55 
Kakariall recounted that "the Governor put all the Indians in 
the Front, because he mistrusted them for feare they would 
join with the Senecas."56 They were exposed mercilessly to 
the enemy, and must have steeled their nerves to the 
situation. The Sault Iroquois received honorable mention 
later for their conduct in the battle; Denonville said they 
"surpassed themselves, and performed deeds of valour."57 
They even sacrificed one of their headmen; when the smoke 
lifted, Ogenheratarihiens lay dead on the field.
Perhaps they steeled themselves in the heat of the battle 
because their only other choice was to defect to the Senecas, 
to whom they were often very close during the fighting. But 
this would have been suicidal; the French would probably try 
to shoot them down rather than allow them to defect, and there 
was certainly no guarantee that the Senecas would look kindly 
on those who had travelled all these miles to accompany the 
enemy army. They might expect to be killed as traitors. 
Therefore, they made the best of their situation and at least
55DHNY 1:152; NYCD 3: 434; Baugy, Journal, pp. 99-100; 
NYCD 3:446.
56NYCD 3:431.
57Baugy, Journal. pp. 99-100; C11A 9:65.
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had the goodwill and even admiration of the French army after 
the last shot had been fired.58
Clearly, there were some who genuinely wanted to fight 
with the French. Of the three captains of the Kahnawakes who 
went with their men (an Onondaga, an Oneida, and a Mohawk), 
the Mohawk captain Kryn was known to be pro-French, and may 
even have contributed to the arm-twisting efforts of the 
French in recruiting men for the occasion.59
Suspicion that some of the Sault Iroquois fought bravely 
only to cut their losses is fueled by the testimony of the two 
Kahnawake prisoners detained by the New Yorkers; Kakariall 
indicated that his people refused to participate in the phase 
of Denonville's campaign which followed the battle —  
destroying corn stores at the Senecas' abandoned villages. 
Adandandidghko said the same, adding that some of these 
Indians found hidden c o m  stores but kept them secret from the 
French in order to minimize Seneca famine.60 Denonville must 
have sensed that allegiance was fragile; the governor wanted 
to send some Indians and Frenchmen out to chase enemy 
stragglers left in the area after the routing by the French 
(most Senecas had fled to the Cayugas) but did not because he
58Baugy, the former sceptic, commented after the battle 
that "we could be proud of them." (In Journal, p. 101.)
59NYCD 3:431; Henri Bechard, "Togouiroui," Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography 1:650-651. He was on good terms with the 
Jesuits at Sault Saint-Louis, and probably joined their 
efforts to convince Indians to sign up for military service.
“NYCD 3:432, 435.
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feared that if they were attacked by hostile forces, the 
French-allied Indians would allow the Frenchmen to be hacked 
to pieces and would join the enemy.61 In the days following 
the defeat of the Senecas, the French-allied Indiems refused 
to provide an escort for a party of French bringing wounded 
back to the main station near the shore.62 The spirit of 
cooperation was short-lived.
Four Kahnawakes served the Seneca cause through 
espionage, at some point fleeing the French camp undetected to 
tell the tribesmen of the French attack. For their troubles, 
however, they had their heads broken by those they informed, 
as one escapee from the Senecas told the French. Other Sault 
Iroquois, obviously of the pro-French faction, followed an 
example set by the Huron Indians on the campaign in Seneca 
country and went out looking for scalps.63 But the neutral 
faction prevailed on the retreat from Seneca country. 
Kakariall, Adandidaghko, Denonville, and his aide de camp, 
Baugy, all recounted that the Christian Indians refused to go 
with the rest of the entourage to Niagara after the Seneca 
campaign. Denonville wanted them to help build some 
fortifications at that outpost on the western end of Lake 
Ontario. The French tried "all the arguments which could be 
brought to bear upon them" but the Indians insisted on
61Baugy, Journal. p. 106.
62Baugy, Journal. p. 107.
^Baugy, Journal. pp. 110, 111.
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leaving. Denonville sent ten or twelve canoes after them to 
attempt to bring them back by force if necessary.64 While 
the two groups were negotiating in their boats, one Indian 
stood up and suggested capitulation, reasoning with the rest 
of the Christian Indians that they should minimize their 
losses; they had heard the governor's threats, they might as 
well go along with him voluntarily rather than be forced to do 
so. Most of the dissidents capitulated, but later, when no 
Frenchmen were looking, a couple of canoes managed to 
escape.65
Although the events surrounding this first open hostility 
between Kahnawakes and one of the Five Nations are confusing, 
and actions sometimes contradictory, it is clear that the 
Sault Iroquois harbored divided loyalties. There were at 
least two factions: those who wished to please the Jesuits and 
the French officials and felt that Kahnawake interests were 
inextricably tied to those of the French, and those who felt 
more allegiance to their ancestry and their fellow brothers of 
the longhouse. The latter were present at the 1687 campaign 
but probably against their wishes. A broad range of 
persuasions could have been and no doubt were employed to 
involve them in the fighting. Their own kinsmen at the Sault 
may have been agents in convincing them to join the war 
effort. As in most wars, some volunteered, but many were
^Baugy, Journal, p. 115; NYCD 3:432, 435, 9:367.
65NYCD 3:435, 9:367.
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drafted.
After discovering that the Kahnawake Iroquois had joined 
the French army in trying to bring the Seneca people to their 
knees, New York's Governor Dongan asked the League Iroquois to 
send a message to their cold-hearted brethren pleading with 
them once again to leave their community and return to the 
Iroquois homeland, promising them protection if they agreed. 
"If they will not bee advised," Dongan darkly hinted in his 
instructions to Five Nations representatives, "then you know 
what to doe with them."66 Representatives of the Five 
Nations replied that they wanted very much to have their 
relatives return from Canada, and did not know why the latter 
had fought against their brethren, but could conceive of no 
way to get them to return except by sending in a messenger (a 
Sault Indian held prisoner among the Iroquois) to give them a 
signal to escape.67 There was a widely held belief in New 
York and Iroquoia that the Sault Indians were held against 
their will in their village.
The recent hostilities between Sault and League Iroquois
^LIR p. 132? NYCD 3:439.
67NYCD 3:444. After the attack on the Senecas, the Five 
Nations harangued the Huron Indians for not warning them of 
the attack; if they expected the Hurons, who had formerly been 
their mortal enemies, to do so, then they must have been even 
more shocked that only two Sault Iroquois warned them, and 
only at the last minute, and that so many others participated 
in the assault. (Nicolas Perrot, Memo ire sur les Moeurs et 
Coutumes des Sauvaaes... (Leipzig: 1824) p. 138-143.)
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was a cause for remorse on all sides. Alarmed at the 
implications of recent events, Kryn and a few other Kahnawakes 
set out in August 1687, shortly after returning from 
Denonville's campaign, for Lake Champlain and points south. 
Eyewitnesses differ on exactly what was Kryn's purpose. 
Kakariall asserted that he came to ask if the Mohawks, 
Onondagas, and Oneidas were united with the Senecas against 
the French, hoping to dissuade them from such a stance. (He 
also said that Kryn had been sent on the mission by the Jesuit 
resident at the Sault, possibly on orders from the governor.) 
Adandidaghko, however, testified that Kryn and a few other 
Sault Indians came to see if they could still be reunited with 
the Mohawks and other Iroquois since this [French] war with 
the Senecas had started. (The Jesuit had sent them to ask 
about eastern Iroquois neutrality in the French-Seneca war, in 
exchange for a return of prisoners, but they added their own 
agenda.) He claimed that many of the Catholic Iroquois wanted 
very much to be reunited in their native land. Both 
testimonies indicate that even the pro-French among the 
Kahnawakes were as worried as the League tribesmen and the New 
Yorkers about the new situation and the possibility that it 
was irrevocable.68
A band of Dutch New Yorkers on their way back to New York 
from Montreal who met Kryn' s group said that Kryn told them he 
had been down in Mohawk country to dissuade the eastern
68NYCD 3:432, 435.
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Iroquois from going to war against the French and to try to 
convince all of them to come and live in Canada. If this did 
not work, Kryn apparently told the Dutchmen, then all the 
Sault Iroquois would return to the Albany area to live with 
their relatives once more, pending the arrival of English 
Jesuits.69 Despite concern about the possibility of 
fratricide, the French Jesuits and their faction among the 
Sault, of which Kryn was the apparent spokesman, believed that 
the French war against the Senecas was warranted and was no 
cause for the other four nations to come to the aid of their 
fellow Iroquois. A Frenchman who deserted to the English and 
served henceforth as an information pipeline for the New 
Yorkers claimed that Kryn was "very true to the French and 
would immediately join with the French in the warr against the 
Sniekes and Maquaes," and was "in great esteem with the French 
Governour. ,,7° Kryn was committed to the French cause; 
although he was doing anything possible to dissuade the 
eastern Iroquois from moving to a war footing, this goal was 
defined by the French point of view.71 He would be working 
for a French peace.
Kryn did prove himself at peace-keeping, for Kakariall 
and Adandidaghko both recounted a meeting which took place
69NYCD 3:437-438.
70NYCD 3:487-88. This was confirmed by Denonville's 
praise of Kryn to the minister of marine on October 27, 1687 
(C11A 9:130).
71NYCD 3:478.
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between Kryn's group and a band of sixty League Mohawks in 
early August 1687. Meeting somewhere around Lake Champlain, 
the two groups could easily have come to blows, since the 
sixty were headed to New France to attack villages (possibly 
Sault Saint-Louis) in retaliation for the French action 
against the Senecas and for Denonville's capture of Iroquois 
prisoners at Fort Frontenac. Kryn seems to have persuaded the 
warriors, some of whom were his own relatives, to return home, 
and even convinced a few to come and live at Kahnawake and 
consider Christian conversion.72
The war party's mere approach to Canada, nevertheless, 
was a cause for anger from Denonville, even though their plan 
to pillage New France communities ready for harvest was 
derailed. Denonville angrily wrote to Dongan reproaching the 
latter for sending these Indians to attack his people. Dongan 
replied that he had not commissioned them to go, that they 
decided for their own reasons to take revenge on the 
French.73 But in September, the Onondagas told Peter 
Schuyler, the mayor of Albany, that Dongan "desired us...to 
take as many French prisoners as wee could," and that he had 
indeed (justifying Denonville's accusation on this point) 
provided the Iroquois involved with powder and ammunition for 
the job. The New York government then wanted the Indians to 
hand over to the mayor and aldermen of Albany any prisoners
^NYCD 3:433, 435-436; C11A 9:141-141v.
^NYCD 3:512, 514.
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they might take.74 In fact, Kryn's diplomatic skill seems 
all the more impressive given the fact that the sixty Mohawks 
had been assigned specifically to take Kryn and his group of 
seven or eight hostage. When they apologized to Schuyler for 
not accomplishing their mission, he reproached them by 
reminding them that they had been "often charged" with 
bringing Kryn to Albany as a prisoner and had failed 
repeatedly.75
Not all Kahnawake Indians were valuable prey because not 
all were French partisans. Denonville realized that only some 
at the Sault supported Kryn. Some Kahnawakes even informed 
New York partisans whom they met in the woods and waterways 
between New York and New France of French intentions to make 
war on the Iroquois and New Yorkers, thereby undermining the 
French side.76 A few attempted to escape from the Sault 
mission village; four Sault women and one Sault man did so in 
October 1687, and men were sent out to hunt them down and 
bring them back. The four women were returned to Kahnawake 
but as for the man, his "brains were knocked out as a traitor" 
as soon as he was caught. Denonville coldly commented that 
"this proof of fidelity afforded me great pleasure."77 The
74New York Council Minutes Old Vol. 6, p. 5; NYCD 3:485.
^NYCD 3:483, 434.
76LIR p. 142. Denonville praised Kryn and "some of his 
warriors of our village of Sault St. Louis Iroquois." 
(Emphasis mine.) (C11A 9:130.)
^NYCD 9:353.
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accusations by Governor Dongan that the Sault Iroquois were 
"kept upp in a fort there [in Canada] with guards uppon them" 
and not "att free liberty to returne to their country if they 
thinke fitt" seem not to be merely the wild-eyed accusations 
of this hawkish governor.78
The French agent, Jesuit Francis Valliant, who was 
corresponding with Dongan on this matter, tried to turn the 
accusation around, claiming that the two hundred soldiers 
stationed at the village of Sault Saint-Louis were there to 
protect the Indians from enemy attack. Valliant referred to 
the testimony of a Sault Indian named Cakare who denied that 
his people were kept against their will. But Cakare was pro- 
French and had been on a journey to discuss peace with the 
League Mohawks when he was captured and held in irons in 
Manhattan for his troubles. He was less likely than a neutral 
Indian to admit the truth of such an embarrassing and 
politically damaging allegation. When asked "whether in 
Canada the Christian Mohox were att libertie," he answered 
every time that "he knew none that was detained," implying 
something different from what the question asked.79 
Spokesmen of the League Iroquois told the New York governor 
that they wanted their relatives, "the praying Indians at 
Canida," to be free from constraint. This is telling? if the 
League Iroquois were claiming this situation existed, there
78NYCD 3:526.
^NYCD 3:530.
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can be no doubt that they had it first-hand from their fellow 
Iroquois.80 A group of Sault Indians journeyed to Mohawk 
country in the summer of 1688 claiming that they came "with 
consent of ye Jesuite and say that ye Governor of Cannada gave 
them liberty to come heither [sic] in the midle of summer."81 
That they had to specify this speaks to the usual restriction 
of free movement.
Dongan also accused the French of gaining the support of 
the Kahnawake Indians through bribery.82 He was not wrong 
here either. Coincidences of time between donations made to 
the community and military manpower needed for an upcoming 
expedition occurred in 1684 and 1687. It happened again in 
1688.83 Denonville used presents to retain their favor, to 
appease them, or to convince them that Dongan's offers for a 
new life in Saratoga could not possibly be as generous as 
those made by the French. The Marquis suggested in the autumn 
following the Seneca campaign that clothing be given to the 
Kahnawakes because they had been unable to hunt while marching 
with the French army. Other supplies for their subsistence 
were offered as well, "as an encouragement to act well, and as
^NYCD 3:534. The tribal grapevine was alive and well, 
even in the late 1680s.
81NYCD 3:565. A Dutchman held in New France reported in 
1691 that although some Kahnawakes were inclined to emigrate 
to New York, there were "strict guards kept by the French to 
prevent their departure." (NYCD 3:781.)
82NYCD 3:511.
^RAPO 1939-40, p. 283.
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an evidence that care is taken of them."84 Part of the 
reason was that a smallpox epidemic had struck the village 
hard; three hundred of the Sault Indians (almost half) were 
ill at the time.85 But another concern the governor 
expressed was New France's public image. Its administration 
had to appear more generous than that of its neighbor to the 
south, both as a sort of one-upmanship, and as an inducement 
to the Indians to view their colony as the one which valued 
them the most and treated them best.
The war for the support of Indians became a race to 
furnish earthly goods in the most commodious way possible. 
The Sault Saint-Louis Iroquois were the spoils of the war; 
both sides courted them vigorously. Much more than the League 
Iroquois, they were caught between two superpowers who viewed 
them as prizes. To complicate the situation, they did not 
themselves agree on where their allegiances lay. Pro-French 
and pro-League Iroquois factions were to vie for control 
within an increasingly constricted sphere of action. But as 
constricted as it was to become, the Kahnawakes managed to 
involve themselves in Franco-Iroquois-English relations in 
such a way as would keep all the belligerents guessing as to
^NYCD 9:353-354. On at least one occasion in 1690, 
French officers used spirits to lure the Mission Iroquois to 
a battlefield. (Collection de Manuscrits. contenant lettres. 
memoires et autres documents historioues relatifs a la 
Nouvelle-France 4 vols. (Quebec: A. Cote, 1883-1885), 1:511.)
85Trelease, Indian Affairs, p. 304. In autumn 1690, 
smallpox claimed 400 League Iroquois lives. (NYCD 9:490; JR 
64:63.)
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what their next move would be and to influence events 
powerfully. They knew that they were the spoils of the coming 
war.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KAHNAWAKE-FIVE NATIONS RELATIONS, 1689-1701
When Teganissorens, the Onondaga diplomat, lamented to 
his Kahnawake counterparts in 1694 that "we have mutually 
butchered each other," he struck at a major psychic crisis 
among the people of the longhouse.1 In the 1690s Iroquoian 
hostilities were directed at each other as never before and 
fratricide became an increasingly likely scenario. Father 
Joseph Frangois Lafitau, the Jesuit missionary to the Sault 
Iroguois, noticed in them by the 1710s a hardened attitude 
towards war which had its roots in the era of Teganissorens 
and Kryn: "Quite often they [enemies in battle] know each 
other and speak to each other. They ask each other news, 
harangue each other and do not beat each other up without 
first paying each other compliments.1,2 These words are 
haunting against the chronicle of hostile encounters between 
Sault and Five Nations people.
Hostilities were indeed beginning to mount in the late- 
1680s. In the fall of 1688, for example, some Kahnawakes 
scalped League Iroquois travellers. League Mohawks continued 
to pillage French settlements during this time, and Denonville
1Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: 
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:580 (hereafter cited as
NYCD).
2Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians 
Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols., William 
N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans. (Toronto: 
Champlain Society, 1974-77), 2:143.
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told Dongan that he had not "ordered" his Indians to cease 
their hostilities against the Five Nations, and did not plan 
to do so. He increased the fortification of the Sault village 
that year, and placed troops on an island near the Sault to 
prevent Iroquois attacks from the river. French officials 
feared that the League Iroquois might attack the village of 
their Catholic relatives, and so Kahnawake became a heavily 
protected - and surveillanced - place. The expressed fear may 
have been a pretext for increasing fortifications at the 
Indian village. The French made a practice of keeping 
Iroquois prisoners there; some Iroquois came to Montreal in 
June 1688 to negotiate for the release of some ninety of their 
kinsmen. One wishes for information on how Iroquois prisoners 
were treated inside the village of Sault Saint-Louis.
Despite these escalations, however, there was evidence 
that some Iroquois were consciously attempting to avoid 
killing each other. In the summer of 1689, the Iroquois did 
come and surprise the northern colony, but not the Sault 
village. They struck the hamlet of Lachine directly across 
the St. Lawrence from Sault Saint-Louis. The night of August 
4 brought screams from the Lachinois as they attempted to 
escape the wrath of the invaders. But the Iroquois avoided 
Kahnawakes in their attack. Even when some Sault and Mountain 
Mission Iroquois joined a French officer who had come out from 
Montreal to help repulse the raiders, the latter shot only at 
the Frenchmen among the defensive fighters, leaving the
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Mission Iroquois reinforcements unharmed. When the French 
militiamen were captured, and the rest of the French in sight 
were fleeing, seven Sault Indians tried to reach a fortified 
church where another officer and some men were attempting to 
hold out. All of these Frenchmen were killed, yet the Sault 
Iroquois fought on bravely, defiant of the League Iroquois 
(although perhaps bravery was no longer necessary when they 
saw that they were being spared Iroquois bullets) .3 They did 
not, however, defect to their kinsmen. Rather, some were 
taken as captives to Iroquois country and forced to give 
information about French activities and plans.4
The greatest effect of this invasion, infamously known as 
the "Lachine Massacre," was to bring the Sault Iroquois to 
live inside Montreal temporarily in a makeshift village they 
had erected there. Denonville claimed that he had them moved 
to the city because he had heard rumors that the English and 
Iroquois wanted to seize the village and because their fort 
was in a state of disrepair. A League Mohawk, Lawrence, who 
was a prominent Anglophile and Protestant convert, disagreed, 
accusing the governor of Canada of having these Indians moved
3Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., "[Frangois Vachon de] Belmont's 
History of Canada," Mid-America XXXIV (1952), p. 142.
4Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the 
State of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and 
Parsons, 1850-1851) 2:50 (hereafter cited as DHNY).
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because "the French were jealous of the praying Indians."5 
By this he meant that the French feared Kahnawake defection, 
a demoralizing prospect for the French in their war against 
the Iroquois and English. Another account suggests that 
"although the Indians of Sault Saint-Louis were entirely in 
our interests, and we had a garrison in their fort, they were 
obliged to bring their families and their crop harvest to 
Montreal, where they put their cabins in the form of a 
village." French fears that these Indians may not have been 
entirely in their interest were strong enough to warrant this 
removal, at a cost of using valuable troops to transport the 
Indians' personal effects and food supply when the colony was 
on a war footing.6 This removal was probably not carried out 
voluntarily; there is no evidence that the Kahnawakes wanted 
to move, but also no evidence of large-scale resistance, 
perhaps because of bias in French records.
When they were finally moved back to the Sault in the 
summer of 1690, having had a full year in which to learn all
5Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada: 
Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.) I0:339v
(hereafter cited as C11A; references are to originals); 
Lawrence's claim: American Antiquarian Society Notebook, s.v.
4 Jan. 1690 (cited in Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the 
Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 
1609-1720" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1984), p. 366).
Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 1927-
28, p. 19 (hereafter cited as RAPQ) ; "Relation de ce qui s'est 
passe en Canada au sujet de la guerre, tant des Anglais que 
des Iroquois, depuis l'annee 1682," Historical Documents 3d 
ser., no. Ill (Quebec: Literary and Historical Society of 
Quebec, 1871), p. 45 (quote); NYCD 9:435.
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the vices of French society from which they had previously 
been sheltered by the Jesuits, they were not appreciated in 
the city. A major reason for the move back to the Sault was 
that many "disorders" had arisen from this brief experiment in 
intercultural living. The Sault Iroquois became addicted to 
liquor in an urban setting where its traffic was impossible to 
limit, and when drunk they committed horrible acts of violence 
against their own and other people. It is not surprising that 
people taken by fiat out of their homes and into an alien 
environment would react in negative ways. Their discontent 
had become great enough that New France's top officials 
reported to the king their worries over Kahnawake defection to 
the League Iroquois. But it was thought that if they were 
given provisions and ammunition and returned to their former 
home, they would fight exceptionally well against the enemy.7 
Not surprisingly, the new site of the Mission of Saint- 
Frangois-Xavier at Sault Saint-Louis, built in 1690 a league 
or two further west from the former location, was a fortified 
village.8
The last of the so-called "beaver wars" which the 
Iroquois had fought with other Indian tribes, and by extension 
with the French, blended into the first of the wars for empire 
fought between the French and the English in North America.
7C11A 10:321.
8NYCD 9:435.
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The English at Albany had become increasingly protective of 
their Iroquois allies against the pretensions of the French in 
the 1680s, but North American relations were also dictated by 
political and diplomatic realities across the ocean. Until 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Stuart monarchy of 
England was on a friendly footing with its Catholic 
counterpart on the French throne, Louis XIV. The English 
events of 1688 changed all that, however, as the largely 
Protestant English upper class feared continued rule by 
Catholics and supported a coup of the throne by the Dutch 
(Protestant) William of Orange and his marriage to Mary, a 
Protestant in the English royal line. William was no friend 
of the Sun King, and proceeded, virtually on ascending the 
throne, to declare war on his neighbor across the Channel. 
News of this development did not reach North America until 
1689, but it did have the effect of gearing up the war machine 
in both New France and the various English colonies, 
especially the northern ones closest to New France.
As the most vulnerable colony to the new enemy, New York 
had been psychologically prepared since the blustering cold 
war between Dongan and Denonville, but the colony was thrown 
into political chaos and strident anti-Catholicism with the 
local rebellion of Jacob Leisler and his son-in-law, Jacob 
Milborne. The French therefore interpreted the Lachine 
massacre as not just another Iroquois outrage, but one 
instigated by the English at Albany, who, even though not
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entirely sympathetic to Leisler, had had to capitulate to the 
rabidly anti-Catholic German demagogue. The French were to 
retaliate for the attack with a raid of their own in early 
1690, but Indians were involved on both sides, and in this 
February 1690 assault, no Indians were more prominent than the 
Sault Iroquois and their relatives, the League Mohawks.
In fact, the Francophile Sault chief Kryn seems to have 
been the unofficial leader of the expedition which resulted in 
a tit-for-tat "massacre” of Schenectady. Governor Denonville 
had intended to invade Albany, thereby striking at the heart 
of the province of New York (such was the perception in 
Quebec).9 Eighty Sault and Mountain Iroquois, 16 Algonquins, 
and 110 Frenchmen set out from Montreal in late January, and 
as they reached south of Lake George, the Indians asked the 
commanders of the operation, Ste. Helene and de Mantet, what 
the exact plan was.10 The officers replied that Albany was 
the hoped-for target, and on hearing this the tribesmen 
reserved no disdain for this foolhardy plan. These Indians, 
mostly Sault, knew the geography well, and explained the 
difficulties they would have in attacking the largest and most
9C11A 11:186-188; DHNY 1:180; Guillaume Phips, who wrote 
the "Relation de ce qui s’est passe..." says "as it was the 
capital of New York and a considerable place." in Collection 
des Manuscrits. contenant lettres. memoires et autres 
documents historioues relatifs a la Nouvelle-France 4 vols. 
(Quebec: A. Cote, 1883-1885), 1:489.
10NYCD 9:466; Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston 
Indian Records. 1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical 
Association, 1956), p. 158 (hereafter cited as LIR).
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heavily fortified settlement in the region. One Indian 
(probably Kryn) even asked the Frenchmen when they had become 
so desperate. The response had to do with wounded honor from 
the Lachine massacre, and the desire to avenge that blow, or 
to die in the attempt. But Indians were much more pragmatic 
than to go or. a suicide mission and would not accept this 
plan. The bicultural group agreed to disagree until they 
reached the fork in the path leading to Albany and to the 
sleepy hamlet of Schenectady west of it. At that crossroads, 
the Indians managed to convince the Frenchmen to veer to the 
west, perhaps by simply refusing to participate in the attack 
if it was to be on the larger town. Or the French may have 
deferred to the natives' superior knowledge of the area; they 
were quick to admit in accounts of this event that these 
Indians knew what they were talking about.11
Having almost reached Schenectady, the group stopped and 
was given a pep talk by Kryn. He harangued them and exhorted 
them to forget their weariness and to fight hard for the cause 
of avenging the deaths of the previous summer at the hands of 
the Iroquois. Kryn spoke of the Five Nations as traitors 
because they had heeded the solicitation of the English —  
harsh words for a fellow Iroquois.12 This of course earned
11DHNY 1:186-187.
12NYCD 9:467; Pierre F.-X. Charlevoix, History and General 
Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and 
trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872), 4:123; Claude
Bacqueville de la Potherie, Histoire de l'Americxue 
Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris: 1722), 3:67.
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him the praise of the French, who spoke in glowing terms; 
"this Indian was without contradiction the most considerable 
of his tribe, an honest man, as full of spirit, prudence and 
generosity as possible, and capable at the same time of the 
grandest undertakings.1,13 Charlevoix later claimed that Kryn 
"with great eloquence, [spoke] with an authority acquired, not 
only over the Indians, but even over the French, by his great 
services to the colony, actions of admirable conception and 
heroic valour, eminent virtue, and untiring zeal for 
religion."14 In French eyes, Kryn was the most prominent and 
admired Kahnawake Indian because he was the most pro-French.
The Schenectadians did not expect to be attacked in the 
middle of winter when the snow was so deep; they had a 
stockade fortification around their village but had left the 
gates wide open on the night of February 9.15 They were 
awakened in the early morning to the cries of the invaders, 
who spared hardly anyone except one Scottish family and about 
thirty Mohawks who were in the village. According to every 
French account of the event, the Mohawks were spared because 
the French and Mission Indians wanted to make a point that 
they believed the English had been the force behind the
13NYCD 9:467.
14Charlevoix, History 4:123.
15W.H. Whitmore, ed., The Andros Tracts 8 vols. (New York: 
Franklin, 1971, reprinted from the 1874 ed.), 3:114.
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Lachine massacre which they were avenging.16 However, it 
seems a bit far-fetched to absolve the Iroquois of blame for 
attacking Lachine, even if the English encouraged them. They 
still carried out the raid and did the killing, looting, and 
burning. Since the mission Iroquois were so prominent in the 
decision-making on this occasion, they may have insisted on 
clemency for the Mohawks because they were kinsmen. There had 
been no problems with keeping the Sault Iroquois from changing 
their minds about participating in the expedition on the way 
down to Schenectady as there had been three years earlier en 
route to Seneca country; they felt much more at ease about 
military operations against Europeans with whom they had no 
blood ties. Members of their own tribe were a different 
matter. Still in 1690 as at Lachine the preceding year, the 
invading force had strong reservations about inflicting harm 
on others of Iroquois ancestry and spared fellow Indians while 
shooting at whites.
The officials at Albany managed to persuade some League 
Mohawks to pursue the French and mission Indian forces as the 
latter were returning home with their thirty prisoners. 
Mohawks from the first two castles, led by the Anglophile 
Mohawk Lawrence, joined some militiamen from Albany and
16Collection des Maunscrits 1:491; NYCD 9:468; Reuben Gold 
Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 73 
vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 64:61 (hereafter cited 
as JR); Nellis M. Crouse, LeMovne d 1Iberville. Soldier of New 
France (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 57- 
58.
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marched toward Lake Champlain. Lieutenant-Governor Leisler 
praised the eastern Iroquois for their "fidelity and courage" 
in chasing the enemy, but other accounts indicated that there 
had been difficulty in rousing the Mohawks and that the third 
castle had declined to send any men.17 Factionalism reigned 
among the League Mohawks as well as among the Sault Iroquois; 
the third castle was evidently the pro-French or neutral 
group, holding out against the pro-English castles led by 
Lawrence because the Mohawks at Schenectady had been spared or 
because they were more positively disposed toward their Sault 
brethren (or for both reasons). Lawrence's band captured 
fifteen and killed three of the French-allied Indian group, 
but whether the three unfortunate ones were white or Indian is 
not known.18
The neutral or Francophile faction among the League 
Mohawks became more forceful in the following months. 
Kahnawake Indians had joined an assault against English 
settlements in northern New England near Salmon Falls. The 
governor of Connecticut expected to count on the support of 
the League Mohawks to avenge these attacks by French-allied 
Indians, but Robert Livingston complained of the Mohawks' 
reluctance on this occasion to chase the "French praying 
Indians."19 Sault and League Iroquois with loaded guns were
17DHNY 1:191, 2:87-88; NYCD 3:700, 708, 717.
18NYCD 3:708.
19NYCD 3:728-729. fRAPO 1927-28, p. 45 re: expedition).
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still keeping their distance from each other.
On the Sault Iroquois expedition in New England in the 
spring of 1690, Kryn was accidentally killed by a French- 
allied Abenaki who mistook him for an enemy.20 One might 
guess that Kryn's death would result in a withering of pro- 
French (anti-League) sentiment at the Sault village, but 
Kryn's nephew, La Plaque, picked up the torch where his uncle 
had left it, and this younger Francophile headman made himself 
prominent as a trigger-happy reconnaissance man. (But it is 
unclear how much support he had among the Sault people.) He 
frequently ventured south of Montreal toward Lake Champlain to 
check for invading English and Iroquois, and at times seemed 
to be crying wolf.21
However, in July 1690, Major-General John Winthrop of 
Massachusetts attempted to bring a force from several colonies 
to invade Montreal, coinciding with a naval attack from New 
England on Quebec. The naval attempt led by Sir William Phips 
failed, as did Winthrop's land expedition. Winthrop had 
trouble getting the Iroquois to join the force in sufficient
20Collection des Manuscrits 1:500-501; "Relation de ce qui 
s'est passe..." Historical Documents. pp. 47-48; Potherie 
1:347-348.
21See for instance, Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie 
F3 (Collection Moreau de Saint-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.), 
2:249; Louis Armand de Lorn D'Arce de Lahontan, New Vovaaes to 
North America (2nd.ed.) 2 vols. (London: Bonwicke, 1735),
1:158; NYCD 9:479-480; Louis Armand de Lorn D'Arce de Lahontan, 
The Oakes Collection: new documents bv Lahontan. Gustave
Lanctot, ed. (Ottawa: Patenaude, 1940), p. 33. (La Plaque was 
a true French zealot; he went to France to meet the king. 
Potherie, Histoire 1:166.)
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numbers. He attempted to heighten the fervor of at least 
those Mohawks who had arrived, by feigning interest in the 
Mohawk chiefs' advice on strategy. They gave him outrageous 
answers to his questions, a display of contempt for his 
patronizing attitude. But when the assembled men got as far 
as Wood Creek and had to turn back because of delays caused by 
sickness among the troops and a lack of canoes, Winthrop sent 
John Schuyler, the Albanian, on to conduct as much border 
raiding as possible, accompanied by whoever would continue.22 
Forty militia and one hundred Indians, most of them Mohawks, 
continued on to New France. The Mohawk headmen may have 
viewed Winthrop with a contemptuous eye, but John Schuyler was 
popular among them, and what had originally looked like a 
feeble effort from Iroquois forces turned out to be a strong 
showing.23
French forces had known of the approach of the English 
and Iroquois because of La Plaque's reconnaisance efforts. 
Throughout late August, the French assembled as many able male 
bodies as possible at the fort of La Prairie. They took the 
threat seriously; even Governor Frontenac was on hand at the 
fort. He called on his Indian allies from the northern Great
22The Senecas had previously indicated they would provide 
some fighters for this cause, but a smallpox epidemic took its 
toll in the Seneca villages, and none arrived. (NYCD 9:461, 
3:717; Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: 
The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1960), p. 304.
^NYCD 4:193-196; Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," 
pp. 294-295.
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Lakes as well as from the St. Lawrence valley to join them. 
All sorts of bribery were used to encourage natives, including 
liquor.24
Many Sault Indians were on hand and called a meeting of 
all the chiefs of the various tribes represented, inviting 
them to visit with Front enac and to hear an important 
announcement. The speaker was Louis Ateriata, a controversial 
and enigmatic figure.25 Ateriata offered wampum belts along 
with his words, a sign that he meant seriously what he was 
saying. He exhorted each of the assembled headmen to "open 
his heart to Frontenac" as promised, and not to hide from him 
any transaction or communication, no matter how secret. 
Everyone knew that he implied communication with the Iroquois. 
Some French-allied tribes had been opening their own 
diplomatic relations with the Five Nations, since the war 
between the League and the French seemed as though it would 
continue indefinitely and these Indians were desperate to stop 
the carnage of their own people.
Louis Ateriata was proving to be resolutely pro-French,
24BXSB 9:480.
25The biography of him in the Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography confuses him with another Indian. He was 
controversial because despite being extremely pro-French, the 
Jesuits had him banished from Kahnawake for some unknown 
reason. He correctly predicted an Iroquois invasion but the 
Jesuits at the Sault told Calliere not to listen to anything 
that Louis Ateriata said. (Collection des Manuscrits 1:568; 
"Relation de ce qui s'est passe..." Historical Documents, p. 
25; Henri Bechard, "Tareha," Dictionary of Canadian Biography 
Vol. 1, pp. 633-634.
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an ardent successor to Kryn (La Plaque was also strongly pro- 
French, but did not seem to be the speechmaker). He announced 
to the assembled Ottawa chiefs that he (Louis) was aware of 
their secret negotiations with the Iroquois and warned that 
they had some explaining to do as to why they carried on these 
talks while still considering themselves allies of 
Frontenac.26 The Ottawa orator answered that they had indeed 
exchanged some prisoners and negotiated, but reminded the 
assembly that they had been forced by the French to declare 
war on the Five Nations, "to cease and renew hostilities 
without having been advised of the reason," that such a 
situation made no sense to them, and that the French did not 
come to their defense when they needed help in fighting the 
enemy of the French. They had decided to look out for 
themselves in order to survive.27
Other French allies at this meeting (which Louis Ateriata 
was using to rally support for the fleur-de-lys) heard these 
words and started to question French integrity. A Huron 
speaker later asked why the French, on one hand, insisted that 
their Indian allies fight the Iroquois at every chance, and, 
on the other, spared thirty of them at Schenectady.28 The
26Potherie, Histoire 3:99.
27NYCD 9:480.
28NYCD 9:481. The League Mohawks explicitly stated they 
did not kill those they captured on the French/Indian retreat 
from Schenectady in February 1690 and at La Prairie in the 
summer of 1690 because the French-allied Iroquois had spared 
the lives of 30 Mohawks at Schenectady. (NYCD 9:499.)
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Sault Iroquois were not the only ones who had ever become 
disillusioned with the French; these other allies also became 
jaded with a European power which made a policy of double 
standards and of getting Indians to do most of their dirty 
work for them. While the Hurons were complaining that the 
French had spared Mohawks while they were out in the woods 
losing their young men to Iroquois bullets, they may not have 
known that it was probably done as a concession to the 
Kahnawake allies. Frontenac did not let on in his reply that 
this was the case, lest he suffer a revolt of his allied 
Indians who did not appreciate special treatment for certain 
native groups.
The events which followed indicated that most Indian 
allies were not eager to fight French battles. A scouting 
party had been sent out toward Chambly a few days before the 
meeting of allied representatives and Frontenac called by 
Sault Indians. The scouting party consisted of two Frenchmen 
and eight Indians (two from each major tribe represented). 
The ten men had not gone as far as they were instructed to, 
stopping at Chambly, they said, because they had not seen any 
trails. From this report, the alarm which had gathered so 
many habitants and troops as well as Indians at La Prairie 
seemed to have been false, and since many were impatient to be 
back home for the harvest, Frontenac released everyone and 
returned to Montreal.
No record exists to explain the decision made by the
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scouting party, but the official French account blamed the 
failure of the ten scouts to detect the enemy so close to La 
Prairie on the eight Indians. Eight could easily have 
outnumbered two in deciding to report no danger and to disband 
the forces. The official account spoke of the "negligence" of 
the Indians and reasoned that the latter were also eager to 
return home, thereby underestimating the possibility that 
enemy forces were on their way through the woods.29 In any 
case, two days after most of the men at La Prairie returned 
home, the Iroquois and English led by John Schuyler raided the 
outpost, catching the inhabitants off guard, killing twelve 
men and taking nineteen prisoners. By their "negligence," the 
scouting party had managed to avoid a direct confrontation 
with Five Nations fighters.
The La Prairie incident may have caused people on both 
sides of Lake Champlain to think about the status of League- 
Sault relations; some Kahnawakes who had remained in the area 
may have been among those wounded or killed by the Mohawks 
allied with Schuyler.30 The Catholic Iroquois and their 
brothers who remained in the Iroquois League were one step 
closer to fratricide.
Conversely, the summer of 1690 also brought a return to 
normal life of sorts for the Kahnawakes; they left their 
makeshift tents in Montreal and built longhouses at their new
^NYCD 9:481.
30Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 294-295.
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village site at Sault Saint-Louis. The French helped them 
resettle by transporting their supplies and giving them "every 
assistance necessary both for their subsistence and for the 
security of their families, and to induce them to wage a 
vigorous war on the enemy."31 Security considerations were 
never far from French minds, and as their aid to the Sault 
Iroquois indicates, they expected the latter to fight the 
League Iroquois and the English for them.32
Sixteen ninety-one was the year of decision in Kahnawake- 
Five Nations relations. But it started with a strange and 
unpredictable turn of events. In March, a group of 140 
Mohawks and Albanians attacked a group of Sault and Mountain 
Iroquois who were on a hunting trip near Chambly. Taking 
prisoners as they did was standard procedure, but the next 
action of the League Mohawks was unorthodox. They sent three 
of their men as envoys with some of the Sault prisoners to the 
gates of Fort Sault Saint-Louis unarmed, and asked for peace 
with the Mission Iroquois and with Frontenac. There were a 
few minutes of great tension, after which the Sault people 
decided that they meant no harm and indeed came in peace. The 
envoys (and prisoners) were admitted inside and, according to 
Jesuit Father Bruyas, "were well received by our Indians, who
31NYCD 9:453.
32Daniel Richter says the Sault Indians bore the brunt of 
the war for the French. (Richter, "The Ordeal of the 
Longhouse," p . 367.)
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were greatly rejoiced at seeing them so well inclined."33 
Gifts were exchanged, and an impromptu peace conference was 
underway. The League Mohawks ingratiated themselves with 
their Sault counterparts by warning them of an imminent Five 
Nations attack of eight hundred men.34 With belts of wampum 
to reinforce their words, the Kahnawakes thanked them for the 
warning and for sparing their captives, but admonished them 
that if they truly meant to live at peace with Onontio (the 
Iroquois name for the Governor of New France), which according 
to Father Bruyas, they equated with "living under his 
authority, as true children should do," they must not go back 
on their word, as some Onondagas had done.
The pro-French Kahnawakes were the ascendant faction at 
this meeting under the noses of the Jesuits, evident from 
their assumption that peace with Onontio meant living under 
his authority. The Sault orator explained to the League 
delegates that making peace with the Sault Indians meant being 
at peace with all of their "brethren," among whom were "the 
Christians of La Montagne, of Lorette, and of Sillery."35 
The pro-French faction among the Kahnawakes identified more 
closely with other mission Indians than with their 
traditionalist relatives in Iroquoia. Or possibly this was
33JR 64:57; Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C U E  (Des 
Limites et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.), 10:22 (hereafter 
cited as C U E ) .
^NYCD 9:503; JR 64:57.
35JR 64:59.
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said in the presence of the Jesuits to appease them, in any 
case, belts of wampum accompanied these words so they were 
binding, and League Iroquois were given the impression that 
the Sault Iroquois identified more with other "mission 
Indians" than with the Iroquois proper.
As for official words from the League Mohawks, they used 
no wampum in their speech, according to Bruyas' account. 
Therefore, these Mohawks did not represent a general consensus 
among their people; they were a renegade peace faction 
(neutral or pro-French). They admitted that only the warriors 
among their people asked for peace "and have concluded it on 
their own account, and not through the Elders - whom they 
would not consult, because they [Elders] are not always very 
sincere." These men went on to explain that "moreover, all 
those among the Agniers [Mohawks] who had sense are dead."36
The depopulation of the Five Nations by disease and war had 
taken its toll on the political culture of the Mohawks; they 
faced a leadership crisis because so many of their people had 
died, and perhaps some of the more sagacious and cautious 
elders had fallen victim to smallpox or extreme factionalism. 
The peace delegation to the Sault in the spring of 1691 was a 
group which represented only one faction among the tribe; 
since politics relied on consensus, the only solution to an 
impasse was to break off into a splinter group and attempt to 
form policy independently.
36JR 64:59-61.
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Meanwhile the war (pro-English) faction among the League 
Mohawks was preparing for the invasion of which the Sault 
Iroquois had been warned. The League Mohawk peace faction 
warned the Kahnawakes not to stray from their fort lest they 
be captured by Iroquois or Mahican war parties prowling the 
area. This peace faction was out on a limb with its warnings 
and promises to settle for peace and to exchange prisoners. 
One wishes for names of individuals and for knowledge of their 
fates at the hands of their own people because of these 
treasonous actions.
At the Sault these mysterious pacifists left behind two 
of their own as a gesture of faith.37 Father Bruyas pondered 
their sincerity and judged it true. He admitted that others 
(probably Father Lamberville, who was at Sault Saint-Louis) 
doubted them, but Bruyas was hopeful. He reported to 
Frontenac the Sault Iroquois’ elation at the outcome of the 
visit, and that they ardently wished for peace as well, being 
weary of war as well as of disease, which had struck the Sault 
as well as League Iroquois communities. Bruyas was so 
optimistic about entente between the League and Mission 
Iroquois that he predicted that two-thirds of the Mohawks 
would be living at the Sault eventually.38
37And according to another account, 25 League Mohawks 
stayed behind to visit with their relatives. (NYCD 9:499.)
38 JR 64:63. Robert Livingston reported in 1700 that two- 
thirds of that nation had emigrated to the two mission 
villages (the Sault and the Mountain). (NYCD 4:648.)
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However, another French account of the Mohawk peace 
delegation visit indicated that the envoys' message was to 
entreat the Sault Iroquois to return to their homeland before 
the onslaught of the Five Nations/English force. This force 
of 800 soldiers meant to capture as many Sault Indians as 
possible, Intendant Champigny claimed in his letter to the 
minister of marine, and to resettle them forcibly in Iroquoia, 
as well as to inflict damage on as many French settlements as 
possible. Champigny proudly reported that "our Indians 
encouraged by their missionaries, and aided by a reinforcement 
M. de Callieres had sent them, remained faithful."39 With 
such "encouragement," however, these Indians could hardly have 
made a free decision.
According to the Intendant, the Sault Iroquois told the 
League Mohawk diplomats that if they wanted peace with the 
Sault people, they would have to talk to Frontenac. It seems 
difficult to believe that these people would voluntarily 
relinquish their sovereignty and defer their own fate to the 
French government. There must have been encouragement to say 
these words, and all but the pro-French faction must have 
shaken their heads in dismay. Furthermore, the condition 
placed on the negotiations by the Sault speaker —  that the 
League Mohawks had to consider themselves brothers of all the 
Mission Indians, not just the Sault people — may have been a 
device by which to ensure great difficulty in reaching an
39NYCD 9:499.
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agreement. The French had just started their war with the 
English and wanted their Indian allies to do most of the 
fighting. It may have been in French interests to avoid a 
peace with any group of the League Iroquois. Bruyas' wishes 
for peace could not have been appreciated in government 
circles. (Sometimes Jesuits were at odds with policy instead 
of aiding it.40) Champigny expressed grave doubts about the 
sincerity of the peace group and predicted an escalation of 
hostilities instead of a cease-fire.41
In Albany the meeting at Kahnawake was interpreted 
differently from both Bruyas1 and Champigny's accounts. For 
instance, the New York Council was told that the "praying 
Indians" desired to return to New York.42 Jurrian and 
Onnooka, Anglophile Mohawks, reported to the Albany 
authorities that Lawrence the Mohawk had gone inside the fort 
at Kahnawake not to make peace, but to make war, and failed to 
do so only upon seeing that his life was in danger. Jurrian 
and Onnooka failed to mention that the Mohawks warned the 
Sault Iroquois of the coming Iroquois attack, relaying only 
that the French government and the Sault people had thanked 
their Mohawk counterparts for returned prisoners, and that the 
Mission Iroquois expressed interest in emigrating to New York
40See William J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV. 1663-1701 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), p. 133.
41NYCD 9:500.
42New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State 
Library, Old Vol. 6 p. 17 (Calendar p. 64).
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if a priest would be provided there. According to these two 
messengers, the governor of New France declared that he would 
leave most points of diplomacy to his "Children the praying 
Indians att Caguinago [Kahnawake]."43 The discrepancy 
between this interpretation and the Kahnawakes' own apparent 
resignation of their affairs to the French in the other 
accounts is glaring. It is no wonder that years of 
hostilities went on between the French and their allied 
Indians and the English and theirs, given the wildly different 
reports each side got of the same events.
Frontenac seems to have doubted League Iroquois 
intentions for peace, but decided to play the game which had 
been started. He advised Calliere, the governor of Montreal, 
to continue the peace talks started by the Mohawks, "by the 
mediation of our Indians of the Sault."44 He did not want to 
appear too eager for peace, so he used the Sault Iroquois as 
a go-between to cover his intentions, as he explained to the 
minister, "in order that it may not appear that I made any 
advances on my side."45 This policy, intended or not, had 
the effect of scuttling chances of its success with the 
governor of New York, who claimed the right to be involved in
43New York Colonial Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.), New 
York State Library, 37:56. (Interestingly, this version 
indicates that the Sault Iroquois included, in their 
negotiation offer, six points of religion on which they would 
not compromise.)
“RAPS 1927-28, p. 62.
45NYCD 9:496.
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any negotiation the Five Nations entertained with another 
power. Some League Mohawks told Governor Fletcher of the 
meeting at Kahnawake and the desire for peace, asking him how 
they should respond. He answered that they should not 
consider any proposals from the Mission Iroquois, probably 
because he jealously eyed the budding role of the Kahnawakes 
as intermediaries between the French and the League Iroquois, 
wanting that role for his own government. He prohibited the 
Five Nations from communicating with the Sault Iroquois.46
Nor did most of the Five Nations want peace with the 
Sault Iroquois on the terms of the spring 1691 talks. In June 
of that year, a group of League Mohawks addressed Governor 
Fletcher's replacement, Governor Henry Sloughter. They 
represented the wishes of the Sault Iroquois for peace and for 
the return of some Sault prisoners taken by the Senecas, and 
bid the other four nations to agree to this proposal. 
Sloughter asked representatives of the others for their 
opinion of the offer. An Oneida speaker representing the four 
upper nations spoke of the treachery and deceit of the French, 
thereby refusing to consider the Mohawk proposal. Sloughter 
agreed, and a majority of the Iroquois along with the New York 
government scuttled the Mohawk-Sault peace offer.47
Not all Mohawks advocated the peace policy in the spring
^Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in 
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. Charles Howard Mcllwain, 
ed. (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), pp. 16-17.
47NYCD 3:777-780.
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of 1691. Some accompanied Oneidas and other Iroquois in 
raiding along the St. Lawrence at the Long Sault. They were 
met by some mission Indians and Frenchmen led by Frangois Le 
Moyne de Bienville.48 The French and mission Indian group 
deliberated for a long time whether to attack the invaders or 
allow them to pass, because of the peace negotiations pending. 
Finally, the Sault Iroquois, the majority among the 
French/Indian group, convinced the Frenchmen not to harm them, 
and some were allowed to go with the mission Indians to 
Montreal.49 Later they were allowed to return to New York 
unharmed, which upset some of the French. They viewed the 
role of the Sault Iroquois in this incident not as peace 
makers, but as a fifth column among the French working to 
further the intrigues of the Five Nations and the English. 
The Kahnawakes had aided in the escape of Iroquois bandits 
from French justice, as Frontenac saw it. He had always 
mistrusted them, occasionally relenting in this opinion for 
individual cases such as Kryn and Paul.50 On this occasion, 
however, he told the minister, "there has been much outcry 
against the Indians of the Sault, and their conduct has been 
suspected of insincerity, I have long since perceived a great 
indulgence that does not please me, any more than certain
^On Bienville, see "Frangois Le Moyne de Bienville," by 
Jean Blain, in Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1:463.
49NYCD 9:517.
50On Paul's fidelity, see Potherie, Histoire 1:349-350.
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secret intercourse and connexion which they maintain with the 
Mohawks, among whom they have many kindred."51
Frontenac also suspected that the Jesuits at the Sault 
winked at the secret dealings between the Sault and League 
Mohawks. At the very time when bloodshed broke out between 
the two groups of Mohawks, the Christian ones were suspected 
of working for the other side. But those who avoided the 
battle may have only been attempting to avoid the nightmare of 
seeing a relative fall from one's own bullet or arrow.
When Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, commander of the 
troops in Canada, met a party of forty-to-fifty Oneidas, 
however, he showed no mercy but attacked them vigorously, 
burning down a building in which they took shelter. He 
apparently had no Kahnawake fighters in his party.52 The 
presence or absence of Sault Iroquois men in a guerilla party 
seems to have made a difference as to whether or not the party 
would attack the invaders. While at the Sault under the 
watchful eye of Jesuits and garrisoned French troops, 
Kahnawakes may have had a policy dictated to them, but when 
out in the woods in a small group, especially when they 
outnumbered Frenchmen, they usually got their way. Perhaps 
this is why they were so heavily involved in these small-scale 
forays; it was an opportunity to have a great deal of control 
over foreign policy.
51Charlevoix, History 4:197; C11A ll:233v.
52NYCD 9:517-518.
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Many Kahnawakes still wanted peace in late spring; so did 
some Iroquois. While some Five Nations fighters were raiding 
French and- even allied Indian targets (such as the Mountain 
Mission), others sent a secret wampum belt of reconciliation 
to Louis Ateriata at the Sault. It offered a chance for the 
Kahnawakes to escape to New York before hostilities worsened 
and pitted League and Sault Iroquois directly against each 
other.53 But the Iroquois who sent this belt made a serious 
mistake because Louis Ateriata was firmly entrenched in the 
pro-French camp at the Sault, and he demonstrated his loyalty 
to the French government above other allegiances by promptly 
showing the secret belt to Callieres instead of conspiring for 
an escape to New York. Because of this, the scheme was 
aborted, but it indicated an active pro-peace faction among 
the Five Nations.
People were still travelling back and forth between the 
Sault and Iroquoia. A Mohawk named Taonnochrio who was sent 
to Kahnawake reported that although he had returned, ten 
others had stayed at the mission village.54 Simon Groot, a 
Dutchman who had been a prisoner at the Sault and was recently 
released, informed the Albany authorities that the Sault 
village was strongly stockaded and that some of those Indians 
were "inclined to come hither, but strict guards [were] kept
53NYCD 9:518.
54NYCD 3:782.
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by the French to prevent their departure."55 Taonnochrio 
told Robert Livingston (the Albany Indian commissioner) of his 
trip to the Sault, reporting that while there he heard a rumor 
that the French were making canoes to go to war. He asked his 
aunt, a Sault Iroquois, why the French were making so many of 
them, imploring her to "tell me plainly and do not hide it 
from me, for I will not stay here, & suffer my people to be 
cut off." The woman admitted to her nephew that indeed, the 
very next day, thirty "praying Indians" would be going out to 
"annoy" the Onondagas. Another Sault Indian confirmed the 
story for Taonnochrio and implored the latter or any of the 
Mohawks not to go to where the skirmish would take place.56 
Sault Iroquois were going to war against some Five Nations 
people, while warning others of the danger they themselves 
posed.
In June 1691, Major Peter Schuyler assembled his forces 
of New Yorkers and Indians for a combined assault on the 
French near Montreal. He had trouble getting all of the 
Mohawks to come with him, no doubt because of the peace 
faction among them. The first two Mohawk villages sent their 
full forces, but the third could not yet decide. The 
expedition lost track of some Mohawks along the way north 
through the Lake George-Lake Champlain corridor. These 
Mohawks had said they were going hunting and would meet the
55NYCD 3:781.
56NYCD 3:782.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
133
army further north, but did not reappear. Some Schagticoke 
Indians also ducked out along the way.57 This behavior calls 
to mind the Sault Iroquois reluctance to join the 1687 Seneca 
campaign. There is no doubt that these Mohawk and other 
Indians knew that the French army they would meet on the 
southern shore of the St. Lawrence would include Indians, 
perhaps their own clansmen.
Whereas John Schuyler's raid in the summer of 1690 was a 
close call in terms of open fighting between Sault and League 
Mohawks, his brother's attack the following summer was not a 
false alarm. It was the real thing. Even before the two 
armies met, Sault and League Iroquois fighters were pointing 
guns at each other. Schuyler sent out four Mohawk spies near 
Chambly, who met eight French "praying Indians." The eight 
demanded to know where the four were from and were answered. 
The eight then asked their names, and the League Mohawks said 
they need not give this information. The "praying Indians" 
replied to this with bullets, wounding three.58
A few days later, a battle took place at La Prairie 
between Schuyler's forces and a French army which had 
assembled at the fort there on the advice received from some 
Mohawks. The English attacked furiously, but the French soon 
rallied and fought back with surprising strength, forcing the
57NYCD 3:800-803.
58NYCD 3:803.
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English and Mohawks to a running retreat.59 This was the 
first real battle which pitted Sault against League Mohawks, 
but there were very few Sault Iroquois present. Some may have 
pleaded respect for the peace proposal. Probably only the 
most loyal to the French were there; those who fought did so 
commendably and were praised by the French.
One Kahnawake warrior named Paul, a fervent Christian, 
fought courageously and lost his life on the battlefield, 
exhorting his compatriots to fight on even as he fell.60 But 
others from the Sault waited until the fighting was over, at 
which time they approached the battlefield and counted and 
pillaged the bodies. The French were not impressed with this, 
especially since they expected these fresh, well-rested 
Indians to pursue the enemy back down toward Lake Champlain, 
as those who had fought in the battle were too tired to do so. 
But the Sault Iroquois soon found an excuse to leave; claiming 
to hear gunfire and running toward it, they left the battle 
site. The gunshots were merely part of a burial ceremony for 
the officers who had died, but they had served as an excuse 
for the Sault Iroquois fighters who were not as pro-French as 
their neighbor Paul.61 And even his death did not motivate
59Lahontan, New Voyages 1:174.
^RAPO 1927-28, p. 65; C11A ll:301v; NYCD 9:521-522; 
Edward James Devine, Historic Cauqhnawacra (Montreal: Messenger 
Press, 1922), p. 102.
61NYCD 9:523; RAPO 1927-28, p. 68-70. (The Lorette Huron 
Indians were cited as "the most loyal Indians that we have" 
during the summer of 1691. The Sault Iroquois did not receive
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them to take revenge on the League Mohawks. Perhaps the anti- 
French Kahnawakes even welcomed his death.
The French authorities did not look kindly on the conduct 
of the neutral Sault Iroquois in the hostilities of the 
summer. By fall, they began to suspect Kahnawake sincerity 
and that of the Mohawks who had come to the Sault the 
preceding spring. One official claimed that the peace 
delegation was just an excuse for the Mohawks to take shelter 
among their relatives so as to avoid retaliatory action for 
being so far into New France territory.62 Frontenac also 
said as much to the minister, and blamed the Kahnawakes for 
going along with it, "suspect[ing] that the conduct of the 
Sault Indians was not completely right and sincere."63
Frontenac suspected Jesuit complicity. He had always 
been at odds with this religious order, but had to tolerate 
their presence. In 1691, indeed, he needed to be grateful to 
them for continuing to attract more League Iroquois 
(especially Mohawk) immigrants to Sault Saint-Louis. In 
August, the New York governor and his Council had to admit to 
the English king that Mohawks were still emigrating to the 
French mission, to the point that the remaining Mohawks could
such praise, in contrast to the 1687 battle. Potherie, 
Histoire 3:139.)
62C11A 11:300.
63RAPO 1927-28, p. 68.
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no longer provide an effective fighting force.64 Frontenac 
saw treachery among the mission Iroquois on one hand, but on 
the other> a valuable attraction which was draining the 
enemy's fighting strength. Fortunately, Iroquois military 
activity fell off greatly after the summer skirmish and 
Frontenac kept his complaints to a minimum.
When it came time to prepare for the next French military 
plan —  to take Iroquois prisoners at Michilimackinac, where 
the Five Nations and some Albany allies had been homing in on 
the French fur trade, "it was retarded by various secret 
intrigues such as are commonly resorted to here." The 
complaining French official was referring to the Sault 
Indians' efforts to stop the war. The latter postulated, with 
belts of wampum to add weight to their words, that the colony 
would lose its best men if the war was further escalated by 
carrying out the Michilimackinac expedition. But "these new 
Councillors of State," as the Kahnawakes involved were called 
on this occasion, were ignored because Frontenac was 
suspicious about their motives for pacifism.65 Nevertheless, 
the peace faction at the Sault was alive and well in late 
1691, not having given in to the pro-French pressure from 
zealots such as La Plaque.
But this was the last hope for any cessation of 
hostilities. A direct Five Nations attack on Kahnawake people
^NYCD 3:799.
65NYCD 9:526.
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would discredit the peace faction at the Sault (which relied 
on the notion that the Five Nations did not want war) and in 
December, an attack finally erupted. League Iroquois warriors 
were ready by that time to join New York soldiers against 
targets to the north. A group fell on some Kahnawakes out 
hunting near Chambly and killed several of them outright (a 
change from the earlier practice of merely taking them 
prisoner). But the Sault and Mountain Iroquois and the French 
got word of the attack and pursued the enemy south to Lake 
Champlain. The two sides fought each other, no holds barred, 
and all of the "principall Captains" of the League Mohawks and 
Oneidas were killed.66 The Mohawks particularly were 
devastated by this loss; they had no leading men and only 130 
warriors left in their villages. They refused to fight any 
more after this routing.67 .
But the Kahnawakes had their hands full with the central 
and western Iroquois tribes in the next couple of years. 
Various skirmishes erupted in 1692 between Sault and League 
fighters, with deaths on both sides.68 Both sides had
^CllA 12:97; NYCD 9:534.
67NYCD 3:815, 817.
68NYCD 9:534, 3:836. In August 1692, a war party of Five 
Nations men assured Peter Schuyler (Mayor of Albany) that they 
would shortly bring the "praying Indians” to their knees. 
This may have been only to appease Schuyler, as any Indian 
group would have done (the Sault Indians did this in front of 
Jesuits and other French authorities), but may also have been 
a signal that as far as the League was concerned, the time for 
full-scale hostilities between the Sault and League brethren 
was at hand. CLIR 162.)
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suffered great losses in warfare before this phase of the war 
began, so both were limited to small-scale raids for most of 
the year. The French had to abandon a plan to attack iroquoia 
for lack of troops.69 By November, however, 400 western 
Iroquois approached the palisade at the fort of Sault Saint- 
Louis. They did not launch an open attack, but initiated 
sporadic exchanges of fire. An equally large group of eastern 
Iroquois had planned to join them, but on learning of their 
lack of success, retreated and hit outpost settlements along 
the south shore of the St. Lawrence instead.
Large numbers of troops were called in from other 
Montreal area forts to help defend Kahnawake.70 Whether some 
Sault people liked it or not, they were now unmistakeably at 
war with the Iroquois proper, but some did not mind this at 
all.71 The Oneida Sault chief Tataconicere took relish in 
dragging a prisoner, the wife of a League Iroquois chief, 
outside the palisade at the Sault and striking her on the head 
until she died. He did this because he had heard a rumor that 
she was considering an attempt to escape. After killing her, 
he flung his hatchet into the gate by the palisade as a sign 
that he would show mercy to no one, and invited his fellow 
Sault inhabitants to do likewise.72 This zealous display of
69C11A 12:182.
70Charlevoix, History 4:232-233; C11A 12:183.
71C11A 12:87v ; NYCD 9:538.
^NYCD 9:556.
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fidelity to the French cause elicited words of praise from 
Intendant Champigny: "one cannot see more faithfulness and 
bravery than our Indians are showing on all occasions." He 
added that his administration had "a very great interest in 
treating them well."73
There were mixed signals on both sides of the Kahnawake- 
French relationship in 1692. While some Kahnawake 
"councillors of state" had made a last-ditch effort at peace 
with the enemy, Tataconicere showed no mercy, and La Plague 
had returned from his visit to France geared up to fight the 
Iroquois at full capacity. He actively recruited Sault and 
other mission men to field a war party for that purpose.74 
Depending on which individuals at the Sault one looked at, one 
might see the Sault Indians as "doves" trying to subvert the 
French war effort or as "hawks" doing their best to support 
the war. Governor Frontenac perceived only the pacifist (in 
his terms, negative) side, whereas Intendant Champigny could 
see nothing but great efforts for the French and allied Indian 
cause.75
^CllA 12:87v.
74C11A 12:95v; NYCD 9:564.
^Cadwallader Colden, in his History of the Five Indian 
Nations... discussed this issue; he explained that the French 
wanted the Sault Iroquois to lure more Mohawks and other 
Iroquois people to live in New France, but when this did not 
happen on a scale large enough to satisfy the Jesuits, the 
French became suspicious of Sault communication with the Five 
Nations, and viewed it, volte-face, as a source of spy 
information for the Iroquois and New Yorkers. They were 
viewed alternately as pillars of the French cause in North
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The issue came to a head during 1692, when some Jesuits 
(anonymously) issued a memoir "on behalf of the Christian 
Iroquois in Canada" to Minister of Marine Pontchartrain. They 
were pleading for funds to support members of the Sault 
community who had become impoverished over the years during 
which they had fought with the French.76 The crowning 
argument was that were it not for these Indians, the Iroquois 
would now inhabit the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, and 
that the mission Iroquois had even killed some of their own 
relatives to prevent this from happening. The Jesuits who 
wrote this petition were truly concerned with the plight of 
their "charges"77 and argued that the Kahnawakes had given up 
their usual subsistence patterns and means of livelihood for 
much of each year since 1684 in order to provide military 
support.78 They also pointed out that these people were
America, and as fifth-column traitors. (Cadwallader Colden, 
History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada... 2 vols. (New 
York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from the 1747 edition), 1:179; 
also NYCD 9:557.)
76JR 64:109-113; C11A 12:136v-137.
^The term "charges" is used adviseably here; it seems 
appropriate in the sense that the Jesuits viewed these Indians 
as their charges, but we cannot assume from this that the 
Indians saw themselves as charges of the missionaries. More 
likely, they saw the Black Robes as diplomats or mediators 
between the Indian community and the French government and saw 
themselves as independent.
^Sault fighters were starting to demand daily pay when 
they went on expeditions with the French, just as French 
regular soldiers were entitled to. (C11A 12:193. Another 
example of such a demand occurred a few years later (in 
Charlevoix, History 5:76-77) (1697) ).
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fighting a war for the French, not a war of their own making. 
Despite Frontenac's wariness, Champigny also promoted their 
cause at the French court. And the Jesuit petition on their 
behalf made them seem to be a bulwark of the French military 
machine.
A few months later, "the concurrence in sentiment of the 
oldest and the best heads of the Sault and of the Mountain, 
obliged the Count [Frontenac] to direct his attention" to 
planning an invasion of eastern Iroquoia.79 The 1693 
onslaught took place in February, when the French and Mission 
Indians would have the advantage of surprising the League 
Mohawks in the off-season. Six hundred habitants. regular 
soldiers, Christian Iroquois, Algonquins from Trois Rivieres, 
Hurons, and Abenakis descended upon the Mohawk country in the 
dead of winter, destroying the first two Mohawk villages 
easily. Almost all the men were away on hunting trips and the 
two villages were barely fortified because of their proximity 
to the English settlements.80 The villages were burned and 
the women, children, and elderly people taken prisoner.
The English in Albany and Schenectady knew of the 
invading army but did not tell their Mohawk allies, which 
later infuriated the Five Nations. The latter had been 
continually enlisted to fight with the English against their
T’NYCD 9:557.
80New York Council Minutes Calendar, p. 81; NYCD 4:2, 6, 
19, 39, 9: 550; Potherie, Histoire 1:320-321; Colder., History 
1:181-182.
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enemies, and the English constantly spoke to the Iroquois of 
their obligations to the English as part of the Covenant Chain 
alliance between them, but when the turn came for the English 
to assist their Indian allies, they turned a blind eye.81
The third Mohawk village was inhabited by armed men able 
to repulse the invaders; they put up a fight, killing thirty 
or more of the French and allied Indian forces. But finally 
the attackers gained control and the Mohawks surrendered. 
Calliere, the French commander, and Frontenac had ordered that 
only women and children were to be spared from death. 
According to Pierre Charlevoix, the eighteenth-century 
historian of New France, the Christian Iroquois agreed to this 
policy when they set out from La Prairie. But at the Mohawk 
village, they changed their minds and would not allow the 
French to kill any of the prisoners they had just taken.82
One account describes an exchange which took place 
between La Plaque and his father, a League Mohawk. They came 
across each other during the fighting at the third village and 
the son said, "You have given me life, I give it to you today; 
but do not return again under my hand, because I won't save 
you [the next time]."83 La Plaque may have issued the threat 
for the benefit of his French allies who were watching warily
S1NYCD 4:2, 9:551; Colden, History 1:181-182.
“ Charlevoix, History 4:235; NYCD 9:551, 561.
“ Potherie, Histoire 1:322. (Bacqueville de la Potherie 
mistakenly identifies La Plaque as a war chief of the Iroquois 
of the Mountain, instead of the Sault.)
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for Sault fidelity. But the important fact was that even in 
this most heated battle, quarter was given. The Mohawks 
apparently asked for clemency, when they surrendered, by 
volunteering to emigrate to the missions. They claimed they 
had been intending to do so for some time, a clever way to 
have their captors regard them as new converts rather than as 
enemies who should be killed.84 This helped confirm the 
worst suspicions of the French about their Indian allies by 
inclining the latter to show mercy.
The Sault and Mountain Iroquois were responsible for 
scuttling any gains made in the military victory over the 
Mohawks; not only did they refuse to allow any of the male 
prisoners to be killed, but on the return home, with hundreds 
of Mohawk prisoners in their entourage, they found ways to 
sabotage French efforts to take the Mohawks all the way to New 
France. They delayed the return march home in order to allow 
Iroquois and/or English troops to catch up with them along the 
Lake Champlain corridor and released some of the prisoners 
when they were able. Charlevoix claimed that the French 
should have foreseen that the Kahnawakes would have done this 
because of their "lingering love of country."85 Faced with 
the test of taking relatives' lives in order to destroy the 
Mohawks as a people, the Sault Iroquois showed themselves
^NYCD 9:551.
^Charlevoix, History 4:235; C11A 13:109; Potherie, 
Histoire 1:322-323; NYCD 9:573.
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unwilling to commit outright fratricide.86
Eventually the Mohawks were able to rebuild, and since 
many prisoners escaped or were released, they repopulated 
their homeland to some extent. But the easternmost tribe of 
the Iroquois confederacy was no longer the potent force after 
1693 that it had been earlier in the seventeenth century. The 
February invasion was the last straw which broke them as a 
formidable power. Bacquevilie de la Potherie, a French 
chronicler of the events of the 1690s, wrote that since the 
1693 defeat, "this ... nation has become the smallest of the 
Five Nations, and now they are the ones who cause us the least 
trouble, although they are neighbours of the English."87
Many Mohawks voluntarily emigrated to the Sault and 
Mountain mission villages in the summer of 1693.88 Perhaps, 
as in the 1666 defeat, they saw a military devastation of 
their homes and their very nation as a sign from spiritual 
forces that the Frenchmen's god was the true one and that they 
had better capitulate to that deity in order to avoid further 
wrath. Their homes had been destroyed anyway and many had 
relatives at the Sault and Mountain villages, so the 1693
^ h e  King wrote a year later to Frontenac and Champigny 
that they should stop offering the Christian Indians bounties 
for Iroquois scalps, since not even that inducement kept them 
from "conniving at the escape of the Mohawks, and rendering 
that expedition ... useless." (NYCD 9:573.)
87Potherie, Histoire 1:323.
“ LIR, P- 171; New York Colonial Manuscripts 39:82v-82/2; 
NYCD 4:59.
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invasion was the final push convincing many to emigrate. 
There was talk of peace between the Five Nations and the 
French, and if this had come about (the New York government 
and the Albany commissioners did their best to prevent it) it 
would have seemed logical for people to once again move back 
and forth across the border.
The exodus of not just Mohawks but many other Five 
Nations people continued during the war years until the 1701 
peace settlement as well as after. Many of those who came had 
relatives at Kahnawake.89 The governor of New York and 
others having correspondence with New York officials in 1693 
referred to the Five Nations as "the Staggering Indians" or as 
people "who seem to stagger."90 Clearly, they were at a low 
point in their strength, and many of them decided that they 
had a better chance of surviving as a people in the new 
society along the St. Lawrence.91
89In JR 65:31 (1696), Father Lamberville stated that many 
adults came "from the country of our enemies to live here (at 
the Sault) with their kindred." (Also see NYCD 9:665, 687, 
4:648.) The Skachkook Indians testified to Albany officials 
that some of their Indians had gone to Canada "because they 
kill'd no Beaver, and were much indebted here, and so were 
ashamed to come hither, chusing rather to go to Canada." 
(Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July 1698 (New 
York: 1698), p. 15.) The demographic trend of the 1690s was 
overwhelmingly a northward shift.
^NYCD 4:37, 54.
91The Five Nations went from a fighting force of 2650 
before the war of 1689-1701 to 1230. The Sault Iroquois did 
not fare as badly, losing barely half of theirs. (NYCD 4:337) 
On the scuttling of peace efforts, see New York Council 
Minutes Old Vol. 7, p. 11 (Calendar p. 90) and p. 36 (Calendar 
p. 93).
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The Sault Iroquois avoided military confrontation with 
their League counterparts after the February event, raiding 
only whites further east in the western Massachusetts town of 
Deerfield.92 But some League Iroquois still held a grudge 
for the attack, as a Sault woman found out in the summer of 
1693. She was out in the fields about one league from 
Kahnawake nursing her newborn child and was captured by some 
League men and taken to Iroquoia where they tortured her. A 
number of similar incidents were reported during this time by 
French eyewitnesses held prisoner among the Five Nations who 
later reported them to Jesuits.93
The Sault stance of avoiding mass confrontations but 
taking revenge on their brethren on a small scale was a 
strategy which satisfied at the same time their anger at their 
southern relatives, French expectations of their support, and 
their own desire to minimize the escalation of hostilities. 
This was the sum effect of Sault attitudes and actions, as 
viewed from the outside, but to see a single Sault "policy" 
which brought this about is probably inaccurate. Opinions 
differed at Kahnawake on whether the villagers were obligated 
or even inclined to follow French policy. Much may have 
depended on how much individual leaders —  be they League
92New York Colonial Manuscripts 39:73; New York Council 
Minutes Old Vol. 6, p. 211 (Calendar p. 86); NYCD 9:553.
93JR 64:145, 65:33-35; William Ingraham Kip, trans. and 
comp., The Earlv Jesuit Missions in North America (New York: 
1847), pp. 124-131. (These violent incidents were interpreted 
by the Jesuits as religiously motivated.)
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able to convince others, and for those who were taking on 
European traits, on how far they were able to assert their 
will over those who disagreed with them. Kryn and La Plague 
were leaders who, although not representing everyone at the 
Sault, were able to affect events significantly (judged by 
their appearance in written documents). These are some of the 
few individual Sault Indians about which we can guess; the 
others are all but invisible in the historical record, 
probably because their opinions were unpopular with people who 
chronicled New France's history. If Indians had a written 
culture, instead of or in addition to an oral one, we might 
have an entirely different view of these events and 
developments.94
94In the following chapter, some others will be mentioned 
who appear in the written records and were not pro-French.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
KAHNAWAKE-FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE 1690S
After the 1693 invasion, the Kahnawakes seem to have 
become virtual puppets of Frontenac. In 1694 negotiations 
between the governor and the Five Nations, the French count 
spoke on behalf of the Sault Iroquois, stating that they were 
submissive to him. The Sault people present allegedly 
"uttered a cry of approval of this."1 When a mission Iroquois 
speaker (representing both those of the Sault and the 
Mountain) finally had a chance to speak, he reiterated this 
claim, adding that his people would have nothing to do with 
either the governor of New York or other officials at Albany. 
He added, speaking to Five Nations representatives, that "we 
... have even less thought of going to your village to convey 
proposals of our movement ... If Onontio [the governor of New 
France] hangs up his hatchet, we hang ours up, if he sharpen 
it in order to strike the better, so do we."2 It was likely 
that only Francophile Indians accompanied Frontenac to this 
session, explaining why the only opinion expressed was one of 
complete subordination to the French. Or perhaps the speaker 
of the mission Iroquois believed that conditions would be 
better for them if they claimed to be Frontenac's unfailing
1Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: 
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:578 (hereafter cited as NYCD).
2NYCD 9:579; New York colonial Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 
vols.) New York State Library, 39:156.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
149
supporters in public, regardless of their true feelings. The 
individual involved may have been encouraged with money or 
privileges. to say these words. Jesuits, French officials, 
even Frontenac himself may have bribed the mission Iroquois 
speaker into giving the League Iroquois the impression that 
they had no friends at the Sault or the Mountain.
On this occasion, even when Teganissorens had queries for 
the Sault Iroquois, Frontenac answered him on their behalf. 
The Five Nations would be more inclined to make peace on 
French terms if they thought that their own Christian cousins 
were prepared to fight them in the event of hostilities. 
Therefore, Frontenac was using the Sault Indians as a "big 
stick" to make the League capitulate to French demands rather 
than risk another fratricidal bloodbath.
But these mission Iroquois protestations of loyalty to 
the French did not always translate into unified support in 
battle. In the 1687, 1690, 1691, and 1693 military
engagements in which Sault Iroquois were present against Five 
Nations people, the Sault men more often than not attempted to 
minimize their own involvement, or even to sabotage the French 
goal. Therefore, the words spoken at these meetings may have 
been mere posturing.
Tatachquiserax was one who seemed not to be merely 
posturing; he appeared sincere in his pro-French stance. 
Early in 1694 he expressed French allegiance to an Iroquois 
woman who visited the Sault in telling her that if the Five
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Nations did not make peace with the French, they and their 
allied Indians would come in the spring to destroy the 
Iroquois.3 Frontenac even sent Sault and Mountain Indian 
emissaries to Onondaga later that year to ask the League to 
consider a peace settlement, so confident had he become of 
their fidelity to his cause. The Onondagas responded with 
disdain, chastising the emissaries for their people's attacks 
on New York frontier settlements. They also asked for 
Onondaga prisoners held at the mission villages to be given to 
Frontenac so that they could negotiate directly with him for 
their return. Kahnawake relations with the outside world had 
become significantly determined by the French government if 
control over prisoners was any gauge. The Kahnawakes seemed 
not to have control over prisoners they held at their own 
village.4
But the blustering words of Tatachquiserax and other 
French mouthpieces at the Sault did not reflect what happened 
when it came to war. Through 1695, rumors of a French 
campaign rippled throughout Iroquoia and the upper Hudson 
Valley, but even when an eyewitness reported Sault warriors 
headed for Cataraqui on their way across Lake Ontario to an 
Onondaga invasion, not all Iroquois people took the threat
3NYCD 4:87.
4NYCD 4:120. See also Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie, 
Histoire de l'Americrue Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris: 1722) , 
4:76 regarding lack of control over prisoners that they had 
taken. (They had to hand them over to French military 
officers.)
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seriously. Some travelled back and forth from the Mohawk 
Valley to Kahnawake to visit relatives.5
Not only did people defy the danger of a military 
confrontation, but when Frontenac wanted to send war parties 
of mission Iroquois out to take prisoners in order to find out 
what was going on in Albany and Onondaga, he found no 
volunteers at the Sault. He had to enlist the help of the 
Jesuits to persuade them, and the Black Robes found only a few 
who would agree to go. Soon after that, when Frontenac wanted 
to assemble an expedition to meet the enemy (with explicit 
orders not to spare any lives), he sent "no French Maquas 
[Mohawk] Indians."6 It was rare for accounts to state who did 
not participate in an expedition.
Later that year, Frontenac wrote to the minister of 
marine that the Indians allied with the French did not think 
the French sufficiently heeded their allies' wishes, adding, 
however, that gifts would probably induce them to continue 
fighting the war.7 The bounty for scalps helped as well, 
although the king wanted to eliminate this method "of exciting 
the Christian Indians to make war on the Iroquois; the former 
ought to be induced by the subsistence it appears they
5New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State 
Library, Old Vol. 7, p. 127 (Calendar p. 104); NYCD 4:123, 
124.
6NYCD 4:125.
7Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 1928- 
29, p. 284 (hereafter cited as RAPQ).
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receive, when they go to war, and by the other favours and the 
protection of his Majesty."8 This issue became timely in the 
coming year. For in June 1696, when the French attempted to 
mobilize their Indian allies against the Onondagas, the 
warriors refused to go unless liquor was provided. There 
being none available in French stores, the officers permitted 
the Indians with them to steal what they found from French 
farmhouses along the way.9 There was a price to pay for 
having a not-so-willing Indian fighting force, as in the 1693 
Mohawk campaign. At that time a French official complained 
that "though the Indian disposition be naturally prone to war, 
and though an attempt was made to persuade them that they are 
carrying on hostilities as much for their own, as for our 
interest, yet they fail not to demand, every time they set 
out, a quantity of provisions and ammunition which costs a 
considerable sum, and to refuse, would be to utterly disgust, 
them."10 The Indians who lived in mission villages may have 
been dominated by the French authorities in some ways, but 
having something that Frontenac and other officials wanted, 
they made the Frenchmen appease them in order to get it.
In 1696, as in earlier campaigns, Sault Indians could
8NYCD 9:591. Sault raiding parties often brought English 
scalps back [i.e. NYCD 9:642; Archives des Colonies (Paris) 
Serie C11A (Canada: Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 
vols.), 14:217v (hereafter cited as C11A; references are to 
originals) ] but seldom brought those of Iroquois extraction.
9NYCD 9:646.
10NYCD 9:563.
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sabotage French efforts even if they appeared to be fighting 
with the French. It was so well known that they leaked news 
of French war plans to the enemy that Callieres deliberately 
fed them incorrect information in the summer of 1696. He told 
them that the plan was to attack the Senecas, so that both the 
latter and the real victims, the Onondagas, would be thrown 
off by Sault intelligence.11 In addition, on the way to 
battle, the Indians in the French entourage were separated and 
placed between regular troops and militia so that no mutiny 
would take place.12
No real military engagement took place during the 
Onondaga campaign; the sole village of that tribe was already 
burned and abandoned when the French and their Indian allies 
arrived at it. Therefore, they ventured eastward to surprise 
the Oneidas and found this tribe ready to surrender without a 
fight. Significantly, the Oneidas surrendered to the mission 
Iroquois, not directly to the French.13 When a lame elderly
11Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and General 
Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and 
trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872), 5:16. (A Mountain
Indian did inform some League Iroquois of this invasion. 
Charlevoix, History 5:15.)
12Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the 
State of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and 
Parsons, 1851-1851) 1:209 (hereafter cited as DHNY). One is 
reminded of the 1687 expedition to the Senecas when this 
proved to be necessary for preventing Sault Indians from 
deserting.
13Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 
65:27 (hereafter cited as JR); Archives des Colonies (Paris) 
Serie B (Lettres Envoyees, 1663-1774, 189 vols.), 19:236-238
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man who had been abandoned in one of the villages was 
discovered, the Sauit Indians asked the French officers to 
spare his life. But the French "peremptorily demanded" that 
he be burned at the stake, a French Jesuit missionary 
reported.14 The experience was a sobering one for the Sault 
Iroquois because this man was a relative of some of them. 
They were also distressed when a former Sault resident who had 
gone back to Iroquoia was found near the Onondaga village. 
The French authorities showed him no more mercy; they burned 
him to death as well, for the benefit of Sault eyes.15
Examples such as this were not the only way in which the 
French attempted to assert control over the Sault people. 
Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie observed the community of 
Kahnawake in the 1690s and reported how political decisions 
were made. Although he noted the theoretical participation of 
the elders, the chiefs, the aqoianders. the women, and the 
warriors, he observed that these Indians "allow themselves to 
be directed entirely by the Governor who makes them [the 
elders] come to Montreal. When the matter at hand has to do 
with peace, they execute the orders [from the governor] with 
docility." In another context, Potherie stated that the 
Kahnawakes "don't decide anything without the agreement of the 
Governor." Even the Prayer Chief (dogigue) "doesn't do
(hereafter cited as Serie B).
14JR 65:27.
15NYCD 9:655-656.
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anything without consulting with the missionary Father." 
Potherie asserted that this method of governing "facilitates 
the conversion of the elders whom we want to make 
Christians. "16
Potherie claimed that the Christian faith alone made 
these Indians stay in New France, ignoring the fact that his 
statement directly contradicted his earlier descriptions of 
how decisions were made at the Sault, that these people stayed 
partly because of pressure exerted on them, not just out of 
religious adherence.17 The fortifications no doubt helped to 
keep people there; by 1692 there were 200 French soldiers 
stationed at Fort Sault Saint-Louis, and two years later, 
Callieres was enlarging the fort "so that they may be more 
efficiently and readily assisted in case of attack."18 When 
in 1700 Robert Livingston spoke of the Kahnawakes being 
"secured in a Fort guarded with souldiers," it was unclear 
whether the Indians were being protected from enemies or 
prevented from escaping.19 Thioratorion, a Sault speaker, 
told some League Iroquois representatives in 1695 that he came
16Potherie, Histoire 1:363, 3:39-40. (It seems that
elders were religious traditionalists who resisted 
Christianity even at the mission village.)
17Potherie, Histoire 1:363.
18C11A 13:118v, 400; NYCD 9:599; Nicholas Bayard and
Charles Lodowick, A Narrative of an Attempt made bv the French 
of Canada upon the Mohaoues Country Being Indians under the 
Protection of their Majesties Government of New York (New 
York: 1693), p. 8.
19NYCD 4:648.
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to visit them "with Onontio*s consent," indicating that such 
consent was considered necessary.20 The French colonial 
government. attempted to have as much control over these 
Indians as possible. The same thing was happening to the Five 
Nations people with the English at Albany.21
Sometimes, however, when Kahnawake politicians were 
allowed to travel for diplomatic purposes (often initiated by 
Frontenac or the current governor), they were able to assert 
their own agenda into negotiations. Odatsigtha was an Oneida 
Sault sachem who travelled to Onondaga on behalf of the 
French-Five Nations peace attempts in 1697. He was in a 
strong position to influence events because both Frontenac and 
the League Oneidas trusted him.22 He turned the job of 
messenger into a chance to promote understanding and detente 
between League and Sault Iroquois. Wanting to demonstrate 
that not all Mission Indians did the French bidding, he 
relayed a conversation he had had with Frontenac to 
Teganissorens. Frontenac said: "I would have your arm tyed to 
mine that hereafter we might live peaceable together," to 
which Odatsigtha answered: "No Father, I will not have my arm
20NYCD 9:597.
21Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in 
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. Charles Howard Mcllwain, 
ed. (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), p. 22y New York Colonial 
Manuscripts 39:134; NYCD 4:91.
22Richard L. Haan, "The Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy 
on the Niagara Frontier, 1697-1730" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of California-Santa Barbara, 1976), 
p. 69.
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tyed to yours, because you might lift up your arm against my 
own people & then my arm would hang to yours."23 This 
exchange also revealed Sault skepticism about French force —  
that it might easily be turned against the colony's own 
allies. No wonder there may have been some ambivalent 
feelings about the fortification of the Kahnawake village.
Odatsigtha's speech was not the only opportunity taken by 
Sault people to interject their own opinions into the 
diplomatic process. A year later, the Sault Iroquois 
upbraided the governor of New France for rejecting what they 
(or at least some of them) argued was a perfectly good peace 
offer from the Five Nations. They chided him, saying "it is 
as if [you are] bereav'd of Your Sences or Drunk; you have 
seen how courteous and friendly those Gentlemen sent by the 
Government of New-York have been, and also the Mohaoues...1124 
These speakers and Odatsigtha were seldom mentioned in French 
records because they were not solid supporters of French 
policy. Despite how little we know of them, it is clear that 
there were significant forces at the Sault countering the pro- 
French initiatives of Sault notables such as La Plaque, Kryn, 
and Tatachquiserax.
In the 1694-95 attempts at peace talks, a neutral Sault 
sachem tried to steer his people away from Frontenac's course
^NYCD 4:280.
24Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July. 1698 
(New York: 1698), pp. 20-21.
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and toward an independent path. Frontenac allowed 
Thioratarion to go to Onondaga to listen to Iroquois council 
meetings, and in return the sachem was instructed "only to 
listen, and not to enter into any negotiation whatsoever." 
This admonition included receiving belts of wampum from the 
Five Nations people. But Thioratarion was in fact negotiating 
his own agenda with the League councillors, dissuading them 
from dealing with Frontenac, and targeting French voyageurs to 
attack. The self-styled broker also misrepresented the events 
of his trip to the governor on returning to New France. But 
Thioratarion was exposed by his political enemies at home, 
including Tataconicere and seven other Sault chiefs, all of 
whom were pro-French and opposed to a rapprochement between 
League and Sault Iroquois. Tataconicere told French officials 
of Thioratorion's treacherous diplomacy and Calliere ordered 
the renegade diplomat kept under constant surveillance at the 
Sault and arrested if he attempted to return to Onondaga.25
Similar developments occurred in Iroquoia. The League 
Iroquois were pressured to wait for a European peace 
settlement as New York officials in Albany tried to prevent 
them from initiating their own rapprochement with the Sault 
Iroquois and Frontenac. Teganissorens, the veteran Onondaga 
diplomat, had to await the approval of military and civic 
leaders at Albany's City Hall before being allowed to send a 
messenger to Kahnawake. Peter Schuyler and the others
25NYCD 9:596-599.
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approved only when Teganissorens promised that the League's 
message would be a refusal to meet with the French for peace 
talks. (Albany wanted to wait until such talks were conducted 
on their terms, not wanting a separate peace of the Five 
Nations with the French.) Teganissorens even found himself 
acquiescing to the English "have[ing] now shut up the way from 
hence to Canada." He admitted that he had made a mistake in 
sending men to the Sault after the English had "shut up the 
way," and agreeing with Schuyler's expressed disdain of Five 
Nations contacts with the French.26 Like the Kahnawakes, the 
League Iroquois had lost significant authority to their 
European counterparts.
But while Albany leaders were trying to prevent 
communication between the League and the Sault, they were 
trying to cultivate their own relationship with the 
Kahnawakes. The report which documented Schuyler's reprimand 
of Teganissorens also included Schuyler's invitation to the 
Sault Iroquois to come and meet with him.27 Similarly in 
1700, six years later, the commissioners for Indian Affairs at 
Albany simultaneously tried to prevent communication between 
Sault Iroquois and the Five Nations and tried to court the 
Kahnawakes, promising them aid in various forms if they would 
settle near Albany. The Sault Indians had come to Albany to
26NYCD 4:90; New York Coloxiial Manuscripts 39:134; 
Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 22.
27NYCD 4:91.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
160
trade northern pelts for English trade goods such as blankets. 
But Schuyler, Livingston, and the other commissioners also 
seemed interested in them as immigrants; consequently they 
"caressed" the Sault envoys, and took "fitting care that the 
Indians may be plentifully entertained that they may see the 
difference between a fertile country and a poor rocky swampy 
Canada."28 The commissioners also promised "stores of plenty 
to make [them] live for ever happy," and distributed a hog, 
some venison, a barrel of strong beer, and great quantities of 
powder and lead to their guests. But they retreated from 
their former policy of promising to bring an English Jesuit to 
the colony for the Sault Indians; instead they promised them 
some Protestant ministers "to instruct Indians in the true 
Christian religion."29
28NYCD 4:690.
29NYCD 4:692-693. The English appeared to be losing the 
ideological battle of Christianity in converting the Iroquois. 
In 1697, a group of Oneidas had demanded from the French 
government their own village in New France, with Father Pierre 
Milet there to minister to their spiritual needs. (NYCD 
9:665.) In 1700, while New York was promising Protestant 
ministers for Sault Indians, a Montreal businessman was 
explaining to David Schuyler why Catholicism was so much more 
attractive to Indians. He said that the spirit of forgiveness 
in the Roman church made the fundamental difference, that it 
caused Indians to flock to the priests asking for instruction 
and the sacrament of confession. Schuyler told this to 
Governor Bellomont, adding that this was the reason why the 
Five Nations were "every day going over more and more to the 
French." Schuyler tied this to the fate of the English 
imperial cause, warning that the situation would be worse in 
the next war (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church would get even 
more Indian converts), and would be the reason for France's 
ability to take New York, then other English colonies, and 
then finally the whole continent. (NYCD 4:747-748.)
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The Albanians made large promises and generous gestures 
to the Kahnawakes but the wary Indians did not commit 
themselves to emigrating. In 1698 when Governor Bellomont had 
made overtures to the Kahnawakes, they replied that they 
appreciated the offer but would have to consult with elders 
back home at the Sault, a stalling tactic. No doubt they 
feared that once they moved to New York they might not be 
treated well and that the Albanians might try to force them in 
line with English policy.30
While the New Yorkers were courting and "caressing" Sault 
Indians, it was obvious to all Indians that Albany officials 
were trying to discourage communication between Sault and 
League Iroquois. In the summer of 1700, the Sault Iroquois 
had wanted to exchange a secret peace belt with their League 
brethren —  secret from New York's governor. Robert 
Livingston found out about this contact, and had the Five 
Nations send back the belt saying that they would never again 
enter into negotiations with the Kahnawakes without New York 
officials being involved. The League Iroquois were 
sufficiently intimidated that they agreed to Livingston's 
demands and publicly rejected this type of communication with 
their brethren, explaining to the latter that their allegiance 
was to New York (and not to their Iroquois brethren in New
30Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July. 
1698. p. 3.
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France) .31
In the fall of i700, the Sault Iroquois requested closer 
relations with their League brethren, but the Onondaga sachems 
who responded rebuffed them (perhaps because New York 
interpreter Lawrence Claessen was present).32 This sign of 
strained relations between the two Iroquois groups was just 
what both New York and New France wanted. The French 
officials tried to prevent Sault diplomats from communicating 
with the League, and New York also intervened to prevent close 
ties between the two. Just as the English wanted Sault envoys 
to deal directly with Albany, by-passing Iroquoia, the French 
wanted the Five Nations to negotiate directly with Montreal 
officials, by-passing the Sault.33 The only message which 
French officials allowed the Sault Iroquois to send tc the 
Mohawks was one inviting the latter to settle immediately in 
New France, to which the Mohawks coyly avoided answering.34
Neither Indian group appreciated these attempts by the 
French and the English to straitjacket them. The League and 
Sault Iroquois were being used for European ends, losing 
control over their own diplomatic policy, and being forced to
31Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 38; NYCD 4:696, 745-46.
32NYCD 4:803.
^Charlevoix, History 5:94; Bellomont's Conference with 
the Five Nations. July. 1698. p. 3; Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 
28; NYCD 9:600, 713, 4:895.
^NYCD 9:671, 676. (Even though this was the only message 
"allowed" by the French, it may not have been the only one 
sent.)
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watch while their European neighbors entertained the opposing 
tribal group and promised these guests things which the "home" 
group were never promised. Some League Iroquois demonstrated 
that they did not appreciate New Yorkers interfering with 
their guests from Kahnawake in 1695, when Albany officials 
wanted two Sault envoys visiting the Onondaga council fire to 
make a stop at Albany on their way home; the Oneidas at the 
council fire would not allow this diversion from the 
itinerary.35 In 1699, Five Nations representatives at Albany 
complained that while they had obeyed the rule set by New York 
that there was to be no travel between them and Canada, the 
Albany officials had both sent envoys to Canada and received 
visitors from that colony, including Indians.36 The League 
Iroquois were jealous of English preferential treatment of the 
Sault Indians. They might have been even more so if they had 
heard Albany officials declare that "the Maquase praying 
Indians...are ye spring that move all ye rest."37
No doubt Kahnawakes were also miffed when Frontenac 
regaled visiting League Mohawks.38 But while Frontenac saw 
the advantages of driving a wedge between the Five Nations and 
New York by treating the League Iroquois royally, he also came 
around in 1698, his last year as governor of New France (and
35NYCD 9:600.
36NYCD 4:567-572.
37NYCD 4:690.
^Charlevoix, History 5:84-85; NYCD 4:803.
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the last year of his life), to see a positive role the Sault 
Iroquois could play in his foreign policy. In that year he 
encouraged League Indians to visit Kahnawake (and to come over 
to Montreal as long as they were in the area). He was 
convinced that this was a sure way to get more of the League 
Iroquois to emigrate to the mission village, thereby 
depopulating Iroquoia and weakening the adjacent English 
colony.39
As a result of Frontenac's detente policy on Five Nations 
visits to Kahnawake, many League Iroquois families came to the 
south shore of the St. Lawrence to visit, some with an 
intention of staying.40 Meanwhile (if English accounts can 
be believed regarding what their allied Indians wanted in 
terms of Christian missionaries), the Five Nations apparently 
finally agreed on a policy regarding Jesuit missionaries in 
Iroquoia —  they did not want them there again.41 But 
emigrants flocked once again from Iroquoia to the Sault 
mission village (all accounts agree), desiring baptism from 
the Jesuits (if the Jesuit Relations can be believed).42 At 
least it seemed that all those inclined toward Catholicism had 
moved north to the Catholic Iroquois communities at the Sault 
and the Mountain, and opinion was consolidated on the once
39Charlevoix, History 5:84-85.
40Potherie, Histoire 4:106.
41Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 41.
42JR 65:31.
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explosive issue in the homeland.
Tensions were now relaxed between the Sault and League 
Iroquois. Indeed, by 1698, the two Iroquois groups were 
speaking of mutually "burying the hatchet" and of renewing 
their former friendships.43 A year later, a mutual 
condolence ceremony was held at Kahnawake, attended by League 
and Sault warriors. They held day-long sessions in which one 
after another rose and confessed, often with remorse, all the 
war deeds he had done and mourned the death of his friends in 
battle. Bacqueville de la Potherie witnessed this combination 
of public confession and boasting, breast-beating forum, 
recording the words of one Sault warrior: "I killed four
Iroquois five years ago at a certain place," and tearing off 
a piece of tobacco, "I take this as a medicine to remake my 
spirit;" the musicians applauded him with cries, and by a 
movement precipitated by their gourds, you heard the noise of 
two hundred to three hundred Indians from one end of the 
longhouse to the other...as long as the tobacco lasted, there 
were plenty of people who cited their exploits." The 
octagenarian grand chief of the Senecas remained standing in 
his canoe during this event, making "death cries of " H a i !  
H a i l , "  crying and mourning for those who had been killed 
during the war.44
43NYCD 9:685-686.
^Potherie, Histoire 4:194-201.
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This mutual condolence ritual among former enemies was 
part of the healing process for the factionalized Iroquois 
people. Arid at the ratification of the final peace agreement 
between the Five Nations and the French in 1701 (in which the 
Five Nations agreed to remain neutral in any conflict between 
the English and the French), the Kahnawake people announced 
that they were working for peace and asked their League 
brethren to preserve the peace as well.45 The Ho-de-no-sau- 
nee had survived the brutal decade of war despite some searing 
incidents of fratricide.
On very few occasions had League and Sault battle forces 
eagerly engaged each other. For the most part, they tried to 
avoid each other, while still trying to maintain good 
relations with their respective European allies, realizing 
this was necessary in an era of European expansion. Following 
Iroquois tradition, they merely avoided conflict whenever 
possible, except for a few true "hawks," notably the zealots 
such as Paul of the Sault, converted to the French-Catholic 
cause, and Lawrence, the League Mohawk who was an Anglophile 
and a devoted convert to Protestant Christianity. 
Teganissorens, the neutral League sachem, was much more the 
norm than these other noted French or English allies. He saw 
any entangling alliance with either power as a threat to his
45Serie B 20:135; NYCD 9:724-725.
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people's sovereignty.46
Despite almost surrendering control of their own 
policies, the League and the Sault Iroquois both retained 
their autonomy. Neither group denounced their European ally, 
perhaps because this was politically or geopolitically 
impossible. And although factions complicated matters both in 
Iroquoia and at Kahnawake, the damage resulting from working 
at cross-purposes was minimized. These people ingeniously 
used their situations to their own advantage whenever 
possible. Their spheres of action were narrower than 
formerly, but not completely restricted? they used what 
latitude they could. Both groups realized that they had to 
steer their way through a complicated set of allegiances in 
which they may have regretted becoming entangled, and both 
groups survived the ordeals of the 1690s, although not all 
with equal success.
The Iroquois entered the eighteenth century forced by 
their peace treaty to remain neutral between the French and 
the English, but instead of letting this straitjacket them, 
they used the position to play the two powers off against each 
other. They made the best of their population losses and of 
a situation which was not ideal. Likewise, the Kahnawakes,
^See Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: 
Change and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984), 
Ch. 7-10 (passim), and William J. Eccles, "Teganissorens," in 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 2, pp. 619-623, 
regarding Teganissorens.
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although arguably "vassals" or "charges" of the French, were 
only nominally so, and were to use their unique position once 
again in the eighteenth century to their own advantage, this 
time in the sphere of trade more than in warfare or diplomacy. 
Important because they had embarked on a project of creating 
a new cultural group which assimilated beliefs and habits from 
two cultures, they were to prove themselves to be important 
politically as well, to be "ye spring that move all ye rest."
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CHAPTER SIX 
KAHNAWAKE FOREIGN RELATIONS 1701-1760
After the 1701 settlement between the French, English, 
Five Nations, and mission Iroquois, the question remaining to 
be answered was whether the Indian groups would actually 
remain neutral, as had been agreed. An Onondaga sachem 
identified the dilemma: "for ye Indians are divided there [at 
Kahnawake] as well as among ye Five Nations, ye one half is 
for ye English & ye other half for ye french."1 While 
Canadian officials worried about the Five Nations and hoped 
they would keep out of the French-English war which broke out 
in 1702, the Albany Commissioners and the New York governor 
alike expended great effort to achieve and maintain neutrality 
from the Kahnawakes.2 At the same time, however, the 
Kaihnawakes continued to be a thorn in their sides, and they 
complained often from 1701 on aibout the continuing flow of
1Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records. 
1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 
1956) (hereafter cited as LIR), p. 212. Regarding Iroquois 
foreign relations in this period, see Daniel K. Richter, "The 
Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the
Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1984), Part Four; Richard Aquila, The 
Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial
Frontier. 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 
1983); Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The 
Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English 
Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 
(New York: Norton, 1984), Part Three.
2Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the 
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: 
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 4:983, 5:141, 9:737, 834
(hereafter cited as NYCDf; Rapport de l'Archiviste de la 
Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as RAPO) 1939-40, pp. 418, 
441.
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Iroquois emigrants to the mission town at Sault Saint-Louis.
For many reasons, not the least of which was military, 
New York officials were concerned about the decrease in 
population of the Five Nations, and viewed the flow of 
migrants northward as a hemorrhaging of a vital human 
resource.3 The declining population was a major impetus 
toward forcing the remaining Jesuit missionaries in Iroquois 
villages to leave once and for all, because they were 
contributing to the problem by recruiting emigrants to 
Kahnawake.4 Father Jacques Bruyas was the last remaining 
Black Robe, and he finally left his Onondaga mission in 1708.
At the same time, New York officials continued their 
efforts to repatriate the Sault Mission Iroquois in the 
Iroquois homeland (or rather, to move them to a spot of land 
north of Albany). The officials engaged the League Iroquois 
to send emissaries to the Sault to suggest the move back to 
New York and sent wampum belts themselves to plead with the 
Kahnawakes. The response of the governor of New France, 
however, indicated the importance of the Kahnawakes to the 
French. When he heard of the New York offer, he threatened to 
go to war with the English colony over these Indians. His 
reaction caused a disturbance in the Sault village because 
many in the pro-English faction had been excited about the 
possibility of moving south. But the possibility of a move
3NYCD 4:899.
4NYCD 4:888, 899, 905; LIR p. 187.
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"made a great noise" because it was controversial in New 
France and the enthusiasm was squelched by authorities, 
probably Jesuits as well as secular officials.5
Claude de Ramezay, the governor of Montreal, "used every 
exertion" to prevent a meeting between Peter Schuyler (the 
mayor of Albany and Commissioner of Indian Affairs who 
spearheaded the effort) and Sault sachems who were interested 
in negotiating a move to New York. Oddly enough, some Abenaki 
Indians, who themselves had been known to waver in their 
support for the French, met the sachems on the way to Albany, 
and reportedly "shamed them out of a course so unbecoming in 
Christians and so dangerous to themselves."6 Schuyler took 
advantage of the League and Sault practice of visiting each 
others' villages, and invited some Sault headmen who were 
visiting in Iroquoia to come to Schenectady, where he made his 
offer of tracts of land in New York for them to settle their 
people. He also offered them wampum belts for the 
Mountain/Sault-au-Recollet Indians as well, and waited for the 
response from Kahnawake. Ramezay again heard of this, no 
doubt through a pro-French Kahnwake who informed the Jesuits 
at the Sault, and had the wampum belts sent back without an
5Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in 
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles Howard Mcllwain 
(New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), pp. 42-43 (quote), 44, 80; 
NYCD 4:978-79, 983-84, 987.
6Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and General 
Description of New France 6 vols., ed. John G. Shea (New York: 
Harper, 1866-1872), Vol. 5, p. 164.
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answer.7
Even though unsuccessful, Schuyler's efforts indicated 
New York's, desperation to attract the Kahnawakes, since the 
effort was made only months after a Sault and French attack on 
the Massachusetts town of Deerfield. Forty-seven New 
Englanders were killed and over a hundred taken prisoner. 
Many of these captives were brought to Kahnawake and remained 
there, some of them later choosing to remain among the Indians 
and convert to Catholicism even after being allowed to return 
to their Massachusetts homes. This was significant in that it 
caused much intermarriage in the ensuing years at Kahnawake. 
The best known of these New Englanders who became part of the 
Kahnawake community and clan network was Eunice Williams, a 
young daughter of a Puritan minister. At first she abhorred 
her new surroundings and captors but eventually became a 
devout Catholic, married a Sault Indian, and renounced any 
desire to return to Deerfield, a decision that fascinated and 
horrified New Englanders as blasphemous.8
7Charlevoix, History 5:166; NYCD 4:871, 918; LIR p. 190. 
On the "Mountain" Indians, as they are referred to by the 
French, see Chapter 2, footnote 36.
Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and 
Province of Massachusetts-Bav 3 vols., ed. Lawrence Shaw May 
(Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1936), Vol. 2, p. 
102; Emma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives Carried to 
Canada between 1677 and 1760 during the French and Indian Wars 
2 vols. (Portland, Me: 1925-26), Vol. 2, p. 40; John G. Shea, 
History of the Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of 
the United States. 1529-1854 (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1854), 
p. 332; John Williams, The Redeemed Captive returning to Zion 
ed. Edward W. Clark (Amherst, Ma: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1976) (first published 1707), esp. pp. 45-69; New York
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The Deerfield attack could not have been looked upon 
kindly in Albany since New York was expected to present a 
united front with the New Englanders against French 
incursions, and since the Kahnawakes refused to give up the 
Reverend Williams' daughter even after much pleading from New 
York officials. The New Englanders resented Albany's 
neutrality toward Canada and her Indian allies, and condemned 
Albany for maintaining diplomatic ties with the Kahnwakes. 
But some Kahnawake messengers informed Albany officials of the 
impending attack on the Massachusetts town, so that they in 
turn could warn their eastern neighbors and avert horrible 
results. (These Sault informers were probably pro-English, and 
presumably those from the Sault who conducted the raid were 
pro-French.)9 But the warning did not reach the Deerfielders 
in time and their town was devastated. Nevertheless, 
relations between the Kahnawakes and Albany remained as close 
as ever, and trade as well as talks about resettling near the 
Hudson River town continued.
The pro-English faction at the Sault was strong after the 
Deerfield raid, because although four Kahnawake warriors went
Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State Library, Old Vol.
10, p. 22 (Calendar p. 210); NYCD 4:1083, 1099-1100. See also 
James Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America," in The 
European and the Indian: Essavs in the Ethnohistorv of
Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981), pp. 168-206; Alden T. Vaughan and Daniel K. Richter, 
"Crossing the Cultural Divide: Indians and New Englanders, 
1605-1763," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society XC 
(1980), pp. 23-99.
9NYCD 4:1099-1100.
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out later in 1704 to conduct raids on New England outposts, at 
least some of the Kahnawake sachems prevented the French from 
planning an attack on English targets.10 And three years 
later, a Kahnawake sachem made a telling request of the Albany 
commissioners: he asked them to send a secret (secret from the 
French) wampum belt to the Sault to ask the Kahnawakes to stop 
raiding New England settlements.11 No doubt this sachem was 
pro-English and was trying to gain support within his 
community to stop French-inspired attacks on Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire towns. The effort seems to have achieved 
results, because later in 1707, Ramezay experienced great 
difficulty in convincing the Sault warriors to support his war 
policies. One reason for the reluctance to do so at this time 
may have been the issue of control over captives; after the 
Deerfield raid, French officials had taken into custody some 
prisoners whom Kahnawakes claimed as their own.
The Kahnawakes were angry about French presumption of 
control over captives because the captives were taken largely 
in order to be adopted into Kahnawake families to increase the 
population. In early 1708 Sault spokesmen informed Ramezay 
that because the French had taken many of the captives from 
Deerfield and exchanged them with the English, the Sault 
warriors would no longer join French war parties to the
10NYCD 4:1164.
11LIR p. 201.
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English colonies.12 This would have a crippling effect on 
French military strength, even for these small-scale surprise 
raids. In the same year, the minister of marine Pontchartrain 
ordered the governor of Canada, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, to 
attack Albany as a way of ending the contraband trade between 
that town and Montreal. Jacques and Antoine-Denis Raudot, the 
joint intendants of the colony, declined to do so since they 
knew that the mission Iroquois would not participate in an 
expedition to end the trade from which they themselves 
profited, and the Raudots realized that without their support, 
the attack could not succeed. Mission Iroquois (Sault and 
Mountain) military support was crucial to French sorties in 
the early eighteenth century.13
By 1708, the Kahnawakes had worked out a private 
agreement with Schuyler not to join French war parties in New 
England; the pro-English faction at the Sault had won out at 
least temporarily. This deal became evident because the 
French were planning an attack for the summer, but when 
rounding up recruits among the Kahnawakes, "they semmed [sic] 
very tardy & unwilling to join."14 The Sault elders,
12Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada: 
Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.), 28:77-84
(hereafter cited as C11A; references are to transcripts, not 
originals, unless otherwise indicated)? Vaughan and Richter, 
"Crossing the Cultural Divide," pp. 78-79.
13Dale Miquelon, New France 1701-1744. "A Supplement to 
Europe" (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p. 42.
14Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 56.
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evidently anti-French, had convinced the warriors to "stop 
their hatchets" and not to support the French on this 
occasion, a pro-French warrior informed Ramezay. But French 
authorities had "in a manner forced some Caghnawaga Indians to 
join" and the joint expedition moved toward its destination. 
However, at Wood Creek near English territory, the Kahnawake 
warriors, "recollecting their Engagements with us [Albany 
Commissioners] not to join in War against New England wch they 
supposed was to be Attacked, threw away all their Provisions 
& left the other Forces," dooming the expedition to failure. 
To emphasize their defiance and independence from the French, 
the mutinous warriors offered to pay the French governor for 
the guns he had given them and for the provisions that they 
had thrown away in disgust.15
Predictably, the French were furious at the Sault display 
of cheek and treachery, and when they found out about the 
secret deal with Albany which had precipitated the mutiny 
their anger deepened. Vaudreuil gave an order to local 
officials to find out from the Jesuit missionaries at the 
Sault and from the garrison commander at the Kahnawake fort 
who the pro-English culprits were. Perhaps fearing serious 
reprisals, the elders and chiefs at the Sault soon promised 
authorities that they would no longer prevent warriors from 
going to war, but not until receiving a scathing reprimand 
from Vaudreuil himself. The governor threatened that "the
15Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 61-62; RAPQ 1939-40, p. 429.
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idleness [by which] they wanted to keep their young ones would 
one day be the destruction of their village." After 
"reconciling all these spirited opinions," he reported back to 
France, the Kahnawakes decided to join Abenakis and other 
French-allied Indians in renewed raiding forays against New 
England, thereby breaking their agreement with Schuyler and 
ending, at least temporarily, the ascendancy of the pro- 
English faction at the Sault.16
In working out their own internal disagreements, the 
Kahnawakes had been railroaded by the French when they 
attempted to create an independent policy. Nevertheless, the 
Indians still held some power in the relationship; they had 
managed to leave an expedition in mid-march and in doing so 
had succeeded in demonstrating that the French needed them in 
order to pursue their military objectives. In reporting the 
events of 1708 to his superior, Vaudreuil contrasted the 
unreliable Kahnawakes with their dependable, loyal cousins, 
the Mountain mission Indians.17 Vaudreuil had nothing but 
praise for the latter, but the fact that they were so loyal 
precluded them from having much independence from the French, 
or at least from forcing the French to deal with them as a 
belligerent group. The Kahnwakes had at least carved out a
16RAPO 1939-40. pp. 429-430, 432-433, 441-442; Charlevoix, 
History 5:204-205, 208-209; David A. Armour, "The Merchants of 
Albany, New York, 1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Northwestern University, 1965), pp. 94-95.
17RAPO 1939-40, p. 430.
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measure of autonomy with which to negotiate with the French.
In an invasion of Canada planned for 1709 the New Yorkers 
and New Englanders had similar trouble gaining military 
support from the Seneca nation. But the other four Iroquois 
nations supported the effort, warning their Sault brethren 
through wampum belt messages that an invasion of New France 
was imminent and that the mission Iroquois should leave their 
village and return to New York. The League sachems also 
warned the Kahnawakes that once the force had invaded New 
France, the mission could not be assured safety. The reply 
from the Sault reflected the recent shift toward pro-French 
policy ~  the Indians answered that they would remain with the 
French. But the expedition failed anyway, and this was the 
closest the League and mission Iroquois came to fighting 
against each other during Queen Anne's War. Otherwise, the 
opening years of the eighteenth century were characterized by 
close and frequent relations between the two groups, including 
the regular exchange of intelligence.18
Meanwhile, the Kahnawakes continued to see how far they 
could push the French in their psychological power struggle. 
Vaudreuil's wife reported that "the Iroquois of Sault St.- 
Louis have become so insolent that they're boasting that the 
French can't do without them." Her husband responded by
18Bruce T. McCully, ed., "Catastrophe in the Wilderness: 
New Light on the Canada Expedition of 1709," William and Mary 
Quarterly. 3d ser., XI (1954), pp. 452-453; LIR p. 212; NYCD 
5:72-74, 85-86, 141, 9:834; Wraxall, Abridgment,p. 94.
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plucking the strings of pride among the warrior faction; he 
stopped inviting the Kahnawakes on warring expeditions. This 
had the desired effect of wounding Indian pride, and a fair 
number came running to join in the next French sortie into 
enemy territory.19
Not all rallied around the fleur-de-lys, however. Some 
Sault Indians had too much of a renegade spirit to conform to 
life at the mission village. A Kahnawake named Paskoue lived 
with a "band” of like-minded people apart from the village, 
probably north of Lake Ontario. A description of him in 1710 
indicated that he had "been some years separated from his 
Nation" at the Sault. In that year, Paskoue and his friends 
murdered two League Iroquois travellers not far from Fort 
Frontenac, causing a delicate diplomatic problem for Vaudreuil 
with the Five Nations. The Canadian governor claimed that no 
one in the upper country was able to persuade any Indians in 
the area to deliver the murderers to French authorities, an 
indication that Paskoue's group was a furtive and dangerous 
collection of individuals. No doubt the fugitives were 
disgruntled at life in the settled community of the Jesuit 
mission and were no friends of the Five Nations either, as the 
murders demonstrate.20
Paskoue and his fellow "renegades" were not the only ones 
from, or at, the Sault who chafed at authority there.
19RAPO 1942-43, p. 415.
20NYCD 9:848, 857.
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Complaints against the insolence of the Kahnawakes continued, 
as did claims that they were not easy to govern and were not 
sufficiently docile toward the French.21 When Father Pierre 
Cholenec decided in 1714 that the community needed to relocate 
further west along the south shore, various issues emerged 
which revealed conflicts between the Indians and the priests 
at Kahnawake, as well as between the priests and secular 
authorities in the colony. In applying to Vaudreuil for 
funding, Cholenec claimed that the Sault Indians had exhausted 
the firewood and the soil through c o m  cultivation since 
moving to the site in 1696. Cholenec claimed that the Indians 
insisted on moving the village site up two leagues further 
along the shore.
In making his case for funds to finance the move, 
Cholenec argued that the New Yorkers and Five Nations had been 
relentlessly pursuing the return of the Kahnawakes to New 
York, and that financing the new village site was the only way 
to prevent dissatisfaction among the Sault Indians which might 
cause them to emigrate. The missionary claimed that the Sault 
mission was indispensible to the defense of New France against 
neighbors to the south, providing a buttress against 
incursions which would otherwise have to be borne by Canadian 
habitants. The funding was needed quickly, he added, because 
the Kahnawakes were "becoming more and more formidable through
21RAP0 1946-47, p. 408.
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their great numbers, and ... seek occasions for a rupture."22 
Cholenec attempted to make it seem that the Indians were 
asking for a new fort and a church as well as a palisaded 
enclosure, although probably the Jesuits cared much more about 
a church than the Indians did. As for a stone fort, it soon 
became evident that not all the Kahnawakes wanted one. But 
for now, Vaudreuil wholeheartedly embraced the proposal and 
the funding for the move —  2,000 livres —  was granted by the 
king in 1716, in which year much of the actual labor of moving 
the village took place.23
A conflict arose, however, when the Jesuits requested 
that the land concession granted to them in 1680 be renewed, 
with new titles to confirm Jesuit possession. This request 
triggered discussion of the status of the concession and 
suspicion that the Jesuits might have selfish motives for 
wanting their possession clarified. Father Joseph Frangois 
Lafitau of Kahnawake was compelled to present the argument 
that the Jesuits had no intention of moving the Indians from 
the site at a later date to turn a profit from the improved 
land. But the Council of Marine apparently remained skeptical
22Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Al1ied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 
67:25-27 (hereafter cited as JR).
^Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F3 (Collection 
Moreau St.-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.), Vol. 7, p. 374; RAPO 
1941-42, pp. 184-185, 1940-41, p. 454. The entire village, 
however, was not in place until 1719, and the church and 
Jesuits' residence not until 1721. (E. J. Devine, Historic
Cauahnawaqa (Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p. 180.)
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—  Lafitau may have protested too much —  and stipulations 
were attached to the grant of land. Most importantly, the new 
letters patent indicated that the land was to be held jointly 
by the Jesuits and the Indians of Sault St.-Louis, and that 
when and if the Indians should abandon it, it would revert 
directly to the king. This is a likely reason why the village 
did not move again.24
Another related issue had been whether the Jesuits or the 
Crown had control over whether to build a fort, who would
24RAPO 1941-42, pp. 184-186; Archives des Colonies (Paris) 
Serie C UE (Des Limites et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.) 
11:26-30 (hereafter cited as C U E ) . (The present Kahnawake 
reserve is on the 1716 site.) Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 
a colonel serving with the French forces in the Seven Years' 
War, indicated in 1757 that the Jesuits desired to "profit 
from the lands which the Indians had cleared," and he noticed 
that they had done this with the Lorette Hurons in moving 
their village from "Ancien Lorette" to their later site. The 
issue emerged in 1757 because the Jesuits were proposing 
moving their Abenaki missions at St.-Frangois and Becancour. 
(Louis Antoine, comte de Bougainville, Adventure in the 
wilderness: the American journals of Louis Antoine de
Bougainville. 1756-1760 ed. and trans. Edward P. Hamilton 
(Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 83.) 
Louis Franquet also was suspicious in 1752 that the Jesuits 
were encouraging Kahnawakes to make improvements on their 
land, only to turn a profit on parcelling it out to habitants 
later. (Louis Franquet, Voyages et Memoires sur le Canada ed. 
J. Cohen (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974), pp. 38-39.) There 
was a legal dispute between the Jesuits and the Kahnawakes in 
1762, brought on by the question of land control after the 
British Conquest. In 1762, Daniel Claus, Sir William 
Johnson's agent in charge of Indian affairs for the British in 
Montreal, was attempting to settle the dispute between the 
Jesuits and the Kahnawakes. He found that the Jesuits had 
engaged in so much fraud in running the survey line, so as to 
add to their land grant at the expense of the Kahnwakes', that 
it took Claus a few extra days to determine the actual 
boundary. (James Sullivan et. al., eds., The Papers of Sir 
William Johnson 14 vols. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1921-1965),
10:376-379, 3:862 (hereafter cited as JP).)
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finance its contruction, and who would have jurisdiction over 
it once it was built. The Council seemed to give latitude to 
the Jesuits on whether to build it or not, but they 
demonstrated once again their distrust of the Black Robes by 
stipulating that monies earmarked for construction of the fort 
be held by the colonial treasurer rather than being placed in 
Jesuit hands.25
The issue of a fort at Kahnawake did not dissipate 
quickly. It had been a touchy one in the 1690s, as it 
symbolized a loss of self-determination to the Kahnawakes. 
Many of them felt trapped by a garrisoned fort and considered 
the soldiers stationed there to be thwarting their freedom as 
much as protecting them.26 Officials hinted at such a 
purpose? one document related to the 1716 move mentioned the 
building of a new fort as an effort to "retain" (retenir) the 
Indians.27 In 1719, Ramezay wanted a garrison "to keep the 
Indians from trading at Albany," and toward the end of the 
Desauniers era at the Sault, these women protested to Louis 
Franquet, the engineer who was charged with making preliminary 
arrangements for fortification of the entire village, that a
^Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F5A (Missions 
Religieuses, 1639-1782, 3 vols.) 2:32-33; RAPO 1941-42, pp. 
185-186.
26In 1722 the Kahnawakes complained that the presence of 
garrison troops in their village indicated that the government 
of New France mistrusted the Indians, and they also protested 
that no other Indian communities were occupied by troops. (JR 
67:81.)
27RAPO 1941-42, p. 185.
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complete enclosure would interfere with the free flow of 
trade.28
Whether or not the Jesuits had wanted a garrisoned fort 
at the new village site when they applied for the moving funds 
in 1714, it is clear that by the early 1720s they were 
adamantly opposed to it and repeatedly lobbied the Council of 
Marine to stop its construction. Some troops had been 
stationed at the new village site but they were removed in 
1719. The Jesuits' motives for not wanting them and their 
officer returned to the Sault were mixed. No doubt they 
resented having to share authority with the commandant, as 
they had to during King William's and Queen Anne's Wars. One 
Black Robe argued that "whenever the Governor wishes to obtain 
anything from the Indians, and the officer does not succeed, 
as is nearly always the case, he casts the blame upon the 
Missionary. m29
But reasons having to do with the welfare of the native 
community itself were also cited by both Jesuits and Indians. 
The Kahnawakes claimed that "horrible discord" existed in the 
village because of the garrison troops stationed there; the 
wives and daughters of Sault warriors and hunters were not
28Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.... p. 120; Devine, 
Historic Cauahnawaaa. p. 189.
29 JR 67:73-81 (quote p. 79); RAPO 1941-42, pp. 202, 205, 
213. Another example of friction between Jesuits and garrison 
commanders at Kahnawake: C11A 98:36-39. Franquet noted that 
the Jesuits greatly desired to have complete control in 
running the community. (Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.... p. 
120.)
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safe with the French soldiers, and the Indian men themselves 
were sorely tempted by the vices introduced into the village 
by the troops. A Kahnawake orator charged that since there 
had been a garrison, "tranquility and good order have been 
banished," because of the debaucheries mentioned, and also 
because "the soldiers frequently seek by false reports to 
embroil us with the officer, and the officer with the 
Governors, none of which things happened when we had no 
garrison."30 The Indians cunningly argued that they were 
made into slaves by the impingement on their freedom which the 
garrison posed, and that the funds spent on a garrison and its 
barracks would be better spent in relief for the widows and 
orphans of Kahnawake whose fathers and husbands had been 
killed in the war for the French cause.31 And knowing the 
worst fears of the French authorities, they threatened to 
emigrate back to their homeland if the stone fort for the 
garrison was built.32
Jesuits argued that the Sault Indians were much more 
docile in the absense of garrison troops than in their 
presence, and that Father Pierre de Lauzon had only managed to 
convince them to settle at the 1716 site instead of much 
farther away, perhaps even in New York, when there was no 
longer a garrison breathing down their necks. Also important
30JR 67:73-75.
31 JR 67:75-77.
32RAPO 1941-42, p. 263.
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to the Jesuits was the level of piety and Christian devotion 
at the Sault; they claimed it had plummeted with the coming of 
French troops.33 Finally in 1724, Vaudreuil gave up the idea 
of placing a garrison there in the face of such opposition, 
but the outbreak of war in the 1740s again forced the issue to 
the forefront.34 The debate aggravated some of the tensions 
between various interests in New France in determining how the 
Kahnawake mission community would be run.
The late 1710s were a time of shifting physical settings 
for related Iroquois groups as well. Starting in 1717 the 
Sulpician Sault-au-Recollet (the former "Mountain" Mission) 
moved to its final site at Lac-des-Deux-Montagnes (present-day 
Oka) northwest of Montreal. The Indians at that mission 
continued to be called the "Mountain" Indians. And from 1714 
until about 1720, Tuscarora refugees from the war with the 
Carolina colonists continued to pour in to Five Nations 
communities, until finally a separate homeland was carved out 
for them adjacent to the Cayugas and they were incorporated
33JR 67:77, 81.
^RAPO 1941-42, p. 232. Potential hostilities in King 
George's War were used as a pretext for installing a garrison 
in 1747. But the Kahnawakes "had some difficulty in receiving 
that little garrison of twenty soldiers," because of alleged 
reasons (which the French officials did not believe) 
concerning "secret interests." There would have been a revolt 
at the Sault if Charles Deschamps de Boishebert, a leading 
military officer, had not promised them that the garrison 
would be removed as soon as the war was over. Boishebert did 
not understand why these Indians did not want the soldiers 
stationed in their village, and concluded that "evil councils 
prevail" at Kahnawake. (NYCD 10:86-87, 96.)
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into the League; hence the change in name around 1720 from the 
Five to the Six Nations.35
Warriors of the reincorporated Six Nations people joined 
Kahnawake war parties in the 1720s for forays against the 
Virginians and the Catawba Indians of South Carolina who had 
assisted the North Carolinians in driving out the 
Tuscaroras.36 Six Nations motives for fighting these peoples 
seem to be in revenge for the routing of the newest member of 
the League as well as the renewal of long-standing rivalries. 
But Sault motives for warring against these groups is less 
clear. Sault Iroquois were the instigators who persuaded 
League Iroquois warriors to participate against the wishes of 
the New York government. Kahnawake war parties had ventured 
to Catawba country even before the Tuscarora War of 1711-1713. 
The Catawbas were a convenient enemy, far enough away so as 
not to be able to retaliate or upset relations with the 
French, with whom the Catawbas had little or nothing to do. 
(The French in fact smiled on these Kahnawake raids to the
350n the Mountain mission, see C U E  11:54-55; RAPQ 1940- 
41, p. 454; Louise Tremblay, "La Politique Missionnaire 
Sulpicienne au 17e et debut du 18e siecle, 1668-1735," 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis: Universite de Montreal, 1981). On 
the Tuscaroras and their war, see NYCD 5:387; Christine A. 
Styrna, "The Winds of War and Change: The Impact of the 
Tuscarora War on Proprietary North Carolina, 1690-1729," 
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary, 
1990).
36See James H. Merrell, The Indians1 New World: Catawbas 
and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of 
Removal (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 1989), p. 54, regarding Catawbas fighting against the 
Tuscaroras for South Carolina in the Tuscarora War.
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south.)37
Daniel Richter's compelling argument about the League's 
need for mourning wars to assuage the bereaved and to boost 
the population of Iroquois tribes holds true for the mission 
Iroquois as well.38 They, too, integrated captives into 
their societies. For example, in a 1723 raid, a Kahnawake war 
party took an Indian prisoner in Virginia whose release became 
an urgent cause involving the New York provincial authorities 
and the Six Nations as well as the Sault Iroquois and 
Virginia. The English tried to enlist Six Nations help in 
convincing the Kahnawakes to give up the man, but the English 
declined to use force for fear of offending the Sault and 
League Iroquois. But the prisoner "was more Endin'd to go to 
Canada then to return to his own Country." Albany officials 
reported that the Kahnawakes "have made a Sachim of him
37Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 50, 52; New York Colonial
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library, 
60:156; NYCD 5:568, 660; Commission for Indian Affairs,
Albany. Minutes of meetings at Albany [1722-1748] and schedule 
of propositions made by the Indians and answers given to them, 
1677-1719. 5 vols. National Archives of Canada (hereafter
cited as Minutes of the Indian Commissioners) l:6-8a, 165, 
167, 2:67; New York Council Minutes Old Vol. 21, p. 436
(Calendar p. 381); The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader 
Colden (New-York Historical Society, Collections. L-LVI [New 
York, 1917-1923]), Vol. 4, p. 278 (hereafter cited as Colden 
Papers); JP 1:378, 386; James H. Merrell, "Their Very Bones 
Shall Fight: The Catawba-Iroquois Wars," in Daniel K. Richter 
and James H. Merrell, eds., Bevond the Covenant Chain: The 
Iroauois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America. 1600- 
1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p. 
127.
38Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois
Experience," William and Marv Quarterly 3d Ser., XL (1983), 
528-559.
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according to Custom."39 The community at the Sault continued 
to be a mosaic of cultural origins, with the periodic influx 
of native as well as European captives, integrated into the 
seamless web of families and clans.
Other targets of the Kahnawakes provided new family
members in the form of captives. In 1716 at the invitation of 
the French, Sault warriors took part in the war against the 
Fox nation west of Lake Michigan.40 Once again in 1731 they 
were called upon and provided more fighting men than did the 
Canadian militia.41 Four years later, the call came again 
and ninety joined the French campaign against the Fox. Bad 
luck cursed this expedition, however. The journey to Fox 
territory was arduous and guides led the fighting forces
astray so that hardly any of them encountered the enemy.
Those who did found themselves greatly outnumbered, but as 
Father Luc Nau, the Kahnawake priest who accompanied the 
expedition, recounted, the Kahnawakes in the group proved
their bravery and their reputation as "the most Warlike of all 
the american tribes." One of their leaders, Onorakinguiak, 
called out to the rest that they must fight bravely and not 
let themselves be captured; his words of inspiration were "Let
39Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:8a, 11-lla.
40Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
16:341 (hereafter cited as CSHSW); Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed., 
Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (Norman, Ok: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1987), p. 42.
41CSHSW 17:124.
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us show these renards [Foxes] that we are Iroquois and 
frenchmen.1,42 The French and allied-Indian force defeated 
the Fox warriors soundly, forcing them back into a wooded area 
to take refuge. It is telling that a Sault Indian was the 
unofficial commander in this battle. Perhaps because of their 
numbers, the mission Iroquois seem to have dominated the 
expedition, and the French militia and their leaders feared 
their allies almost as much as they did the enemy.
Officially, the commander in charge of the expedition was 
Sieur de Noyelle, but his authority was limited. He confided 
to his superiors that the French soldiers in the war party 
feared that the Sault (and probably Mountain) Iroquois "would 
put them into the Kettle." De Noyelle advised that on future 
expeditions, "it is necessary that the French should be 
stronger than the savages so as to be able to dominate them; 
otherwise They dominate us ... notwithstanding [our] 
complaisance and attention to Them." He spoke from personal 
experience; a Kahnawake warrior during this expedition "was 
bold enough to beat one of our soldiers in my presence." But 
de Noyelle did not punish the man, rather pretending to turn 
his head "as if I had not seen it," explaining that "we 
expected every Day to be abandoned by those people [mission 
Iroquois] at the first word we might say to them."43
French commanders lived in fear of their allied forces in
42JR 68:275-277.
43CSHSW 17:226-229.
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these backcountry forays and the Kahnawakes knew they could 
behave as they wished. They realized they had the upper hand. 
Power relationships were different in the interior of the 
continent from what they were at the garrisoned fort along the 
St. Lawrence. The Kahnawakes may have been the most warlike 
of all North American bands, but they were not unswervingly 
loyal to the French cause. However, they were easily the 
largest single group of Indians on which the French called in 
time of war, and therefore they had to be tolerated.44
In 1739, the missionaries at the Sault played an active 
part in convincing Kahnawake warriors to join a French foray 
against the Cherokees. Father Lauzon used the confidence he 
enjoyed among the Kahnawakes to press them into service. The 
Kahnawakes made up more than half of the entire allied-Indian 
force for the southern offensive. Even some League Mohawks 
joined in this effort, notwithstanding promises they had made 
to the governor of New York.45 No doubt the reason that 
Kahnawakes agreed enthusiastically to fight was the prospect 
of captives, potential adoptees, for their community, since 
Father Nau had recently commented that the Sault population 
was not as large as it had once been. In 1740, a Jesuit 
missionary at Detroit noticed that a party of "bandits" from
^E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State 
of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 
1850-1851), Vol. 1, pp. 17-18. (Hereafter cited as DHNY.)
45RAPO 1922-23, pp. 181-182, 184-185; JR 69:37; NYCD
6:148.
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the Sault came back from the southern foray with some 
Chickasaw captives.46 Whatever the Kahnawakes * reasons for 
fighting, they were much braver than their French 
counterparts; although the French had brought cannons and 
mortars, they did not dare engage Indians in battle, and the 
Iroquois of Kahnawake, along with some Canadian militia, were 
the only ones to encounter the enemy.47
Charles, Marquis de Beauharnois, the governor of New 
France, came to think of these Indians, along with the other 
"domiciliated" (mission) Indians, as the heart of the French 
fighting force; he noted that despite their "inconstancy" they 
were to be kept on alert in case needed for battle, whereas 
his French and Canadian regulars and militia seemed soft by 
comparison.48 However, one year after stating this, he found 
the "inconstancy" to be overwhelming; when Beauharnois 
approached the village at Kahnawake to speak with the Sault 
Iroquois, the sachems gathered up all the people and fled the 
village to avoid having a confrontation with him, true to the 
Iroquoian trait of avoiding conflict. Despite fighting 
bravely, the Kahnawake reputation for "inconstancy" was 
monumental in the early 1740s, since they engaged in battle 
with Indian tribes behind Beauharnois' back and against his 
will, maintained close trading ties (and, Beauharnois feared,
46JR 69:47; CSHSW 17:328.
47JR 69:47-48.
48NYCD 9:1068.
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information networks) with New York, and at times even incited 
other mission Indians against the French.
When Beauharnois finally managed to get an audience with 
the Kahnawake people in the summer of 1741 by engaging Father 
Lauzon to strongarm the sachems into coming to Kontreal, he 
chastized them for fomenting dissent among the St. Francis 
Abenakis and the Mountain Indians. Charging that "one of your 
Chiefs wished to inspire them [the Mountain Indians] with 
sentiments of rebellion against the discipline of your common 
Father," he expressed his disbelief that they could have 
suggested such bad thoughts to the Mountain Indians, who 
"understand better than you the value of my friendship."49 
But the Sault sachems spoke ill of their Mountain Iroquois 
cousins, complaining that the latter had informed the French 
of Sault intrigues. Relations between the two communities 
were strained at best, and Beauharnois did not help by 
suggesting that the Mountain Iroquois were beyond reproach 
whereas the Sault Iroquois needed to be reprimanded and forced 
back into a posture of obedience. He complained that in 
contrast to the loyal Mountain Indians, almost all the 
Kahnawakes had "English hearts."50
49NYCD 9:1073-1074; Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et 
la Nouvelle-France au XVIIIe siecle 2 vols. (Paris: Alphonse 
Picard et Fils, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 254. A similar statement 
comparing Sault and Mountain loyalty is found in CSHSW 18:18 
(1749).
S0NYCD 9:1071.
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The warring efforts of the Kahnawakes against distant 
tribes in the 1730s and early 1740s clearly paid off at home? 
periodic raids against the Chickasaws as well as the Catawbas 
produced "a large number of slaves” to be brought to the 
mission village, according to Father Nau. But these so-called 
"slaves" were spared torture for the most part and were 
adopted into the community. Nau claimed that the Kahnawake 
Indians "instruct them in our mysteries, and by Holy baptism 
place Them in The way of reaching heaven." By this means as 
well as the voluntary immigration of "outside families coming 
from a distance who willingly settle down among us," the 
population of the Sault mission increased significantly in 
this period. Nau indicated that there was so much work to be 
done because of the influx of people, as well as caring for 
the sick and settling quarrels among the Indians, that the 
missionaries stationed there were extremely overworked. But 
the Jesuits could not have helped feeling gratified that 
Indians were joining the ranks of the Sault in such numbers 
and that conversely Six Nations sachems in the homeland were 
worrying about the exodus of their tribesmen and women.51
Undoubtedly, however, the influx of voluntary and 
involuntary newcomers complicated life at the Sault 
immeasurably. The number of tribal origins represented
51 JR 69:57-59 (quote); Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 223; New 
York Council Minutes Old Vol. 21, p. 33 (Calendar p. 349) ; 
NYCD 6:282, 645. In 1741 the population at Sault St.-Louis 
was 1160, with 270 warriors. (C11A 75:206-207)
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increased, so that many languages must have been spoken in the 
longhouses, although Mohawk remained the dominant tongue. An 
example of the cosmopolitan nature of the Kahnawake community, 
was a man whom the French called Beauvais; he was a metis and 
could speak "every language," according to his compatriots.52 
During a raid against the Foxes and Sakis, Beauvais had been 
able to converse with them, which struck French observers on 
the scene as remarkable. Beauvais served as a reminder of the 
multi-cultural community in which he made his home.53
The polyglot nature of the Kahnawake community goes far
toward explaining the many and contradictory responses to war 
which came from its members. With the outbreak of King 
George's War in 1744, the English and French once again
prepared for military activity in the northeast and both sides 
courted their Indian contacts. The English goal was
unqualified military support from the Six Nations and 
neutrality from the Kahnawakes and other mission Indians. The 
French sought the reverse. The French had reason to be 
worried about Sault allegiance, because trade ties with Albany 
were closer than ever in the mid-1740s, and the Albany 
Commissioners, if not the League Iroquois, might be able to 
convince the Kahnawakes to stand neutral in the conflict, as
52CSHSW 17:227; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 35.
53Beauvais became a sachem, indicating that the Kahnawakes 
were color-blind, that mixed-bloods were not barred from being 
appointed to positions of honor. There were many references 
to mixed-blood people at Kahnawake. One family even retained 
ties to white relatives in New England. (JP 1:267)
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they had managed to do previously. But whereas Europeans 
assumed that a belligerrent group would have one policy to 
which the whole group would adhere, native society did not 
allow for leaders to force others to agree with them; sachems, 
elders, or matrons might decide on a policy, but this did not 
mean that warriors would adhere to it.54 Individuals would 
make their own decisions.55 At the Sault there were at least
54Despite the cultural blinders with which most Europeans 
perceived Indian political culture, Iroquoian women played an 
integral role in deciding whether or not Iroquoian men would 
wage war. But since they were involved at the village level 
of negotiations, European politicians seldom witnessed their 
involvement. Only one meeting of Beauharnois with a Mountain 
mission council is documented specifically enough to 
distinguish between elders, women, and warriors speaking to 
the governor. fNYCD 9:1078-1079) The only other references in 
European sources documenting mission Iroquois women's 
involvement in politics were by Frenchmen interested in native 
culture. In the 1710s Father Lafitau noticed at Kahnawake 
that "the matron has the power to make peace or war," and 
Pierre Pouchot concurred in the 1750s. (Lafitau, Customs Vol. 
2, pp. 163-164; Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war in 
North America between the French and English. 1755-60 2 vols., 
trans. Franklin B. Hough (Roxbury, Ma: W.E. Woodward, 1866), 
Vol. 2, p. 202.
55Claude LeBeau, Aventures du Sr. C. LeBeau. avocat en 
oarlement. ou vovacre curieux et nouveau parmi les Sauvaoes de 
l'Ameriaue septentrionale 2 vols. (New York: Johnson Reprints, 
1966) [originally published in Amsterdam, 1738], Vol. 2, pp. 
278-279; Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs of the American 
Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols., 
William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans. 
(Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77), 1:293-296, 300; Theda 
Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois in the 
Eighteenth Century," in Richter and Merrell, eds., Beyond the 
Covenant Chain: The Irocruois and Their Neighbors in Indian 
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press, 1987), pp. 148-149; Mary Druke, "Structure and Meanings 
of Leadership Among the Mohawk and Oneida During rhe Mid- 
Eighteenth Century" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 7, 22 23. Father Joseph 
Frangois Lafitau observed that at times, war was a "political 
agreement between chiefs of opposing parties to keep their
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two factions which pursued independent policies in the ensuing 
years of French-English conflict; this was more and more 
apparent in the years leading up to war.
Differences of opinion had been visible as early as the 
1720s. In 1725, a group of warriors had murdered an 
Englishman at Saratoga, but some sachems hurried to Albany 
upon hearing of it to ensure the Albany Commissioners that 
they regretted the act, that it was in no way condoned by the 
majority of their community, and that it was only "some of 
their vilest people" who had committed the heinous deed.56 
In the same year, the Commissioners reported that there were 
six sachems at Kahnawake and two of them had been accepted by 
the Albany men "as Children of this Govemmt" (allies of New 
York), and would give regular intelligence of affairs in New 
France. No doubt representing the pro-English position at 
Kahnawake councils was also part of their role.57
youth alert and had no other object except to harry each other 
and put their valour to the test." (Lafitau, Customs... 
2:105.)
56Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:151a.
S7Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:129. Some captives
taken by a Kahnawake war party in the early 1750s became an 
issue which illustrated this point; Susanna, a respected 
Kahnawake woman who was visiting in Albany, told Conrad Weiser 
that the conduct of that party in capturing the English 
traders in peacetime was not approved of at all at the Sault,
and that most of the people there were angry at those who had
done it, "and in their Drunkenness would call them [the 
captors] old women and Breakers of the Peace." (NYCD 6:796.) 
The peacetime taking of captives by Indians was becoming a 
social problem in New France, because it was condoned by the 
French, who purchased prisoners from Indians and kept them as 
slaves. An economic incentive for taking captives developed
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An Indian named Skonondo also played this role for a 
time. A frequent visitor at Albany from 1724 to 1726, when 
he acted as a speaker on behalf of the Sault Iroquois and 
passed intelligence to the New Yorkers, he emigrated in 1728 
from the Sault, bringing his family and about sixty others to 
live near Albany. He was unquestionably a pro-English 
Kahnawake at this time. It is unclear how long he and his 
group remained in New York, but by 1735 he had returned to the 
Sault and was by that time referred to as a sachem, not just 
a speaker. But he was still very much in the pro-English camp 
at the Sault and still made frequent diplomatic trips to 
Albany, ensuring the Commissioners of good relations between 
the Kahnawakes and New York. In fact, in 1736, he stated that 
he was "mindfull of his being a Child of this Govemmt. [New 
York]" and that he would "be faithfull to the Same" by 
informing them of anything important that was happening in 
Canada relating to New York.58 Skonondo was also 
instrumental in making sure relations between the Sault and 
League Iroquois were smooth, that the "Road [between Iroquoia 
and Kahnawake] should be kept Clean & be free for all to use 
it peaceably." In further pro-English activities, Skonondo 
went to Boston in 1744 to affirm that the mission Iroquois
among native groups. (Lafitau Customs... 2:152; Ian K. Steele, 
Betrayals: Fort William Henrv & the "Massacre" (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 13-14.)
58Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:68, 171a, 211, 2:82a; 
Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 170; New York Council Minutes Old Vol. 
15, p. 155 (Calendar p. 303).
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would remain neutral in the war.59
However, once the war began, the enigmatic Skonondo 
changed his mind; he was present at the destruction of 
Saratoga by French and mission Indian forces in 1746, the 
event which proved to be the most destructive to Kahnawake - 
New York relations in King George's War. His presence there 
implies that he participated in the fighting, unless he was 
forced to go against his will. But he had become a supporter 
of the French cause. In 1754, when war was again imminent, a 
pro-English diplomatic mission from the Sault headed for 
Albany told New York authorities that Skonondo had wanted to 
join them, but "was Rejected Having often Given Reason to 
Suspect his Fidelity" to the pro-English faction.60 This 
turncoat was living evidence not only of the variety of 
opinions at the Sault but also of the possibility that some 
would change their minds over the years.
Indeed, a group of Kahnawakes admitted to the Albany 
commissioners in 1741 that they had not yet decided whether to 
remain neutral in a French-English war. Three years later a 
Sault spokesman indicated that the sachems of Kahnawake 
supported neutrality, and perhaps in specifying the sachems, 
hinted that not everyone at the Sault agreed with the
59Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:65a, 299.
60New York Colonial Manuscripts 75:33, 79:37.
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sachems.61 Two months later, some other Kahnawake Indians 
visiting Albany were called to task for a rumor that the New 
Yorkers had heard concerning the mission Iroquois: that the 
French governor had offered them the hatchet against the 
English and that they had accepted it. The commissioners 
complained to these visitors that this taking up of the 
hatchet was contrary to what the sachem had told them two 
months earlier and to what Skonondo had promised at Boston. 
The reply was that the Sault sachems had held a meeting with 
the warriors of their village, asking them not to use the 
hatchet "Contrary to the Covent, with ye English" but to make 
war only on the Catawbas.62 Clearly, a majority of the 
sachems and matrons were pro-peace (pro-English) whereas most 
of the warriors seemed to want to make war against the 
English. And indeed, while some Kahnawake travellers came to 
Albany to pass intelligence to the New Yorkers, others spied 
on the English colony, returning to Canada with military 
information about New York for the benefit of the French.63
But even the pro-French faction was concerned about 
relations with their fellow Iroquois of the Six Nations; those 
who agreed to take up the hatchet on behalf of the French 
invited Six Nations sachems to join them in their French
61Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 223; Minutes of Indian 
Commissioners 2:275a-276.
62Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:298a-299.
63NYCD 9:1109-1111; Minutes of Indian Commissioners 
2:308a.
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alliance and in living at the Sault.64 New York officials 
worried about a positive response to either of these 
propositions, especially when they desired Six Nations 
military support for their own cause. The League Iroquois 
were extremely reluctant to pledge military alliance with the 
English in 1745, and one League Indian even emigrated to the 
Mountain mission, embarking on a career of leading war parties 
against New York.65 In early 1746, the grand council at 
Onondaga flatly refused to join the English side, arguing that 
they and the Sault Iroquois were "One Family and one Nation 
that they intermarried amongst one Another and would not 
therefore make war upon each other."66
Some Kahnawakes continued to entreat the League Iroquois 
to remain neutral, claiming that "the white people might fight 
for themselves" and that "there were only a few of Unruly 
Cachnawage Indians at the Destruction of Saratoge" in 1745.67 
This was revealing on two scores: that there were some
inklings of an Indian-versus-white alignment of sympathies, 
and that the "unruly" Kahnawakes present at the Saratoga raid 
represented a small minority of their people, most of whom 
disapproved of the raid.
The possibility of both groups of Indians aligning
^Minutes of Indian Commissioners 3:84, 90.
65Colden Papers 3:137; NYCD 10:32-33.
^raxall, Abridgment, p. 244.
67Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:359-359a.
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against both sets of Europeans frightened the latter. French 
and English alike feared that the League and Sault Iroquois 
had a "secret understanding" not to fight each other even if 
forced to go along on war expeditions. Cadwallader Colden 
claimed that the two Iroquois groups had a code they used to 
identify each other in the woods between New France and New 
York; a Six Nations man told a Schenectady man who wanted to 
go to New France that he needed only to dress like an Indian 
and, when encountering mission Iroquois along the way who 
would ask him to identify himself, call out "Maria" to be 
safe. French officials claimed that in battles which involved 
Kahnawake and League warriors on opposite sides, the 
Kahnawakes would fire warning shots as the enemy approached, 
to save their fellow Iroquois from being slaughtered.68 The 
French officials worried about the understanding and feared 
that the two groups of Indians would "allow the whites to 
fight each other without interfering with them on either 
side."69 New York leaders went even further, worrying that 
the two groups, while protecting each other, would "continue 
their Depredations agt. the Christians [Europeans]."70
^Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian 
Nationsr...1 2 vols. (Reprinted from the London 1747 edition, 
New York: Allerton, 1922), Vol. 2, pp. 214-215; NYCD 10:105.
69NYCD 10:94. Also Paul A. W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser: 
Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 232-233.
Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:406. In 1750, 
Pennsylvania's Indian agent Conrad Weiser lamented that 
Onondaga, seat of the Six Nations Confederacy Council, "was
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But these fears were probably unfounded, since the two 
groups of Indians did go to war on opposite sides and even 
knowingly killed each other on occasion near the close of the 
1744-1748 conflict. The Kahnawakes instigated the distancing 
which led to this position, since they had been first to take 
up the hatchet. In the summer of 1746, when the Six Nations 
were agonizing over whether to go to war, their Sault cousins 
distanced themselves rhetorically from the League, speaking of 
"your Father" and "our Father," as though .the European 
alliances defined their relationship, instead of the blood and 
family connection which League orators had emphasized.71 
Clearly, at least for the moment, the pro-French faction had 
won at the Sault, speaking for the community in general. But 
opposition still existed, since even at the height of Sault 
support for the French in this war, Canadian officials worried 
that the Kahnawakes were "treacherous, and favour the Mohawks 
in their incursions on our settlements; they are even 
suspected of giving the enemy notice when we are in pursuit of 
them.,|7Z
thick with French praying Indians when I was there," adding to 
the fear of pan-Indian organization. (Samuel Hazard, ed., 
Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania 16 vols. 
(Harrisburg; 1838-1853), Vol. 5, p. 480.)
71Colden Papers 3:234.
^NYCD 10:92. Aaron, a League Mohawk, reported to New 
York officials in 1746 that he had visited a friend at 
Kahnawake who was against involvement in the war. (Minutes of 
Indian Commissioners 2:396a.) This is one of few glimpses 
into individual opinion of persons at Kahnawake.
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Not all Kahnawakes favored the Mohawks; in the early 
spring of 1748, a group of Kahnawakes encountered some League 
Mohawks, and the two groups, speaking to each other in Mohawk, 
denounced each other and boasted of their own bravery. 
According to English accounts, the Kahnawakes not only killed 
most of the Mohawk group, but also desecrated the bodies of 
their victims, roasting various parts over a fire.73 
Although at other times, it was clear that Kahnawakes were 
coerced into fighting, there were no Frenchmen present at this 
fratricidal spree; those Kahnawakes who took part in this 
butchering of Six Nations warriors did so of their own 
volition.
But coercion was sometimes evident. In the summer of 
1747, some 34 Sault Iroquois had been outfitted for a war 
party by French authorities, who ordered the warriors to 
divide themselves into two or three smaller groups. The 
reaction to this order was less than enthusiastic since the 
warriors "manifested some repugnance," but they were 
"authoritatively told that they were to submit to orders and 
obey." And some Six Nations representatives at a council with 
William Johnson in April 1748 told him that their Sault 
counterparts were "too much under the Directions of the 
French" to agree to be neutral for the remainder of the 
war.74 New Yorkers who were personally acquainted with some
^JP 1:146-147.
74NYCD 10:167; JP 1:163.
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Kahnawake Indians because of the illegal trade reported that 
the priests at Kahnawake routinely pressed the Sault Indians 
to make war on the English.75 When a League Iroquois 
diplomat came to Kahnawake for discussions in 1746, a 
presumably pro-French Sault Indian informed a missionary of 
this visit, who in turn notified the governor of the colony. 
The Jesuits acted as watchdogs for the interests of the French 
colony by monitoring talks between the Sault and League 
people. If Sault and League negotiators had desired to have 
private meetings, they were thwarted in this attempt as long 
as the meetings were to be at the mission village instead of 
in a village in Iroquoia.76
The government of New France also attempted to control 
the movement of Sault Indians. Governor Beauhamois claimed 
that he installed a chief at Kahnawake, and told him to report 
everything that happened at the Sault, and to heed the Jesuits 
at all times.77 At a particularly delicate time in 1744, the 
Montreal governor decreed that no Kahnawakes should enter that 
city.78 No doubt many chafed at this attempt to limit their
Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:143a. For additional 
evidence of Jesuit pressure, see C11A 95:152-154? NYCD 10:209? 
Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:143a? "Les malignites du 
sieur de Courville," [anon.] Bulletin des recherches 
historioues L (1944), p. 73.
76Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:394-394a, 403. Another 
instance of this happening: 2:373.
^NYCD 9:1075.
78Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:298, also 2:286a.
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freedom and to control their policy.
Some rebelled completely against the growing intrusion of 
French imperial control on life at the Sault by leaving the 
village and heading west to escape the restrictions. The Ohio 
country in the 1740s and 1750s was a haven for many 
dispossessed or discontented tribal groups from the east. For 
the discontented, the source of their unhappiness with life in 
the East was often disagreement with the policies followed by 
the sachems or warriors in their villages. Separating from 
the group had always been a way of dealing with such political 
factionalism and never more so than in the mid-eighteenth 
century.
The nature of politics in Iroquoian and other native 
societies was changing at this time; the traditional pattern 
of sachems, elders, matrons, and warriors enjoying a balance 
of influence within the polity was being replaced by decision­
making by a few "pine-tree chiefs," men unofficially appointed 
by whites, or recognized by whites, as the men in charge of 
making policy. Often these were warriors or war-inclined men 
who were encouraged by Europeans not to seek consensus within 
the village council but to impose a policy.79 Sachems duly 
appointed by matrons saw their position declining, but their
^ a r y  Druke, "Structure and Meanings of Leadership..." 
pp. 93-94, 144-145, 151. Joseph Brant is an example of a 
white-appointed or recognized leader who usurped authority 
from traditionally recognized sachems. (See James O'Donnell, 
"Joseph Brant," in R. David Edmunds, ed., American Indian 
Leaders: Studies in Diversity (Lincoln, Ne: University of
Nebraska Press, 1980). Also see above, footnote 82.)
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role had not been one of coercion. This traditional authority- 
had been that of speaking, of presenting a point of view in 
hopes of convincing others to agree with it rather than using 
force. The elders, sachems, matrons, and warriors had always 
sought agreement in council meetings. If one could not agree 
on extremely important issues and felt strongly enough about 
it, he or she could leave the village.
Many of the people living in the Ohio country were those 
who had voted with their feet. Many Six Nations people were 
there, particularly Senecas (these Ohio Senecas were called 
Mingos), as well as Delawares and Shawnees who had lost their 
land in the east, and Ojibwas, Hurons, Wyandots, Twightees, 
and others. Both Sault and Mountain Mission Iroquois people 
were found in these small communities.80 Little is known 
about these newcomers except for the occasional captivity 
narrative by white prisoners such as Colonel James Smith of 
Kentucky. Smith was captured in 1755, shortly before 
Braddock's defeat, by a Mountain Iroquois and two Delawares. 
They took him to Fort Duquesne, forced him to run the 
gauntlet, and later escorted him to a community of Kahnawakes, 
Delawares, and Ojibwas on the Muskingum River northwest of
^ CSHSW 18:91? Guy Fregault, Le Grand Marquis: Pierre de 
Rioaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane 2e. ed. (Montreal: Fides, 
1952), pp. 357, 358; Shea, History, p. 335? Michael N.
McConnell, "Peoples "In Between": The Iroquois and the Ohio 
Indians, 1720-1768," in Richter and Merrell, eds., Beyond the 
Covenant Chain: The Irocmois and Their Neighbors in Indian 
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press, 1987).
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Fort Duquesne. Smith was adopted by this group and spent 
several years among them. Fortunately, his subsequent account 
of life among them provides clues about these Ohio emigrants. 
For instance, the Kahnawakes among this group may have been 
religious as well as political refugees, since one of his 
adoptive brothers told him that many of the Kahnawakes (as 
well as Wyandots) "were a kind of half Roman Catholics." The 
brother also said that "the priest and him could not agree, as 
they held notions that contradicted both sense_and reason,” 
and that he believed the traditional native religious way "was 
better than this new way of worshipping God."81
Some were opposed to fighting in the Seven Years' War. 
Tecaughretanego, a Kahnawake member of the community, told 
Smith that although he had had a reputation as a warrior, he 
had been very much against the war in council. Therefore he 
"stayed home" rather than go fighting, the traditional 
Iroquoian method of dealing with dissent from the group. If 
this was his attitude in the community in the Ohio country, 
there is a good chance that Tecaughretanego had left his home 
at the Sault for similar reasons.82 Conversely, Smith also 
recounted that Tontileaugo, a Kahnawake refugee at the 
Muskingum camp, who wanted to go to war against an enemy tribe
81Samuel G. Drake, ed., Indian Captivities or Life in the 
Wiowam (Buffalo, N.Y.: 1854), p. 206. Pierre Pouchot reported 
that in the 1750s many Sault Iroquois were abandoning their 
mission village because of disenchantment with the Christian 
religion. (Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war... 2:224.)
82Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 221.
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was voted out of the war party. The community held a council 
when deciding whether or not to make war on another group, and 
they held votes on whether each potential warrior should be 
included in the expedition. Tontileaugo was disappointed 
because "the votes went against him, as he was one of our best 
hunters." He was needed to stay behind and provide meat for 
the women, children, and elderly people at the community.83
Smith also told of elders trying to cajole the young men 
into going to war; on this occasion the former did not believe 
that the warriors necessarily could drive all the English off 
the continent, but "they were willing to propagate the idea in 
order to encourage the young men to go to war." These elders 
also claimed to have visions just before a war party set out 
for battle in order to "animate and excite [the warriors] to 
push on with vigor."84 Whereas at the Kahnawake community 
itself elders and sachems seemed to be opposed to war and 
warriors eager to go to war, more often than not, the reverse 
seemed to be true in this western community of Kahnawakes. 
The practice of cajoling and using gentle pressure on warriors 
shows that traditional behavior in decision-making and 
conflict resolution persisted.
Also revealing in terms of Kahnawake attitudes toward and 
perceptions of the League Iroquois, was a potential skirmish 
between this Muskingum community and William Johnson's war
^Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 195.
^Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, pp. 203, 216.
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party which included Mohawk warriors. This party was spotted 
one evening near the camp and many feared that they would be 
ambushed. The women were sent out of the range of possible 
fire and the men hunkered down on the ground to wait for enemy 
action. But Tecaughretanego, Smith's Kahnawake friend from 
whom he had learned some Mohawk, whispered to him that he 
should not be afraid, because all the Mohawk speakers of the 
community had to do to ensure their safety was to talk with 
Johnson's Mohawk allies. Since they spoke the same language, 
Johnson's Mohawks would not hurt the Kahnawakes or Smith 
(since he also spoke Mohawk), although they would kill the 
Ojibwas and others.85 Thus the "understanding" between the 
League and Kahnawake Iroquois was based on language. Once a 
European had been adopted into a tribe, he or she was no 
longer considered to have any identity other than that of the 
tribe. There was no distinction between natural-born native 
and white adoptee.86
While some Kahnawakes had emigrated to the Ohio country 
to find a freer life, other Iroquois people were forming new 
communities closer to New York and New France in the east. 
Abbe Frangois Picquet, a Sulpician missionary, left Montreal
85Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 215. (Several 
languages were spoken at the community: Wyandot and Ojibwa as 
well as Mohawk, and possibly others, and some of these Indians 
also spoke English.)
^Indeed, at Smith's elaborate adoption ceremony, a sachem 
addressed him in a speech, declaring that "every drop of white 
blood was washed out of your veins." (Drake, ed., Indian 
Captivities, p. 186.)
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in 1748 to start an Iroquois mission on the St. Lawrence far 
west of Sault St.-LoUis, almost at the mouth of Lake Ontario. 
He called his mission "La Presentation," and recruited League 
Onondagas and Oneidas, whose homelands lay almost directly 
south of the mission. Picquet's mission became militarily 
significant; the League Mohawks were sufficiently enraged by 
it that they razed it in 1750, but the Sulpician was 
determined. He rebuilt it, had it fortified, and established 
a garrison there. By 1753 there were 400 Onondagas and 
Oneidas in residence.87 Picquet aggressively attempted to 
influence these Indians with French culture; he sent some of 
the La Presentation people to France and had them dressed as 
Frenchmen "from head to foot" even when they returned to the 
mission community. Bougainville described one as "a savage 
harlequin in blond wig and lace-covered garb."88 Picquet's 
aggressive approach also extended into the political realm, as 
he allowed New France officials to try to intervene in village 
politics, and he spied on the League Iroquois for the French 
in the early 1750s. Some Indians of La Presentation balked at 
this, and still felt themselves to be part of the Six Nations. 
By 1753, many were returning to their home villages, and the 
mission atrophied during the Seven Years' War. Picquet
87John G. Shea, "The Jesuits, Recollets, and the Indians," 
in Justin Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History of 
America 8 vols. (Boston: 1884-1889), 4:285; DHNY 2:421;
Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History (New York:
Scribners, 1975), p. 314; NYCD 10:263.
^Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 103.
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abandoned the mission, but some Iroquois continued to live 
there until 1806 when the New York State government had them 
removed and sent to other reserves.89
Another mission community was established in 1753 at Lake 
Saint Francis on the St. Lawrence, halfway between La 
Presentation and Kahnawake. Fathers Gordon and Billiard left 
with thirty families from the Sault to settle on this site. 
Although official correspondence claimed that these families 
had decided to move because they could no longer make a living 
from the soil at Kahnawake, a Catholic historian claimed that 
one particular family did not fit in at Kahnawake and left 
with those who supported them against the majority at the 
Sault.90 Although having to spend some money to help 
establish the new community, the French government approved of 
its foundation because it would add to the geographic barrier 
against enemy invasion which the Sault village and the La 
Presentation mission provided to the colony.91
Whatever the reason for the thirty families leaving
a9NYCD 6:780, 10:563; DHNY 2:421; Bougainville, Adventure 
in the wilderness. pp. 103-104; Robert Lahaise, "Frangois 
Picquet," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 4, pp. 636- 
638. The mission was near present-day Ogdensburg, N.Y. (On 
this mission see Harold Blau, Jack Campisi, and Elisabeth 
Tooker, "Onondaga," in Handbook of North American Indians 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978- )
[William Sturtevant, gen. ed.], Volume 15, Northeast. Bruce 
Trigger, vol. ed. (1978), p. 495.)
^Shea, History p. 339. Also C11A 99:311-317; Devine, 
Historic Cauqhnawaqa. p. 255.
91C11A 99:315-316.
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Kahnawake for a new start, it was clear that this "St. Regis" 
or "Akwesasne" mission community was more attractive to 
potential newcomers from the Six Nations, as departing 
Governor Duguesne told his successor in the post, Pierre 
Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, in 1755. Duquesne claimed that 
the League Mohawks "had evinced some repugnance to come to the 
Sault, either because the land there was not fertile, or 
rather because they had remarked that Brandy was as abundant 
among their praying Brethren as among the English."92 By the 
1750s, the social problems of the League Iroquois were as 
common at the Kahnawake community.
However, at the same time, a large number of English 
prisoners had been taken by Sault warriors, and many of these 
English adoptees at Kahnawake liked the community so much they 
decided to stay when offered safe return to their own colony. 
They had converted to Catholicism, been adopted by Kahnawake 
women into families, and dressed as the Sault people did.93 
It is puzzling that these adoptees seemed so enamored of the 
Sault community at a time when many Six Nations people viewed
92NYCD 10:301; also Bougainville, Adventure in the 
wilderness. p. 112 (Vaudreuil inviting League Oneidas there 
(or to La Presentation or Fort Frontenac) in 1757). (This 
Governor Vaudreuil is not to be confused with the earlier 
Governor Vaudreuil who died in 1725. The one who became 
governor of Canada in 1755 was his son. See William J. 
Eccles, "Pierre Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial," 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 4, pp. 662-674.
^CllA 95:100-105; NYCD 10:212, 214-216; New York Colonial 
Manuscripts 77:77 (Calendar p. 603); New York Council Minutes 
Old Vol. 23 p. 71 (Calendar p. 387); Franquet, Voyages et 
Memoires. p. 38; Lafitau, Customs... 2:172.
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it as an undesirable place to live. Kahnawake was a place of 
enigma in the 1750s.
"Spirited opinions" were exchanged at Kahnawake council 
meetings leading up to the Seven Years' War. And whether or 
not the French allowed them to decide for themselves is 
difficult to tell. The Sault Iroquois experienced the tension 
between their desire for autonomy and the French desire to 
make them dependent and pliant. We have seen evidence of 
French attempts to control these people and their policy, and 
one of the most obvious attempts to have mastery over their 
fate was the imposition of French garrison troops and a 
commandant in the village fort. Louis Franquet visited the
village in 1750 to make possible recommendations on improving
fortifications and adding troops. He encountered an awkward 
subject in his conversations with the Jesuits there; when 
asking them about the number of people and of warriors in the 
village, the Jesuit replied that there was no way to calculate 
either population. Franquet noted that his query had been 
viewed as indiscrete, and that there might be difficulties for 
French authorities in "ascertaining the resources that we 
could draw from the community in wartime."94
Proof of the division in political opinions among the
Kahnawakes emerged in regard to the garrison; at least two
sachems (Teganagwasen and Beauvais) wanted the garrison 
maintained in the early 1750s, whereas three were opposed and
94Franquet, Voyages et Memo ires, p. 119.
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demonstrated this by returning war medals they had received 
from the commander of the garrison, M. Douville.95
While factions at Kahnawake were engaged in a tug-of-war, 
so were New York and New France engaged in their own tug-of- 
war, a contest for the sympathies of both the Sault and the 
League Iroquois. Their attempts reached a fever pitch by 
1755. Especially conspicuous were William Johnson's courting 
of the Kahnawakes, his willingness to spend money in the 
effort, and his orders to officials in Albany "to give the 
said Cagnawaga Indians no ill usage of any kind."96 He did 
this in the face of opposition of other influential people 
such as William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts and major- 
general of British forces in the Seven Years' War, who 
believed that all Kahnawakes in Albany should be imprisoned. 
Goldsbrow Banyar, an important figure in New York governing 
circles, believed that the Sault Iroquois visited the colony 
of New York only to spy for the Canadians and to thwart New 
York's efforts at enlisting the League Iroquois.97 Johnson
^CllA 95:145-147, 150-151; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.
p. 120.
96 J£ 1:639-640, 643, 646, 2:582, 597; New York Council 
Minutes Old Vol. 21 p. 430-432 (Calendar p. 380) ; New York 
Colonial Manuscripts 79:44; NYCD 10:218; DHNY 2:384; Richard 
Day, ed., Calendar of the Sir William Johnson Manuscripts 
(Albany: New York State Department of Education, 1909), p. 37.
97JP 1:543-544, 650, 791. Banyar held the positions of 
deputy auditor-general of New York, deputy secretary of New 
York, deputy clerk of the Council, deputy clerk of the 
provincial Supreme Court, register of the court of chancery, 
and probate judge, until 1776.
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invited individual Kahnawakes to live near his estate in the 
Mohawk Valley west of Albany for a two-year period starting in 
the spring of 1755, and he assured the Six Nations that one of 
his main concerns in preparing for the coming battles with the 
French was not to spill any Kahnawake blood, knowing that this 
was one of the main reasons why the Six Nations had not yet 
pledged their support for the English cause.98
Indeed, Kahnawake support was pivotal to military 
campaigns in the Lake Champlain corridor, the arena for which 
Johnson was preparing, not only because of their military 
prowess and intimate knowledge of the terrain and waterways, 
but also because the decision of most Six Nations warriors on 
whether to join Johnson's redcoats depended on whether their 
Sault relatives would join the French effort or remain 
neutral. The League Iroquois viewed the Kahnawakes as being 
"a part of themselves" and many of them pledged as late as 
1754 that they would not ally with the English because of 
their alliance with their Sault cousins.99
The vast majority of Kahnawakes had refused to 
participate in the French campaign in the Ohio country at the 
start of the Seven Years' War, agreeing only to be employed on 
a monthly basis as hunters for the army's food supply.100
98NYCD 6:973, 980-983; JP 9:619.
"Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war... 1:37: Bougainville, 
Adventure in the wilderness, pp. 54-55; DHNY 2:384; New York 
Colonial Manuscripts 79:105c, 80:51; NYCD 10:267-269.
100DHNY 2:365.
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And when all the other mission Indians were out on scalping 
raids in New England in the early summer of 1755, only the 
Kahnawakes refrained from conducting such raids.101 However, 
as the months, weeks, and days counted down to the time of 
battle in the Lake Champlain-Lake George region, with many 
attempts by Johnson and League delegates to dissuade the 
Kahnawakes from military involvement, the latter finally, in 
desperation and with deep regret, explained that they were 
powerless to remain neutral, that "the French Priests by 
throwing Water upon our Heads, subject us to the Will of the 
Governor of Canada." The Sault spokesman who announced this 
also reminded the League delegation that the Six Nations 
people were fortunate in that they were still "a free People." 
The Kahnawakes' decision was made with regret; they asked 
their League cousins to be careful for their own safety and to 
stay out of the way of the fighting.102
When Iroquois individuals had responded years earlier to 
the spiritual message of the Jesuits, they had not realized 
the imperial implications of their choice, but it now became 
clear.
Although the French had not been able to force the Kahnawakes 
to fight in the Ohio country or to go on scalping raids,
101JP 9:201.
102JP 9:220-221; DHNY 2:399. The Sault spokesman also 
stated that "it is not in our power to comply with it [the 
plea for neutrality], for the French & we are one Blood, & 
where they are to dye we must dye also." (JP 9:221.)
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Jesuits as well as military officers exerted significant and 
successful intimidation to enlist with General Dieskau's 
forces based at Fort St. Frederic in the summer of 1755. A 
Dutchman who had been a prisoner in an Abenaki mission village 
east of Montreal told Johnson on his return to New York that 
the French had not been able to persuade the Kahnawakes to 
join them until the French "threatened to kill them or drive 
them out of their country.1,103
Johnson was deeply disappointed, not only because he 
would face these formidable Indians as foes, but also because 
his own Iroquois support would dwindle; on the eve of the 
battle at Lake George, he had only sixty League Iroquois, 
although he had expected four hundred.104 And those who did 
accompany him into battle were not much help against the 
enemy.105
Nor, in the end, were the Sault Iroquois much help to 
Dieskau; in fact, they determined the outcome of the Battle of 
Lake George fought in September 1755 by sabotaging Dieskau's 
plan of attack. The tension between forest and European-style 
warfare was a constant theme throughout this war, but 
particularly in this battle the tension between the two 
approaches and the discontent of the Kahnawakes combined for
103JP 2:649.
104DHNY 2:397-398; JP 1:880, 882, 894, 2:8, 383, 9:223; 
NYCD 6:994, 1001.
105NYCD 6:1012.
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disastrous results. Although Governor Vaudreuil had 
instructed General Dieskau, a German baron who had made a 
career as a professional soldier in Europe, on how to treat 
Indians and how to conduct forest warfare, Dieskau could not 
adapt to the North American situation. Fresh from the 
European theater, he had not enough time, no experience, and 
little desire or patience to deal with Indians and Canadian 
habitant militia units and their customs of warfare.106
Dieskau's mistakes included not consulting with Indians 
on battle plans or at least making a pretense at doing so, not 
using Indian scouts, expecting them to attack a fortified camp 
(something Indians refused to do), expecting them to remain 
fighting and even to advance when the fighting was going badly 
and there was a chance at escape, and not taking into account 
the allegiance of Indian groups across enemy lines. The 
various accounts of what happened at the Battle of Lake George 
differ considerably, so that it is difficult to know precisely 
what happened, but it seems clear that the Kahnawakes, when 
told of Dieskau' initial plan, refused to participate, forcing 
him to change his plan. At least at this point Dieskau 
realized that the Kahnawakes "were considered by the other 
Indians as the oldest and first" and took the objections
106NYCD 10:316, 329; Bougainville, Adventure in the
wilderness, p. 60: Colonel Bougainville also shared the
European mistrust and ignorance of the ways of forest and 
Indian warfare: George F.G. Stanley, New France: The Last 
Phase. 1744-1760 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 
102-103; Steele, Betrayals, pp. 43-50.
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seriously enough to adapt.107
All accounts concur that the Kahnawakes sabotaged the 
French plan by warning the League Iroquois and English of the 
approaching French ambush with warning shots. And when 
Dieskau tried to make the best of a bad situation (from a 
European point of view) by charging Johnson's fortified camp, 
the Kahnawakes, along with other Indians and the Canadian 
militia, fled leaving the French regulars to their bloody 
defeat. Dieskau himself was seriously wounded. The 
Kahnawakes later told some Six Nations deputies at a meeting 
that they should not have feared the Sault Iroquois in this 
battle; they claimed they had had only powder, no shot, in 
their muskets.108 Clearly, although the Sault Iroquois had 
engaged in military action, they were pressured into it and 
rebelled by making the situation intolerable for the French, 
and by only pretending to fight against their fellow Iroquois 
warriors. Dieskau held them solely accountable for the French 
defeat at Lake George, expressing great bitterness at their 
treachery.109 But since the Sault Iroquois were strongarmed
107nycd 10:342.
,108NYCD 10:316-327, 335-336, 340-343, 367, 7:239-240;
Daniel Claus, Daniel Claus' Narrative of his Relations with 
Sir William Johnson and Experiences in the Lake George Fight 
(New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, 
1904), pp. 13-16; Charles Henry Lincoln, ed., The 
Correspondence of William Shirley 2 vols. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1912), Vol. 2, pp. 278-279; JP 1:744.
109NYCD 10:316-318, 340-343; Shirlev Correspondence. Vol. 
2, pp. 278-279.
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into fighting, the French should not have expected unswerving 
obedience. Even as they were faced with an unwanted task 
forced upon them, the Kahnawakes had found a way to assert 
their own will.110
In subsequent military actions, the Kahnawakes were 
notable by their absence, despite Vaudreuil's efforts to 
reassure them that he was not angry with them for what had 
happened at Lake George.111 When the French took Fort Bull 
and Fort Oswego in 1756, there were fewer than twenty Sault 
Iroquois present among the French forces as opposed to strong 
showings by other mission Indians. In the fall of 1757, over 
one hundred Kahnawake warriors joined a French attack on 
German Flats, a settlement of German refugees in the Mohawk 
Valley. They disagreed on strategy, however, and forty of the 
Sault warriors left the warpath in disgust.112
Many Kahnawakes had been very disappointed in the French 
victory at Oswego. Thomas Wildman, a Kahnawake known to be 
pro-English, "was crying like a Child" when he heard the news. 
There had been "a general Disgust agt the French" among the
110The English were pleasantly surprised at Dieskau's 
defeat at Lake George, concluding that the Kahnawakes were 
"not altogether in the power of the French" after all. (JP 
2:68; also 2:86.)
111NYCD 10:381, 448. (Vaudreuil treated them with kid
gloves for the remainder of the war. NYCD 10:828, 838; RAPO 
1923-24, p. 354.)
112RAP0 1923-24, p. 223, 1926-27, pp. 380, 403; CUE
10:249-250; DHNY 1:330-331; NYCD 10:404-405, 530, 674; JP
9:862.
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Sault Iroquois in 1755 and 1756, according to a Dutchman who 
had spent time in New France as a prisoner. He claimed that 
the Kahnawakes wanted to leave New France but could not do it 
"without being hindred [sic] from the french," and that eight 
Frenchmen had been murdered in Montreal by some Kahnawakes. 
But there were no official reports about these killings, no 
doubt because the French did not want to risk further rage 
from these Indians which publicity would unleash.113 The 
Dutchman's report included two contradictory realities: French 
tyranny over the Sault Iroquois and simultaneously a French 
fear of offending them because of their importance. The 
dynamic of autonomy versus dependency had clearly slipped 
toward dependency, but the Kahnawakes still had some clout and 
therefore some basis for autonomous power in their 
relationship with the French colony.
The Sault Iroquois could still threaten to leak 
intelligence to the Six Nations or the English, and the French 
took this possibility seriously, suspecting them of this form 
of treason in 1756.114 In meetings with the French governor 
in that year and the next, the Kahnawakes made no secret of 
the fact that they were divided in their opinions and that
113JP 2:649. On a similar note, see Louise Dechene, 
Habitants et Marchands de Montreal au XVIIe siecle (Paris: 
Plon, 1974), p. 32? William J. Eccles, "Sovereignty 
Association, 1500-1783," in Essays on New France (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 166, 214? CllA 95:148-149.
114Minutes of Indian Commissioners 5:63? RAPO 1923-24, pp. 
223-228? Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 32? JP 
2:709.
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they had agents in Albany. Bougainville even claimed that, 
because they were divided among themselves, the Kahnawakes "do 
not dare to take a decisive course." Even if they were 
paralyzed by indecision, at least French officials still 
considered them to be in control of their own decision­
making.115
Although they did accompany the French in large numbers 
to Fort St. Frederic for a possible attempt on Fort William 
Henry in the spring of 1757, there is a good chance that the 
recruits were unhappy with their lot, since a brawl broke out 
between them and some Frenchmen at Fort St. Frederic. Hen on 
both sides were killed during the fight, with one witness (who 
probably exaggerated) claiming that sixty Kahnawakes were 
murdered. In the aftermath, the Sault people complained to 
the Six Nations that the French had formed a scheme to reduce 
not just the Kahnawakes but the League to slavery.116 
French-Kahnawake relations were at a low ebb.
Perhaps because of great efforts to recruit them, 
including visits by General (Louis-Josephe, Marquis de) 
Montcalm and Colonel Bougainville to "dance the war dance" and 
drum up support for the summer 1757 battle plans, virtually 
all of the Sault warriors journeyed to the Lake Champlain 
theater for the August siege of Fort William Henry. In fact,
115Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 110; NYCD 
10:553; JP 9:606-607.
116Minutes of Indian Commissioners 5:120; JP 9:741; NYCD 
7:285-286.
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because they were the largest group of Indians allied with the 
French on this occasion, the war belt was given to them, 
symbolizing their leading military role among both the mission 
and the western French-allied Indians.117 But since Montcalm 
was in charge of this military action, the same disregard for 
Indian allies marred the effort as had marred Dieskau's. The 
siege of the fort was successful, but the ensuing massacre of 
the surrendered English forces by Indians resulted from the 
misunderstandings between Europeans and North Americans 
(especially Indians) on the rules of warfare.118 But the 
Kahnawakes do not seem to have been involved in the furious 
massacre at Fort William Henry. Some of them may even have 
left the area for Crown Point before the killing began.119
Proof of Montcalm's inability to incorporate Indians 
successfully into his military strategy was his desire to 
fight the battles of 1758 without native support. His 
supporters against the forest war strategy of Vaudreuil 
declared, in reporting the news of the French victory at 
Carillon (Ticonderoga) in July, that "what must the more 
excite the public admiration and joy, is the fact that no 
Indian has contributed to this great event —  a circumstance
117RAPO 1923-24, p. 270; NYCD 10:575, 609.
118See Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henrv & the
"Massacre".
119JR 70:91-203 - Father Pierre Roubaud's account.
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which perhaps never occurred in this country."120 And in 
1759, the Kahnawakes informed the League Mohawks, no doubt 
hoping the information would reach Sir William Johnson, that 
"lately they had Buryed their Ax, & they did not choose to 
take it up again so soon."121
More than coincidentally, a few weeks later, after the 
French capitulated at the Plains of Abraham, Johnson sent a 
message to the Sault Iroquois, reminding them that he had 
always wished to befriend them and that it was not too late 
now for them to send wampum belts indicating their warming to 
the English.122 Ever ready to make the best of their 
situation, the Kahnawakes responded not only by renewing good 
relations with Johnson but in 1760 by guiding General Jeffrey 
Amherst's British forces around the Lachine rapids in the St. 
Lawrence river to reach Montreal, the last piece of land held 
by the French in Canada.123
As the British subsequently marched into the city, the 
Kahnawake people faced a new reality. No longer having two 
European powers to play off against each other, they faced a 
Protestant landlord with a less-than-shining reputation for
120NYCD 10:753. See also 10:805-806. Virtually to the 
end, Vaudreuil and Montcalm continued sparring about the 
usefulness and desirability of Indians as military allies: 
NYCD 10:780, 810-812, 828; RAPO 1923-24, p. 354.
121 JP 9:68.
122JP 13:155.
123NYCD 10:1121; JP 3:273, 13:190.
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dealing with Indians. However, they were personally 
acquainted with Johnson, who realized the importance of 
currying their favor. In Johnson's son-in-law, Daniel Claus, 
stationed in Montreal as the British agent for Indian affairs, 
the Kahnawakes had an advocate. Claus conscientiously kept an 
eye out for ill treatment of the Kahnawakes by British 
soldiers garrisoned in the area and by the Jesuits who were 
trying to wrest control of the mission lands away from the 
Indians.124 With Claus' help, the Kahnawakes were successful 
at making the transition to English rule of the surrounding 
colony as painless as possible. Their resourcefulness and 
flexibility was seen by some as convenient collaboration with 
the invading force, but Sault support for the French had 
almost never been unwavering or unqualified.
From the earliest wars between the English and French, to 
the end of the Seven Years' War and the British conquest of 
New France, there had always been many "spirited opinions" at 
Kahnawake, and they had always attempted to reconcile 
differing opinions among themselves in such a way as to retain 
their sovereignty against the wishes of both the French and 
the English. At times they had walked a narrow road bordering 
on dependence, with the traps of Jesuit and official French 
control ready to snare them, but they had maintained political 
autonomy. Militarily, the Sault Iroquois had been important
124Colden Papers 5:360, 7:19; NYCD 7:550; JP 3:332, 353, 
380, 381, 383-384, 575-576, 638, 664, 862, 969-970, 10:269- 
270, 376-379, 13:164-165.
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and even crucial to the French, but had not succumbed to 
French subjugation. They had forced the French to deal with 
them on their own terms, seizing the initiative when 
necessary, such as when Governor Beauhamois came to meet with 
the sachems in 1741, and in 1755 when the Kahnawakes turned a 
seemingly certain French victory under Dieskau at Lake George 
into a chaotic and embarrassing fiasco. Leaders such as 
Skonondo changed their minds, opinions differed greatly, and 
political splits remained unresolved but these variations 
notwithstanding, the Kahnawakes affected the outcome of 
warfare and diplomacy in the colonial Northeast. They were 
not mere puppets of the French.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
KAHNAWAKE AND FREE TRADE 
IN.AN AGE OF MERCANTILISM
Shortly after the French completed fortification of Fort 
St. Frederic at Crown Point on the southern end of Lake 
Champlain, which the English in New York regarded as being 
well inside their territory, a group of sachems from Kahnawake 
arrived at Albany. One would- expect their reception by New 
Yorkers at this 1735 meeting to have been chilly. However, 
they sat down and amicably concluded a treaty with the 
Commissioners of Indian Affairs, a group of Albany merchants 
whom a succession of New York’s governors had authorized to 
conduct business with Indians on behalf of the colony. The 
recording secretary, Peter Wraxall, found this situation 
loathsome, and editorialized in the minutes that most of these 
commissioners "swallowed the Bait with Greediness, by this 
Solemn Treaty the Canada Trade was opened & freed from all 
Obstructions.”1
The bait of which Wraxall spoke was the steady stream of 
furs which the Kahnawake Indians brought to Albany from 
Montreal and points northwest to trade for English 
manufactured goods, chiefly woolens, to clothe Indians and 
French colonists. This arrangement infuriated Wraxall and 
others in New York who believed in the prevailing doctrine of
1Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in 
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles Howard Mcllwain 
(New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), p. 193.
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mercantilism —  that a colony must trade only with its own 
mother country or perhaps with other colonies also tied to the 
same empire, but never with a colony of a rival empire. Trade 
between New York and Massachusetts was morally acceptable even 
if it went against the exasperating Navigation Acts, but trade 
between New York and New France was considered by most people 
in the English colonies to be tantamount to treason. And 
exasperated Canadians also complained of Kahnawake being "a 
sort of Republic" through which this smuggling trade flowed.
The conclusion of a treaty guaranteeing free trade 
between Albany and the Kahnawakes was merely a formalization 
of trade patterns which had existed for nearly half a century. 
As early as 1681, Governor Frontenac of New France had 
complained to the king that the Kahnawakes had commercial 
relations with "the Iroquois of their nation" (meaning the 
Iroquois adjacent to New York), and that their transportation 
of furs past Chambly to Albany was detrimental to the French 
fur trade company's ledger books but irresistible because the 
pelts brought a better price in the Albany fur market.2 
Frontenac lamented that Sault Saint-Louis seemed to be an 
entrepot for this traffic and attempted to curb it there, even 
if he could do nothing about furs which had already been
2Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada: 
Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.) 5:385
(original). (Hereafter cited as C11A; all C11A references are 
to the transcripts, rather than the originals, unless 
otherwise stated.) Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de 
Quebec 1922-23, p. 78, 1926-27, pp. 126-127 (hereafter cited 
as RAPQ).
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carried south beyond Chambly toward New York. But the trade 
increased instead of diminished, and by 1686 there was enough 
trade of this type that it was also discussed with grave 
concern among colonial officials in New York.3
The trade flourished for several reasons, not the least 
of which was geographic. The journey along the Lake Champlain 
corridor was fairly easy despite the Adirondack Mountains and 
their dense forests separating the Montreal area from Albany. 
Canoes were the ideal form of transportation, using the Hudson 
River at Albany, a twelve-mile portage to Wood Creek (Riviere 
des Chicots), Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River, and a 
portage at Chambly covering the eighteen miles to the 
Kahnawake village across the St. Lawrence River from 
Montreal.4 Indians routinely made this trip of about two 
hundred miles in only a few days.
Since the furs of beavers, martens, foxes, and other 
creatures were thicker farther north, and since the price paid 
in Albany for these furs was higher, it was natural that a 
free-wheeling traffic developed, despite the invisible line 
drawn by cartographic imperialists between French and English 
colonies. That invisible line had routinely been crossed by 
Iroquois who travelled, and indeed, emigrated and immigrated,
3Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records. 
1666-1723 (Gettysburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical
Association, 1956), p. 98.
4Cadwallader Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations 
of Canada... 2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from 
the 1747 edition), Vol. 2 p. 44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
231
back and forth between Iroquoia and the Kahnawake mission 
along the St. Lawrence. When relatives went to visit one 
another from the early 1670s on, they always brought gifts for 
each other —  the sine qua non of human relationships in 
native society. The fur trade along the Lake Champlain 
corridor grew out of this gift exchange heightened by the 
awareness that northern furs were thicker and that prices for 
them were better in the southern fur trade center of Albany 
than in New France. Some scholars have even gone so far as to 
suggest that one Iroquois motive for emigrating to the mission 
community was to engage in this profitable trade, which seems 
likely, since an enviable position developed for Kahnawake 
Indians within it.5
At the end of the 1689-1698 war between the French and 
the English and Iroquois, Colonel Peter Schuyler and Domine 
Godfrey Dellius made an official diplomatic visit to Montreal 
on behalf of the colony of New York, and while there took the 
opportunity to invite the Kahnawake Iroquois to trade at 
Albany on a regular basis. This invitation was also extended 
when the Kahnawakes visited Albany in the summer of 1698 and 
attended meetings with New York's Governor Bellomont and the
sThomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York. 
1686-1776 (Madison, Wi: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 
p. 122. (Norton cites E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents 
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York. 15 
vols. (Albany, N.Y.: Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), Vol. 9, pp. 
145-146. [Hereafter cited as NYCD.]) Also Daniel K. Richter, 
"The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the 
Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1984), p. 200.
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League Iroquois. The Commissioners expressly invited the 
Kahnawakes again two years later, playing on the kin ties 
between the Kahnawake and League Iroquois. The commissioners 
said they would trade with the Kahnawakes as if they were 
their own people (that is, League Iroquois.)6
At the turn of the eighteenth century prices fluctuated 
wildly, the rate given for furs in Montreal even sometimes 
rising above that in Albany. For instance, at the July 1698 
meetings between Governor Bellomont and the League and mission 
Iroquois, an Onondaga sachem complained to the governor that 
prices were better in Montreal, and that Albany prices should 
be made more competitive so as not to lose Indian customers 
permanently to New France. (There can be no doubt that by 
this time, even if Indians had not been transformed into 
economically motivated people, they clearly understood market 
principles, and were using economic arguments with Europeans 
in order to persuade them to change market conditions to the 
Indians' favor.)7 Four years later, the same complaint was
6Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July. 1698 
(New York: 1698), p. 3. Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers 
and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664- 
1701," Journal of American History. LXXV (1988), p. 63. NYCD 
4:692.
bellomont*s Conference, pp. 5-7. Regarding the debate 
over when or if Indians adopted European-like economic 
behavior (acquisitive, accumulative, market-oriented) see 
Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as
Hunters. Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of 
Hudson Bav. 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974). Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth 
Century," in Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds., Old Trails 
and New Directions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
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made to Bellomont's successor, Lord Combury, but shortly 
thereafter, longer-term trends returned and the traditional 
pattern of higher prices offered for pelts and lower prices 
charged for European goods at Albany than at Montreal 
prevailed.8 Kahnawake carriers, with their crucifixes and 
bundles of pelts, became a familiar sight on the Albany 
horizon after the turn of the century, and by 1706 probably 
around half of the furs trapped in Canada ended up in the 
European market via Albany instead of Montreal.9
Frenchmen who wanted to pursue the trade seldom made the 
trip to Albany themselves. For a number of reasons, they 
found it much more convenient to hire an Indian who knew his
1980). Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, "Give Us Good 
Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the
Indians and the Hudson's Bav Company before 1763 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978). Daniel Francis and Toby 
Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in 
Eastern James Bav. 1600-1870 (Kingston and Montreal: McGili- 
Queen's University Press, 1985). E.E. Rich, "Trade Habits and 
Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America," 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXVI 
(1960), 35-53.
8NYCD 4:983-987; Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 29; C11A 
29:130; Stephen Earl Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of
Empire" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Southern California, 1973), p. 146.
9David A. Armour, "The Merchants of Albany, New York, 
1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 
University, 1965), p. 112. (Exact numbers are impossible to 
know, because the trade was contraband. It is also unclear 
what percentage of the furs being brought to Albany were 
trapped by Kahnawake hunters themselves, but at least some of 
them came originally from points north and west of the St. 
Lawrence Valley. These were trapped by other Indians, brought 
to Montreal, and then smuggled out of Montreal to the Sault 
mission village, to be taken down to Albany.
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or her way to Albany to carry their cargo of furs (acquired in 
New France from up-country Indians) to the New York fur mecca 
on the upper Hudson River. The Albany fur merchants/Indian 
Commissioners, and certainly New York colonial officials, 
preferred this as well; they did not want Frenchmen "trading 
within his Majesty's dominion on this side of the Lakes."10 
The New Yorkers were jealous of the French success in the fur 
trade; one official lamented in 1686 that the French had made 
many discoveries and formed alliances with Indians because of 
it.11
But whereas the French were more adept at relations with 
Indians and at travelling great distances to find them, the 
English had an unmistakable advantage which kept them 
competitive in the strictly monetary aspect —  the high prices 
they offered for pelts. The French admitted this in 1689, 
complaining that the Albanians gave Indians better rates for 
furs and also that they exchanged English trade goods at a 
better rate. Apart from the aberrant price fluctuations from 
1697 to 1702 associated with the end of a long period of 
warfare and a short-lived glut in the English fur market 
because of a change in hat styles, the better prices in Albany 
were due partly to a long-term glut in the French fur
10Livinaston Indian Records, p. 98.
11NYCD 3:395.
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market.12
For the last three decades of the seventeenth century, 
Frenchmen at trading posts in the pays d'en haut (the "upper 
country" of the northern Great Lakes) had taken advantage of 
a liberal license policy, which opened up the fur business to 
individual profit, despite the official monopoly of the 
Compacmie des Indes.13 By 1700, the fur market in France had 
been all but ruined, flooded with pelts from many individual 
license-holders in New France. The price of peltries on the 
Paris market plummeted and the economy of New France was 
marginal from then until the 1730s, at which point other 
industries had developed sufficiently to take over the export 
revenue once generated solely by furs.14 Illegal trade 
between Albany and Montreal, while siphoning off potential 
profits from the Compaanie des Indes, actually helped the
12William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade in the Colonial 
Northeast," in Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, 
D.C.:Smithsonian Institution, 1978- ) [William Sturtevant,
gen. ed.], Volume 4, History of Indian-White Relations. 
Wilcomb Washburn, vol. ed. (1988), p. 327.
13E.R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade 
During the Eighteenth Century," in J.M. Bumsted, ed., Canadian 
History Before Confederation: Essays and Interpretations 2d 
ed. (Georgetown, Ont.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1979), p. 135.
14Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 
1713-1760," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 
1939, p. 84. Dale Miquelon, New France 1701-1744. "A 
Supplement to Europe" (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 
pp. 174-175. Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial 
New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1960), p. 293. The trade also rebounded 
somewhat when western posts were reopened in 1716, and new 
eastern European markets were found.
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French fair economy by diverting a glut of furs from Paris to 
Albany and London. By the 1720s, the French market for furs 
had recovered (although profits were more moderate than 
formerly) and the smuggling trade to Albany had helped the 
French fur economy to weather the collapse of prices up to 
that time.15
Another factor affecting the price disparity for furs in 
Montreal and Albany was the difference in structure of the 
trade itself. The French trade was controlled by a single 
company, which, although going through several metamorphoses, 
set the prices for pelts. Conversely, the New York trade 
consisted not of one large monopoly but of about a dozen 
independent merchants. While many historians and economists 
have stressed the difference between this competitive 
(supposedly healthy) atmosphere and the (presumably unhealthy 
and unfair) French monopoly, the Albany merchants together had 
a monopoly granted by the New York government. At the highest 
level, Albany' s fur trade was no less a monopoly than
15Miquelon, New France, p. 174. Richard L. Haan, "The 
Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Niagara Frontier, 
1697-1730" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Califomia-Santa Barbara, 1976), p. 143. Denis Riverin, a 
prominent Canadian, offered "reasons for the bad state of 
affairs of the colony of Canada" in 1705, in which he argued 
that the solution to the crisis of the fur trade (brought on, 
he believed, by the monopoly's fixed price) was to export 
beaver surpluses to Albany. Pontchartrain, the Minister of 
Marine, did not take River in's advice, but it was a viable 
solution and underscores that the trade between Albany and 
Montreal in furs aided the French in overcoming the glut in 
their peltry market. (Miquelon, New France, p. 66.)
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Montreal's.16 Their town's prerogative excluded people in 
neighboring towns from carrying on the fur trade and resulted 
in a situation far from a free marketplace.
Although in theory the Albany merchants were in 
competition with each other, in fact they acted together as an 
interest group, the most obvious example being the collective 
role they pursued in managing Indian affairs on behalf of the 
colony. However, they were more open to market forces than 
were their French counterparts, since prices for furs were 
controlled more directly by the market price in London than by 
the price in Paris in the case with the French.17 The French 
company could and did set a low price for a pelt, giving the 
impression that it was under financial stress and had no 
choice in the matter. French officials commented on this, 
revealing the lack of confidence which the French commercial 
community had in the company; they complained that the company 
actually had made great profits but was keeping the price 
offered for furs artificially low. Pierre Pouchot also 
accused the French trade of being poorly managed, corrupt, and 
irrational. His description of how the trade worked leaves 
little question as to why the Albany traders were able to
16Adair debunks the myth of the moral superiority of the 
English "non-monopoly" trade. (In "Anglo-French Rivalry..." 
pp. 136, 140.)
17Robert Sanders, Letter Book, 1742-1758, in National 
Archives of Canada, p. 43. NYCD 10:199-201. Norton, Fur 
Trade. p. 64. William J. Eccles, "A Belated Review of Harold 
Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada." Canadian Historical 
Review LX (1979), p. 436.
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offer more competitive rates.18
Albany's ability to post more alluring prices were also 
rooted in general differences between the colonial economies 
of France and England. The English were much more business- 
oriented than the French. In England, becoming a merchant was 
increasingly respected from the time of the Reformation, and 
more and more Englishmen pursued this mode of making a living. 
In French society, commerce never gained such prestige. As a 
result, the French economy was never as strong or rationalized 
as the English from the sixteenth century on, because the 
cream of society eschewed involvement in that sector, 
preferring royal administrative service instead. The French 
colonial economy depended on a few thriving industries, which 
by good fortune held the whole together, but in general it was 
not as strong as the English economy in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.19
Logistical factors were also considerable in calculating 
the differences between English and French colonial economies.
18NYCD 10:200-201, Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late 
war in North America between the French and English. 1755-60 
2 vols. [Franklin B. Hough, trans.] (Roxbury, Ma: Woodward, 
1866), Vol. 2, pp. 47-51. Also, ultimately the French were 
much more interested in the fur trade as a way of maintaining 
and extending Indian allegiances than as a way of making 
money. See William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth 
Century Imperialism," William and Marv Quarterly 3d ser., XL, 
No. 3 (1983), pp. 341-362.
19Charles W. Cole, Colbert and a Century of French 
Mercantilism 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1939), Vol. 2, pp. 362, 553. Roy Porter, English Society in 
the Eighteenth Century (London: Allen Lane, 1982), Chapters 5 
and 6.
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New York had the advantage of an easily accessible port at 
Manhattan and of the Hudson River, which remained ice-free 
year-round. That meant that twice as much cargo could be 
transported in a year as on the St. Lawrence, and return on 
investment was much faster in New York than in New France. 
The Gulf of St. Lawrence and the St. Lawrence River were ice- 
free for only six to seven months of the year, so that often 
a vessel could make only one trip across the Atlantic from 
France each year. The Hudson River was much easier to 
navigate than the shoal-ridden St. Lawrence, providing another 
geographic advantage to the New Yorkers over the French, which 
translated into a time and cost advantage.20 Furthermore, 
there were no duties on furs in the English colonies, whereas 
the government at Quebec imposed duties on furs leaving the 
colony, an impediment to trade.21 All these factors added up 
to the overwhelming ability of Albany to undersell the French. 
It is remarkable that the French fur trade continued to 
function for as long as it did.
But there were intangibles involved in the fur trade too, 
which sometimes outweighed the considerations of the ledger 
book. One French official reasoned that if the French offered 
merchandise at the same price the English did, the Indians 
would immediately turn to trade with the French, because,
20Peter Kalm, Travels into North America [John R. Foster, 
trans.] (Barre, Ma: Imprint Society, 1972), p. 134; Colden, 
History of the Five Indian Nations 2:21.
21NYCD 5:729, 733; C11A 31:266-270.
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prices being equal, the Indians "like our liquor better than 
they like [theirs], and they get along with us better than 
they do with other nations," particularly the English.22 The 
French were much more interested than the English were in 
learning Indian languages, sending missionaries and others to 
arrange peace settlements between warring tribal groups, and 
respecting Indian customs and preferences. They also 
occasionally intermarried with Indians, and in general were 
not interested in owning native land, all of which stood in 
stark contrast, in the native eye, to the English attitude 
toward their American hosts.23
But prices were far from equal. Nicolas Perrot 
documented the differences between prices at Montreal and 
Albany in 1689? for eight pounds of gunpowder an Indian had to 
pay with one beaver pelt in Albany, but with four in Montreal. 
Similarly, a musket cost two beaver pelts in Albany, five in 
Montreal. Woolen and cloth goods such as blankets, shirts, 
and leggings cost twice as many pelts in the French town as in 
Albany.24
These woolen and cloth goods were another reason for the
22RAPO 1922-23, p. 7.
^Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry..." pp. 149-152. James 
Axtell, The Invasion Within; The Contest of Cultures in 
Colonial North America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), esp. Prologue and Ch. 12.
24Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur les moeurs coutumes et 
religion des sauvaqes de l'americrue du nord (Leipzig and 
Paris: 1864), p. 314.
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rush to take furs to Albany. English woolens were 
acknowledged by everyone in northeastern North America to be 
so far superior to French that by the 1720s and 1730s Montreal 
fur merchants were using any means possible to send their furs 
to Albany to exchange them for high-quality English blankets. 
In turn, the English woolens were sold to Indians in Montreal 
and at posts far away in the pavs d'en haut.25 Cadwallader 
Colden, the surveyor-general of New York, noted that in a 
single year nine hundred pieces of "strouds" (woolen blankets 
made near the Stroud River in Gloucestershire) were 
transported north from Albany, along with other English 
commodities, to be sent by the French "into the Indian 
Country s. "26
These "strouds" were of a color and consistency favored 
by Indians all over northeastern North America, but try as 
they might, the French could not manufacture a comparable 
product. Numerous efforts were made, and as late as 1749 
French officials reported that yet another attempt had been 
made to produce a blanket of comparable value to the English 
scarlet strouds. But this effort by the Compacmie des Indes
^ Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
Vol. 18, pp. 72-73? Francis Back, "The Trade Blanket in New 
France," Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly Vol. 26, No. 3 
(1990), pp. 2-8.
26NYCD 5:729. Most of the Indian trade prosecuted by 
Samuel Storke's London merchant firm with Livingston and 
others in New York was in textiles. (William I. Roberts, 
"Samuel Storke: An Eighteenth-Century London Merchant Trading 
to the American Colonies," Business History Review XXXIX 
(1965), p. 162.
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(the organization which held the French fur trade monopoly) 
was a failure. They sent four pieces of fabric to New France 
on trial, and the pieces were sent back with the comment that 
they were "frightful; the red cloth is brown and impressed; 
the blue of a very inferior quality to that of England; that 
as long as such ventures are sent, they will not become 
favourites with the Indians."27 These brilliant red blankets 
were so vital to the Albany-Montreal commerce that a New York 
official referred to the smuggling trade as "the Strowd Trade" 
and claimed that this trade alone provided the livelihood of 
the Kahnawakes. If not for the transport of this one 
commodity, the observer noted, the Kahnawake Indians would no 
longer find smuggling lucrative and would settle permanently 
in New York.28
Albany officials gave strouds as gifts to Indians
27NYCD 5:747, 10:199-200. Also C11A 67:96-101, 93:170-172. 
Pierre Pouchot commented in the late 1750s that French 
blankets, made in Normandy, were much finer than the coarse 
English variety. It may be, however, that Indians valued 
durability more than fineness of texture. A European's 
opinion of what made a good blanket by no means coincided with 
an Indian view of desirable woolens. (Pouchot, Memoir upon the 
late war in North America between the French and English. 
1755-60. Vol. 2, p. 191; Roberts, "Samuel Storke..." p. 163.)
28Commission for Indian Affairs, Albany. Minutes of 
meetings at Albany [1722-1748] and schedule of propositions 
made by the Indians and answers given to them, 1677-1719. 5 
vols. National Archives of Canada. (Hereafter cited as Minutes 
of the Indian Commissioners.) Vol. I, p. 109. (This account 
even stated that many Kahnawakes had moved to the mission 
community from Iroquoia for the purpose of carrying on "the 
Strowd Trade.") Also NYCD 5:753; The Letters and Papers of 
Cadwallader Colden (New-York Historical Society, Collections. 
L-LVI [New York, 1917-1923]), Vol. 4, p. 286. (Hereafter cited 
as Colden Papers.)
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whenever the latter came on diplomatic missions and colonial 
officials needed to curry favor with them.29 Although the 
trade between Montreal and Albany was frowned on by government 
officials, merchants in both colonies and of course the 
Kahnawake Iroquois continued to pursue it. While New France 
officials attempted to expose abusers and to prosecute 
violators of ordinances, at times even intendants and 
governors of New France felt it necessary to condone emergency 
importations of strouds from Albany, because the commodity was 
desperately needed at Indian trading posts and for government 
use as gifts for Indians.30 Trade was tied to imperial 
alliance and rivalry; Indian alliances needed to be maintained 
because Indians could always threaten to ally themselves 
instead with France's adversary, the English.31 Ironically, 
the French desperately needed English trade goods and had to 
go against the morals of their imperial allegiance to get 
them, in order to maintain the friendship of Indians rather 
than lose them to the English. Cadwallader Colden did not 
exaggerate when he claimed that no considerable trade could be
^e.g. Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:143, NYCD 
5:245.
30C11A 30:255-257, 35:55, 55:190-191, 68:28-29.
31William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century 
Imperialism," William and Marv Quarterly. 3d Ser., XL (1983), 
pp. 341-362. C.H. Mcllwain even stated that "the object was 
to get the trade; it made less difference whether the furs 
were needed or not." (In Introduction to Wraxall's Abridgment. 
p. xxvii.)
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carried on with Indians without strouds,32
The governor of New York in the 1720s, William Burnet, 
engineered passage of legislation in the New York Assembly 
which officially outlawed "the Canada Trade" (much to the 
chagrin of the Albany merchants/Indian commissioners who were 
not the least bit concerned with mercantilism). The main 
effect of this prohibition after two years, however, was 
merely the escalation of stroud prices at Montreal. Before 
the act was passed, a stroud selling for 10 pounds at Alb2any 
sold for 13 pounds and change at Montreal. After the act, the 
Montreal price jumped to 25 pounds and upwards.33 After four 
years of the ban on the "Canada trade," Colden noticed that 
the French had still not found another source of strouds (at 
least not one as inexpensive as the Albany source, despite 
skyrocketing prices). He concluded that as long as the French 
wanted these English woolens and were willing to pay the 
spiralling prices for them, the trade would continue 
indefinitely, ban or no ban.34
32Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations. 2:22.
^Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations. 2:22; NY CD 
5:762; Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:141a.
^NYCD 5:753; Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations. 
2:22; Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:104. The 
Montrealers could have bought strouds in Boston or London, and 
in fact they did obtain some from these sources, but they must 
not have been able to buy enough of them, or as cheaply, since 
they continued to buy them in ever-increasing volume from 
Albany, regardless of the ban. (Armour dissertation, p. 154.) 
One way to get around the ban on trade between Albany and 
Montreal was to take goods such as strouds to Mohawk villages 
west of Albany, where Kahnawakes could come via Lake Ontario
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Another commodity which the Albany merchants provided to 
New France via Kahnawake carriers and Montreal businessmen was 
wampum beads, which were manufactured on Long Island and New 
Jersey. Robert Sanders, an Albany merchant who became mayor 
and an Indian Commissioner by the 1750s, regularly sent 
shipments of wampum beads through his Kahnawake carriers to 
customers in Montreal.35 Every government which had dealings 
with Indians had to use wampum for diplomatic purposes; New 
France got its supply from a rival colony.
Also explosive in terms of imperial allegiances was the 
issue of selling gunpowder to Indians who might use it to 
fight alongside a rival power or, worse, sell it directly to 
the French. An Albany entrepreneur bent on turning a profit 
could not very well argue that Indians needed gunpowder for 
hunting animals with desirable pelts, because even by the 
eighteenth century, Indians used firearms only for moose, elk, 
and bear. For fur-bearing creatures —  beavers, minks, 
raccoons, muskrats, and martens —  Indians used traditional 
(and more effective) means such as nets, snares, and cage
to pick them up in exchange for furs. They would not be 
subject to New York law in Mohawk country, and furs coming 
into Albany from the Mohawk valley would not appear 
suspicious. (Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:102; 
Livingston Indian Records, p. 229; Armour, "The Merchants of 
Albany," p. 150.)
35Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 23, 31, 50, 51, 62, 63. 
(On Sanders, see Norton, Fur Trade. p. 190.) Miquelon, New 
France. p. 175.
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traps.36 Gunpowder, firearms, and lead for shot were 
unmistakably meant for human targets, but the traders of 
Albany were not too concerned. They sold these items to 
Kahnawakes for their own use as well as sale in Montreal.
Conrad Weiser, the Pennsylvania Indian agent, reported 
with distress to the New York Colonial Council in 1745 that 
someone in Albany had sold many barrels of gunpowder to the 
French, via some "praying Indians." Weiser pointed out that 
this had "enabled the French to fight against the English." 
Worse than that, the Albanian culprit had violated a 
prohibition, agreed on in 1744 at the outbreak of King 
George's War, that all sales of ammunition to and repair of 
arms for Indians from Canada would not be allowed.37 During 
this war, the Albany merchants were made responsible for the 
security of the town, being posted in turns on sentry guard 
duty through the night.38 This may have been done in order 
to press upon these men the fact that Albany was not far from 
the frontier between New York and New France, and that 
especially during war the safety of the colony against enemy
Norton, Fur Trade, p. 28.
37New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State 
Library, Old Vol. 21, p. 36; NYCD 9:1109, 6:286. In 1741 New 
England officials charged the Albanians with selling to the 
French ammunition which was used to kill New Englanders, and 
the latter claimed that they had seen their own goods 
(presumably stolen in raids) purchased from the "French 
Indians" at Albany. (Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 221 fn. Also 
Kalm, Travels into North America, p. 334.)
38NYCD 9:1110.
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attack was much more important than making money from 
potential enemy customers.
To the Albany men, profits had always been more important 
than colonial allegiance largely because they were descendants 
of the Dutch traders who peopled Albany, or "Orange" as it had 
been called, before the Dutch lost the colony to the English 
in 1666. Generations after this conquest, much of the 
population of the Hudson Valley was still ethnically Dutch, 
and even in the mid-eighteenth century, one could still find 
as much Dutch as English spoken on an Albany street.39 The 
merchants who prosecuted the fur trade, if not Dutch 
themselves, had married into old elite Dutch families and had 
soaked up the prevailing preoccupation with profit.
English officials appointed by Whitehall to oversee the 
colony of New York were not always welcome in towns such as 
Albany, where the fiscal and trade policies of the alien 
mother country sometimes collided with the Dutch way of doing 
things.40 However, English governors, following Thomas
39Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany: Dutch
Patricians in the Upper Hudson Valiev (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. xxi-xxiii. Patricia U. 
Bonomi, A Factious People; Politics and Society in Colonial 
New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 54.
40Just after the capture of New Netherland by the English 
in 1664, the issue of whether these merchants would have to 
relinquish their ties with Amsterdam commercial agents colored 
their attitude toward mercantilism. (Robert Ritchie, "London 
Merchants, the New York Market, and the Recall of Sir Edmund 
Andros," New York History LVII (1976), pp. 4-29. See also 
Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710: The Dutch and 
English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990).)
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Dongan's example in 1686, granted Albany a continuance of its 
monopoly in the fur trade and also continued the prerogative 
of the Chamber of Commerce-like body to make policy on Indian 
relations. Because the merchant elite was virtually 
synonymous with the town leadership, this body evolved from 
Albany's town government and was formalized in 1696 as the 
"Commissioners of Indian Affairs."
To limit abuses of Indian customers, however, trade was 
confined to the town limits, so that Indians could freely 
choose their trading partners, and not be subject to coercion. 
Just outside the town were buildings set up to lodge Indians 
who came annually for the summer trading season, as a safe 
haven away from grasping merchants.41 Other than these 
safeguards built into the Albany monopoly, the merchants, or 
handlers. had free reign. Their advantageous situation 
enabled them to prevent budding entrepreneurs in the 
neighboring town of Schenectady from sharing a part of the fur 
trade.
The Albany merchants were used to getting their way. As 
time went on, however, politicos outside Albany complained 
that there were too many on the board of Indian Commissioners; 
over the decades their number had grown to twenty.42 By the
41Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of Empire," pp. 86, 116; 
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 28-29, 57, 61-62.
42The twenty in 1730 were a substantial increase from the 
original number of four in 1696. The position was one of 
prestige and was highly in demand by the elite of Albany. 
(Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:311; NYCD 4:177;
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1730s, important figures in New York colonial politics lobbied 
for the demise of the body altogether. They argued for giving 
the responsibility to one person alone, and William Johnson 
was appointed to the position in 1755.43 The interests of 
empire were becoming increasingly important in the 1730s and 
1740s, and Albany's relations with Indians were coming to have 
a larger significance for all of North America. Many New 
Yorkers wanted a single commissioner to make policy with 
imperial interests in mind, not just the commercial concerns 
of the Albany merchants. In fact, the Albany men were 
increasingly seen as having a conflict of interest in being 
involved in Indian affairs.
One reason for tension between these Albany 
merchants/commissioners and other politicians in the colony 
was the neutrality, often tacit, sometimes official, which the 
commissioners engineered between themselves and the mission 
Indians of Canada. This amounted to a de facto neutrality 
between the province of New York and the colony of New France 
during Queen Anne's War, which infuriated New Englanders and
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 74-75.)
43Archibald Kennedy, in The Importance of Gaining and 
Preserving the Friendship of the Indians (New York: 1751), 
claimed that the commissioners "have so abused, defrauded, and 
deceived these poor, innocent, well-meaning People [the 
Indians]" that one would have thought he was an Indian rights 
activist. In another pamphlet, Serious Advice to the 
Inhabitants of the Northern Colonies (1755), Kennedy also 
railed against "our late bad Management." Peter Wraxall's 
Abridgment was published in order to demonstrate the 
incompetence of the commissioners and the fitness of Johnson 
to take over their responsibilities. (Wraxall, p. xcvi.)
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imperial appointees in New York. While the Kahnawake and 
other mission Indians were helping the French attack various 
towns on the exposed frontiers of New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts, these same Indians were allowed to trade with 
Albanians as honored guests. New York governors had to 
appease angry New England leaders because of the tainted 
neutrality.44
This controversial neutrality has affected the 
historiography of colonial New York. The Albany merchants 
have been repeatedly portrayed as villains who selfishly put 
the concerns of their own pocketbooks ahead of the safety and 
security of the colony.45 Only recently have they been 
rehabilitated by Thomas Norton, who suggested that their 
policy of neutrality can be interpreted positively. He 
claimed that they were not necessarily unpatriotic, but were 
opposed to war and saved the colony from being involved in, 
and devastated by, war with neighboring New France many times. 
Although the merchants may have been primarily concerned with 
protecting the fur trade, they also provided for the military 
security of the colony by maintaining peaceful relations with 
the mission Indians instead of inciting war with them as many
^NYCD 5:42-43, 72-74, 141, 228; New York Colonial
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library, Vol. 
56, p. 126. Of course, French officials constantly attempted 
to persuade the Kahnawakes and other mission Indians to 
abandon pledges of neutrality they had made with English 
colonies. (See for example: NYCD 9:856.)
45Wraxall referred to them as "Dutch reptiles.” (In 
Abridgment. p. 180 fn.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
251
New Englanders did.46
When fear of war between the English and the French swept 
the colonies in the 1730s, peace conferences were held between 
the Kahnawakes and the Albanians, and again in 1744 when King 
George's War was imminent.47 New York Governor George 
Clinton spoke angrily of "an abominable neutrality" entered 
into during that war.48 At one point during the conflict of 
1744-1748, neutrality was suspended because Kahnawakes took 
part in a raid on the hamlet of Saratoga just north of Albany. 
But earlier, the neutrality had been so secure that Kahnawakes 
came to Albany claiming that they wanted to conduct business 
as usual despite the circumstances. Although it is difficult 
to discern whether this request was granted and trade was 
carried on, the audacity of the Kahnawakes demonstrates that 
they felt they could disregard the state of war around them 
and that they did not consider trade and war to be related. 
Soon after this request, the governor of New York asked the 
assembly to pass a law prohibiting trade with the "French 
Indians" in time of war.49
For their part, the New France authorities were uneasy 
about close relations between the Sault Iroquois and the
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 7-8, 75-82.
47Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. 191, 223, 233? Minutes of the 
Indian Commissioners, 2:61a, 69, 284a, 359; NYCD 6:207.
48NYCD 6:416.
49Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 233? New York Colonial 
Manuscripts 74:222; NYCD 6:645.
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Albanians. The relationship could either help or hurt New 
France, depending on the circumstances and the wishes of the 
Indians. Especially since the Kahnawakes were "well 
acquainted with the English language," it was not unusual for 
them to provide their business contacts in Albany with 
information regarding war preparations or plans in
Montreal.50 Trade could often be used as a pretext for
gathering intelligence. For instance, two Iroquois Indians 
sent by Albany officials to spy in Canada told those who 
questioned them at the village of Kahnawake that they had come 
only "to fetch beavers." Not only Indians but whites also 
mixed trade and intelligence-gathering. Cornelius Cuyler, an 
Albany merchant, went to Montreal in 1738 and spied on the 
French for the New Yorkers, probably claiming he was there on 
business.51 In the midst of his business records, Robert
Sanders (another Albany merchant) mentioned some intelligence 
to which he was privy regarding an impending French attack; no 
doubt he got this information through personal friendships 
with Montreal merchants or from the Kahnawake carriers who 
regularly delivered pelts to him.52
New York officials as well as those in New France were 
concerned that Indians who traded between the two colonies
S0NYCD 10:19 (quote); Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 
1:193, 195, 253a.
51NYCD 9:899, 6:131.
52NYCD 5:85, 6:131; Robert Sanders Letter Book, p. 83.
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also spied. At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, a New 
York politician complained to William Johnson, "I dont like 
these French Indians being suffered to come to Albany to hear 
& carry away what they can." There was reason for this 
concern, as the gathering of sensitive information by 
Kahnawakes while in Albany seemed to be promoted by the 
French. French records mention the return to New France of 
Nanangousy, a Kahnawake sachem, from the English trading post 
of Oswego "where he has been to spy."53 William Shirley 
complained in 1755 that the French had "constant intelligence 
... of every motion of the English" given to them by the 
French-allied Indians who frequented Albany.54
Kahnawakes often did not heed the wishes of the French. 
Louis Antoine de Bougainville reported with dismay during the 
Seven Years' War that the Sault and Mountain Iroquois wanted 
to remain neutral because they did not wish anything to 
interfere with their smuggling, but that they still desired to 
be privy to French intelligence. Bougainville seemed to be 
wary of allowing them to keep open the path to Albany and to
53James Sullivan et. al., eds., The Papers of Sir William 
Johnson 14 vols. (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1921-1965), Vol. 
1, p. 499 (hereafter cited as Johnson Papers♦): E.B.
O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York 
4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany, N.Y.: Weed and Parsons, 1850- 
1851), Vol. 1, p. 305 (hereafter cited as DHNY. ) Another 
similar incident: NYCD 10:19.
54Johnson Papers 1:543. Also New York Council Minutes, 
Old Vol. 25, p. 37 (Calendar p. 416); Richard Day, ed., 
Calendar of the Sir William Johnson Manuscripts (Albany: New 
York State Department of Education, 1909), pp. 33, 36; DHNY 
2:384.
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tell them of French war plans; this could have been a 
dangerous combination.55
But there were personal ties between Sault Iroquois and 
Albany merchants over which French officials and military 
personnel had no control. Kahnawake people came to Albany 
sometimes on "private business," and their merchant friends in 
Albany condoled the deaths of Kahnawake family members.56 
French government officials had a reason to be nervous about 
such personal contacts between trading partners. In 1739, 
some Kahnawake sachems who came to trade at Albany were 
invited to diplomatic talks as well, a situation which must 
have irked the French.57
Sometimes, however, diplomacy was used for furthering 
trade instead of vice versa. During the 1720s New York ban on 
the smuggling trade, Kahnawakes came to Albany to trade 
clandestinely, under the pretext of announcing that they were 
ready to make peace with the New England colonists.58 At one 
point, some Kahnawakes and possibly Mountain Indians as well 
registered their protest against the New York trade ban by
55Louis Antoine, [comte] de Bougainville, Adventure in the 
wilderness; the American journals of Louis Antoine de 
Bougainville. 1756-1760 [Edward P. Hamilton, trans. and ed.] 
(Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 110. 
Colden also saw danger in this from the New York side. 
(Colden, History 2:53.)
56For example, see Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 
2:177a, 187a.
57Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:173.
58Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 151.
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threatening to join Abenaki Indians in raiding Massachusetts 
towns.59 The Albany commissioners, too, could use the 
blurring of trade and diplomacy to their own advantage. When 
a group of five Kahnawake sachems came to discuss diplomatic 
issues in the summer of 1741, the commissioners did not like 
what the Indians told them. As a kind of sanction imposed 
against their Indian counterparts in these negotiations, the 
commissioners refused to trade with them, claiming that "it is 
no Custom for sachims to Come with Bevers, when they come 
about publick business."60 Everyone present knew this was 
not true, but the commissioners held the upper hand in this 
diplomatic encounter because they could deny the privilege of 
trade. To trade or not to trade was a powerful question in 
this context, and trade and diplomacy were inextricably 
related.
At times the Albany men abused their right to trade with 
Indians, giving rise to the litany of complaints about ill 
treatment of tribesmen and women who had come in good faith to 
exchange pelts for blankets and other trade items. As early 
as 1702, some Iroquois Indians complained to Governor Combury 
that Albany traders used skewed scales in weighing pelts in 
order to cheat Indians, and that in general they did not
59NYCD 5:744. The Commissioners did not like the ban 
either, and not only because it hurt their pocketbooks but 
also because it meant that not as much intelligence would come 
their way from Canada. (Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 
1:186.)
Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:214a.
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conduct business fairly.61 For several decades it was 
considered not unusual for traders from Albany, when they 
heard of a group of mission Indians coming down the Hudson 
River from Canada, to travel north of Albany (or send scouts) 
to wait for the entourage, "lay hold of the Indians, and 
secure their [pelts]." Then they would "escort" these Indians 
into the town to the trader's own house and relieve the 
visitors of their bundles, getting them drunk so as to cheat 
them. Some even prepared wagons to be stationed five or six 
miles outside of the town to unload the canoes and carry the 
cargo to their homes.62
In 1715 a Kahnawake reported that some of John Schuyler's 
servants confiscated his cargo of pelts against his will and 
transported it into town to an unknown location. The 
commissioners acted as their own police force by investigating 
the matter and locating the cargo. Discovering that the 
Kahnawake victim had been transporting the goods on behalf of 
a French merchant for delivery to Myndert Schuyler, they 
ordered the shipment delivered to the latter.63 It was not 
unusual for Kahnawakes to be accosted and harassed by Albany 
traders when venturing into New York territory; this happened
61NYCD 4:987; Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 29, 32-33. (They 
were accused of watering down the rum they sold to Indians as 
well. Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:13.)
62Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 53 fn.
63Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. 110-111.
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again in 1738.64
A particular problem associated with New Yorkers' abuse 
of Indian traders and carriers was the use of liquor to get 
them drunk and take advantage of their intoxication.65 
Robert Sanders was apparently one who did not engage in this 
sort of trickery, since he complained about one of his 
colleagues using liquor to intoxicate an Indian and take 
advantage of him in trade. Sanders attempted to prosecute the 
man for his deviousness.66
Peter Kalm, a Swedish botanist who travelled throughout 
North America in 1750 and 1751, claimed that rum was 
"absolutely necessary to the inhabitants of Albany; they cheat 
the Indians in the fur trade with it; for when the Indians are 
drunk, they will leave it to the Albanians to fix the price of 
furs." From talking to many people and from witnessing these 
transactions himself, Kalm estimated that Indians trading at 
Albany sometimes got less than half of the value of their 
goods. He also charged that the Albany merchants "glory in 
these tricks, and are highly pleased when they have given a
Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:143.
650nly New Yorkers and not Frenchmen are singled out for 
this because there is little evidence that French traders 
abused Indians, and plenty of evidence that the English 
(Dutch) did. Many Indians of varying nations came great 
distances to trade with the English because the French would 
not sell them liquor in as great quantities or as often. (For 
instance see Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:12a.) 
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 68-69; Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry," 
p. 145.
Robert Sanders Letter Book, p. 44.
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poor Indian a greater portion of brandy them he can bear." 
But Kalm also stated'that Indians seemed to weigh their losses 
and grumble only mildly about being cheated, because at least 
they had been able to drink heavily, something which (Kalm 
observed) they valued more than almost anything else in the 
world.67
Alcohol dependency was indeed a social problem in 
Iroquoia and at mission communities such as Kahnawake in the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Jesuits had 
attempted to ban the sale of alcohol to Indians in Canada, and 
were at times partially successful, but even responsible 
traders in New France stocked liquor for sale to Indians. 
This was necessary in order to keep the trade with Indians 
from being completely usurped by the English.68 And of 
course, liquor was the one commodity which could increase 
Indian consumption levels. Without it, there was a definite 
limit to the Indian notion of consumption and profit motive, 
a limit which Europeans were constantly attempting to raise. 
Even so, the French trade in liquor to Indians was negligible 
compared to the English volume of sales; Dale Miquelon
67Kalm, Travels into North America, pp. 322, 331-332. Kalm 
also visited New France and did not comment on such abuses 
there.
^Governor Vaudreuil of New France feared in 1710 that the 
English would be able to make alliances with the mission 
Indians solely because the Albany merchants sold them liquor. 
He claimed that Indians could buy unlimited quantities of it 
there, implying that the sale of liquor to Indians was more 
restrained in Canada. C11A 31:10-10a (original).
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estimates that at one French post, woolens made up 64 per cent 
of goods sold to Indians, and alcoholic beverages only 6 per 
cent.69
Kahnawake Indians complained in 1742 that they did not 
like going to Oswego, the New York trading post northwest of 
Albany, because alcohol and therefore abuse and social chaos 
were endemic there. A Kahnawake orator told some Onondaga 
Iroquois that the demon of rum ran rampant at Oswego and had 
been responsible for the murder of eight Kahnawake men there 
by League Iroquois people.70 By 1750 many League Iroquois 
had become so badly indebted to Oswego and Albany traders, 
largely for rum, that they attempted to sell their own 
children to the traders as security for their debts. That the 
traders let the situation deteriorate so far indicates that 
their morals did not interfere with selling alcohol to make 
money.71
Given the notoriety of English traders for taking 
advantage of an Indian weakness for drink, it was no wonder 
that Indians considered the French more honest in commercial 
dealings. Kahnawake people, in regular contact with both the 
English and the French and travelling between the two colonies
69Miquelon, New France, pp. 150, 152. No numbers are 
available for New York, but Norton suggests that sales of rum 
in the Indian trade were surpassed in volume only by textiles 
at Albany at this time. (Norton, Fur Trade, p. 30.)
^NYCD 9:1093. Also Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 
2:237; Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 31-34.
71New York Colonial Manuscripts 76:118a, 121.
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frequently, were in a position to notice the difference more 
than others. It may have been this obvious difference which 
infuriated them when they came across examples of English foul 
play and trickery. Their consciousness of being cheated may 
explain periodic acts of hostility by Kahnawakes toward Albany 
people.
In 1711, some Kahnawakes murdered several New Yorkers 
outside of Albany but the following spring offered atonement 
for them and desired a renewal of commercial relations with 
the Albany traders.72 Robert Sanders noticed that they 
cheated either him or his trading partner in Montreal while 
carrying shipments of goods back and forth between Montreal 
and Albany. Sanders made light of it, dismissing the carriers 
as "rascals [who] do well for themselves often."73 Alexander 
McGinty and David Hendricks, traders from New York, were taken 
as prisoners by Kahnawakes and kept at the mission village for 
some time before being released. They may have been taken 
captive because of abusive behavior toward these Indians, who 
by the 1750s, when this capture took place, had had many 
negative experiences with greedy, dishonest traders from 
English colonies.74
The New Yorkers were aware of the native preference for
^New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 11, p. 87. (Calendar. 
p. 247.)
^Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 43, 76.
74New York Colonial Manuscripts 77:97, 100, 112; Robert 
Sanders Letter Book, p. 76.
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dealing with Frenchmen, resented it, and were bothered by the 
presence of French traders in League Iroquois villages. The 
Joncaire family, hardy coureurs de bois. enjoyed generations 
of successful relations with the Senecas near Irondequoit and 
Niagara. They traded with the Senecas, repaired their muskets 
and ironware, and married into their families.75 In 1719, it 
was discovered that the French were building a fort at 
Niagara, in addition to the trading post the Joncaires had 
erected at Irondequoit. This development was of grave concern 
in New York, especially since some Kahnawakes were at Niagara 
recruiting League Iroquois people to move to the new French 
post.
The French beachhead at Niagara was part of the impetus 
for the 1720 New York law banning trade with Canada.76 But 
the movement for this law was also a strategy of the recently 
arrived Governor Burnet to end the hegemony of the Albany 
merchants and to force the recalcitrant Dutch to adhere to the 
British empire's priorities —  namely, ending the boon to the 
French which the "Canada trade," or "Strowd trade," provided. 
In the 1720 act, Burnet argued that "the French build Forts
^New York Colonial Manuscripts 60:156; Minutes of the 
Indian Commissioners 1:124; Colden Papers 4:279. Regarding 
the Joncaire family, see Yves F. Zoltvany, "Louis-Thomas 
Chabert de Joncaire," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 
2, pp. 125-126, and Malcolm MacLeod, "Philippe-Thomas Chabert 
de Joncaire," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 3, pp. 
101-102.
76NYCD 5:485, 528, 571.
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with our goods."77
Burnet had managed what no other New York governor had 
been able to do: overcome the political clout of the Albany 
interest in the colonial assembly. However, he did not count 
on opposition from another source: some influential London 
merchants who were suppliers to the Albanians and profited by 
the wholesale woolen trade carried on with Kahnawakes and 
Montrealers. Samuel Storke, Samuel Baker, and other London 
merchants petitioned the king against the law generally and 
particularly against a strengthening of the act which Burnet 
proposed in 1724. Acceding to their wishes, the Lords of 
Trade disallowed the New York law. All those who had favored 
the law had to accept its revocation, since even its 
staunchest advocates realized that it had failed to stop the 
trade.78
The disallowing of the trade ban was a pyrrhic victory
^NYCD 5:577.
Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:105a, 58a, 103- 
103a; Colden, History 2:6-11; Haan, "The Covenant Chain: 
Iroquois Diplomacy...," p. 221; Norton, Fur Trade, p. 147. 
Burnet's law was ineffective because it only outlawed selling 
goods to Canadians and Canadian Indians, but did not ban the 
importation of furs. (NYCD 5:582) This left a large loophole 
which was easy to use to advantage. Also, Burnet himself 
issued passes to travel to New France to the most notorious 
Albany merchants involved in the stroud trade: men such as 
Cornelius Cuyler. (NYCD 9:899) Thomas Norton suggests that 
despite his get-tough stance, Burnet realized that he should 
not crack down too heavily on the trade for fear of alienating 
the Kahnawakes. (Norton, Fur Trade. p. 139.) New York 
officials had to admit anyway that the trade ban was useless 
because Indians were "very difficult to detect...and to bind 
them any way to observe the laws in force." (NYCD 5:811.)
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for the Albany merchants, however. Their singular control 
over the fur trade was gradually eroded in the 1720s, and not 
just by Joncaire's fort at Niagara. Burnet was still 
determined to break their hold on the trade and had a New York 
court strike down their monopoly in 1726. That meant that 
neighboring Schenectadians could prosecute the trade, but more 
importantly, it cleared a path for the opening of a frontier 
trading post, fortified soon after it was built, at Oswego on 
Lake Ontario, northwest of Albany, in Onondaga territory.79 
Both the League Iroquois and the French had misgivings about 
the erection of this fortified post in the heart of Six 
Nations territory, and the Kahnawakes made official trips to 
Albany to warn officials that the French would not countenance 
this move.80
But this diplomatic role of the Kahnawake Indians did not 
preclude their own trading at the new post. They became
^Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of Empire," pp. 175, 
180; Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. lii, lxxx-lxxxii.
®°DHNY 1:290; Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:111a- 
114, 174a; New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs at
Albany, Instructions for Lonrence Claese the Interpreter to 
the Six Nations, Dec 27 1727, New York State Archives;
Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 170-171. The Governor of New France 
was trying to use this building of Oswego to drive a wedge 
between the Kahnawakes and the New Yorkers. Acting 
administrator of the colony in 1727, Charles Le Moyne, Baron 
de Longueuil, tried to take advantage of any League opposition 
for his own purposes; there was not nearly as much opposition 
within Iroquoia as he claimed. However, in 1743, rumors 
abounded in Albany that the Onondagas had become hostile to 
the English presence at Oswego, and that they were recruiting 
Sault and Mountain mission Iroquois, and French ammunition 
supplies, to attack the post. (Colden Papers 3:9.)
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regular customers, along with other Canadians and French- 
allied Indians. Soon French interpreters were needed at 
Oswego, so great was the volume of French-speaking traffic 
there. The French, even in a de facto sense at Oswego, were 
defeating the English at the game of placing posts in Indian 
country whether the contest is seen as a territorial-imperial 
challenge or as a commercial one.81 During the Seven Years' 
War, the Ottawa Indians helped the French take Oswego from the 
English. Later, however, the Ottawas came to regret their 
decision to help the French because in French hands the post 
was no longer a profitable shopping mecca. The French did not 
sell as many goods per skin as the English had, "tho' they 
[Indians] had been disgusted with some ill treatment they had 
received from some of the English," and despite the fact that 
the English were stingier with gifts.82
The French responded to the building of Oswego with the 
building of a post at Crown Point at the south end of Lake 
Champlain in 1731. Fortification was completed four years 
later. The French were attempting to ward off the English who
81New York Colonial Manuscripts 78:115; Minutes of the 
Indian Commissioners 1:185a; Johnson Papers 9:128-129. In 
1749, one day's count of canoes from Kahnawake at Oswego was 
43, and the number of packs of furs was 301. (NYCD 6:538.) 
One indication that the French were seriously undermining 
English efforts in the fur trade-imperial alliance game was 
that French interpreters were regular customers at Oswego, 
buying goods which they in turn traded for furs in Seneca 
villages, thereby strengthening French-Seneca relations. 
(Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 197.)
“NYCD 7:233-234.
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had become bolder with each passing year by travelling farther 
north of Albany to trade with Indians coming down the Lake 
Champlain corridor. Fort St. Frederic was also meant to curb 
the smuggling trade in general by serving as a mandatory 
customs house at which all passing canoes were to stop for 
inspection. However, Indians could get around the customs 
check by sending empty canoes past the fort, while the furs 
were portaged around behind the fort where no one was looking. 
And French officials could not prosecute Indians even if they 
caught them.83 The effect of this fort as a deterrent to 
smuggling was so negligible that, by 1751, Cadwallader Colden 
suspected that it may even have facilitated the illegal trade, 
serving as an entrepot for the shipments going back and 
forth.84
The customs house at Fort St. Frederic was not the first 
French effort to curb the extralegal commerce. Canadian 
officials had made innumerable efforts to stop the trade 
almost as soon as it became noticeable. Claude de Ramezay was 
assigned to crack down on it after 1700. He assured the 
Minister of Marine that he was doing everything possible to 
check the trade, but the extent of his efforts could not have 
been great, since some of the merchants most heavily engaged
^NYCD 9:1021; Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade out of New 
France," p. 82; C11A 93:170-172. Kahnawake Indians were at 
times so brazen as to announce to the Canadian governor- 
general that they were leaving for Albany to buy strouds. 
(NYCD 9:1069)
^Colden Papers 4:286.
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in the trade with Albany were also his personal creditors. In 
1707 he suggested bringing in heavily subsidized trade goods 
(underwritten by the Ministry of Marine) to lure customers, 
but this would have cost the French government a great deal of 
money at a time when it was carrying out an expensive war in 
Europe.85
In 1708, French officials wrote a series of memos 
concerning the smuggling and about how best to prevent 
Kahnawake involvement in it. Around that time, Canadians who 
left New France in canoes with bundles of pelts bound for 
Albany were arrested, had their cargo seized, and were often 
imprisoned for a few months for the offense. But such arrests 
did not last long, since Frenchmen interested in the business 
could always hire Indians, who were not bound by French laws. 
Montrealers could not prevent Kahnawakes from leaving with a 
load of furs for shipment to another colony.86 Moreover, New 
France officials found it politically suicidal to raise the 
ire of Indians, since the latter could always threaten to 
emigrate to New York, where the English were waiting with open 
arms and land grants for the Kahnawakes and other Mission 
Iroquois.87 Or even if they did not leave New France, these 
Indians could withhold needed military support in time of war
85Yves F. Zoltvany, "Claude de Ramezay," Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography Vol. 2, p. 546.
86RAPO 1939-40, pp. 418,433, 458-460; C11A 67:186-195; 
RAPO 1939-40, pp. 355, 360, 459-460.
87C11A 69:74-80.
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if French officials harassed them too much.88
Officials at Chambly, where another customs post was 
placed, could demand of New France habitants to see official 
documentation allowing them to leave the colony for New York, 
but they could not demand this of Indians. Indians were free 
to cross all frontiers, and there was nothing that officials 
could do to prevent this.89 New France officials were also 
authorized, by an edict of 1719, to search every home 
suspected of holding contraband goods, but this was 
unenforceable at Kahnawake and other mission villages. One 
official attempted to establish a garrison and fortification 
at the new Kahnawake village site in 1719, expressly to keep 
the Indians from trading with Albany, but besides being 
politically unpopular, the plan was also thwarted by the 
Jesuits in the village. They pointed out that in the past, 
when the mission had been occupied by a garrison during war, 
the officers of the garrison themselves had been some of the 
worst offenders in contraband trade. Later on, when the 
Desauniers sisters had set up a provisioning shop at 
Kahnawake, they complained about a plan for fortification of
“d l A  75:206-219.
89NYCD 9:908-909; C11A 70:48-59, 69:74-80, 67:188-192, 
55:181-183? Arrets et Ordonnances Rovales (Quebec: 1854), 
Volume 1, p. 489 cited in E. J. Devine, Historic Cauohnawaga 
(Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p. 209; Eccles, "The Fur 
Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," p. 349.
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the village because it would hinder their trade.90 These 
women and the Jesuits carried on their trade with impunity at 
Kahnawake for many years.
Attempts by the Minister of Marine to prevent the Jesuit 
missionaries at Kahnawake from allowing the French to have 
shops at the village and to prevent Jesuits themselves from 
giving the Indians merchandise for trade were unsuccessful.91 
Kahnawake Indians, through their Jesuit spokesmen, responded 
to official requests that the smuggling trade cease by saying 
that they would be happy to stop as soon as the officials also 
demanded that others cease the trade as well. Involvement in 
the trade was too widespread for this to happen, as the 
Kahnawakes well knew.92
On one occasion, a few miles south of Montreal, a cache 
of over three hundred beaver pelts was found in the woods near 
an Indian woman who was apparently guarding it. The 
Kahnawakes claimed the cache, arguing when challenged that 
officials would not be able to prove it was the property of 
any French or English person. The governor of Montreal 
finally had to give the pelts to the Kahnawakes, at the 
instructions of the governor and intendant of the colony.
^CllA 69:74-77, 70:48-59; Devine, Historic Cauahnawaqa. 
p. 189; Louis Franquet. Voyages et Memoires sur le Canada [J. 
Cohen, ed.] (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974), p. 120.
91RAP0 1941-42, p. 236; NYCD 9:938-939; C11A 55:181-183.
92Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and 
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 
67:77 (hereafter cited as Jesuit Relations.)
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Despite the official sanction against carrying around large 
bundles of pelts outside of Montreal, and particularly in the 
direction of New York, Kahnawakes were able to evade the 
prohibition and act at will.93
It took many years for New France officials to enforce 
their own rules against French offenders at Kahnawake. 
Suspicion that the Jesuit missionaries there were involved in, 
or at least cognizant of, the transport of peltries south 
arose as early as 1698. In 1705 authorities in New France 
accused them of being directly involved in the fur trade. 
Nothing was done about the charge, however, and there was no 
further mention of suspicions of Jesuits until the late 1720s, 
when Father Lauzon was accused of being involved in the 
smuggling trade.94
In the early days of the mission, the Jesuit missionaries 
had attempted to prevent French businessmen from opening 
stores within the Indian village, mainly because of the 
inevitability that they would peddle alcohol to their Indian 
customers. However, by the 1720s, the Jesuits were glad to 
lease space within their compound adjacent to the longhouses 
to nearby merchants interested in setting up a dry goods shop.
93RAPO 1939-40, pp. 459-460.
94Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres. memoires et 
autres documents historioues relatifs a la Nouvelle-France 4 
vols. (Quebec: Cote, 1883-1885), Vol. 1, p. 604; CllA
22:314v-315 (original); Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et 
la Nouvelle-France au XVIIIe siecle 2 vols. (Paris: Alphone 
Picard, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 245; CllA 69:224.
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In the late 1750s, they were leasing store space to a Mr. de 
Musseaux, probably the same facility which had been 
established by three famous - or infamous - sisters in 1727. 
The "desmoiselles Desauniers" secured a concession of land in 
that year adjacent to the chapel, and had a shop built on the 
site.95 [See Map 5] These women, Marguerite, Marie, and 
Magdelaine Desauniers, belonged to a prominent Montreal 
merchant family, so they came by their chosen livelihood 
naturally.96 There was no disputing their involvement in the 
smuggling trade with Albany based at Kahnawake; they sold 
goods at a much cheaper rate than the going price in Montreal 
just a few miles away and still made healthy profits (and, it 
seems, paid their Kahnawake carriers well too) .97 It was 
commonly believed that the Desauniers women gave the Jesuits 
large donations and that the Jesuit college in Quebec was 
built with Desauniers "Albany trade" money. So lucrative was
95RAPO 1923-24, p. 50; Devine, Historic Cauahnawaaa. p. 
236; Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, p. 253.
96Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
18:71-72; Personal communication with Louise Dechene, 26 Nov 
1990; Cameron Nish, Les Bourgeois-Gentilshommes de la
Nouvelle-France 1729-1748 (Montreal: Fides, 1968), pp. 46, 74, 
178; CllA 69:60-66; Jacqueline Roy, "Thomas-Ignace Trottier 
Dufy Desauniers," Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Vol. 4, 
pp. 739-740.
97Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin 
18:72; Devine, Historic Caucrhnawaqa. p. 236; NYCD 9:1096; 
Edward P. Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars (New York: 
1962), p. 63; Edward P. Hamilton, "Unrest at Caughnawaga, or 
The Lady Fur Traders of Sault St.-Louis," Bulletin of Fort 
Ticonderoqa Museum XI (1963), pp. 155-160; [Anon.] "Les 
Malignites du Sieur de Courville," Bulletin des Recherches 
Historioues L (1944), p. 72.
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the sisters* trade at Kahnawake that prominent Montreal 
businessmen envied them greatly and would have paid handsomely 
to rent commercial space at the village in order to be at the 
hub of the smuggling trade with Albany.98
Kahnawake was the acknowledged center of the illegal 
trade, where the three French women had a unique partnership 
with their Kahnawake carriers. Governor Beauhamois lamented 
in 1741 that the village had "become a sort of Republic, and 
it is only there that foreign trade is carried on at present." 
Although Indians who bought merchandise at the Desauniers 
store used beaver pelts to pay for them, it came to 
Beauhamois' attention in 1741 that the sisters had not 
brought a single fur to the Compaqnie des Indes1 office in the 
fifteen years that they had been at Kahnawake. Not only that, 
but furs were actually being carried covertly out of Montreal 
(presumably having been brought in from the upcountry) to the 
Kahnawake store. The Desauniers women, besides sending furs 
obtained in exchange for goods at the store, also were acting 
as middlemen for Montreal merchants (perhaps even corrupt 
officers of the Company) to exchange furs coming into Montreal 
for the woolens and other manufactured goods from Albany and 
probably to make the connections for these Montreal
98NYCD 9:1071; Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, pp. 
252-253; J.F. Bosher, The Canada Merchants. 1713-1763 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 182. (The Desauniers 
women also donated land to the Jesuits in 1742. RAPO 1973, p. 
53.)
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businessmen with Kahnawake carriers."
Kahnawake women were hired to smuggle the pelts out of 
Montreal in baskets to their mission village and both male and 
female Sault Indians hired themselves out to transport the 
cargo down to Albany.100 The Kahnawake Indians, known to be 
shrewd dealers themselves, may even have initiated an 
independent branch of the trade;101 Governor Beauharnois was 
under the impression that they carried this "foreign trade" 
into habitant villages near the Sault. By 1750, Governor La 
Jonquiere noted that there was hardly a house in the entire 
area which was not furnished with linens and calicoes from the 
English.102 And even guards posted on the outskirts of the 
colony cooperated with the transport of their goods.103
Governor Beauhamois attempted to put the Desauniers 
sisters out of business when he became fully aware of the 
situation in 1741, but although they were ordered to close 
their store, they remained at Kahnawake, and in fact continued
"NYCD 9:1071; CllA 73:129-130, 77:403-406.
100NYCD 9:1071.
101When Governor La Jonquiere visited the Kahnawake 
village, he noted that "many of their stores are filled with 
English goods, and they are very shrewd in their dealings." 
CllA 97:120; Devine, Historic Cauqhnawaaa. p. 249.
102NYCD 9:1096; Collections of the State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin 18: 62, 72.
103Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, p. 252: "No beaver 
will go to Albany or Oswego unless these same guards want to 
let them go." (Rochemonteix quotes from CllA.)
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to trade, notwithstanding government orders.104 This half­
hearted enforcement of the law, resulting only in a temporary 
cessation of trade and the need to be more clandestine about 
their operations, was politically motivated. New France 
authorities, as those in New York, could not afford to offend 
the Kahnawakes too much lest they turn their backs on the 
colony. Intendant Gilles Hocquart did not even want to 
investigate the Desauniers operation, let alone shut it down, 
for fear of antagonizing the Indians.105
The Desauniers sisters had a close and positive 
relationship with the Kahnawake people; they treated them well 
as employees (sometimes almost as partners) and customers and 
gave charitably to the poor and sick of the village. They 
also knew the Mohawk language fluently, better than many of 
the official interpreters hired by the colonial government. 
When Claude de Ramezay was stationed at the Sault as commander 
of the garrison, he was indebted to them for their services as 
translators.106 The women were well-liked by the Jesuit 
missionaries, and the latter were implicated with having 
worked hand-in-glove with them when they were finally
104NYCD 9:1095-96; CllA 77:13-14, 89-91, 386-388, 79:188- 
192. The Minister of Marine decreased the amount of money 
spent on gifts and supplies for the Kahnawake people in 1741, 
presumably as a punishment. (Devine, Historic Cauahnawaqa. p. 
217; Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, pp. 249-250.)
105C11A 54:148-154, 76:26-28, 97:277-281; NYCD 9:1071; 
S Dale Standen, "Politics, Patronage and Imperial Interest," 
Canadian Historical Review LX (1979), p. 26.
106C11A 97:287-288.
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apprehended.107
In 1750, shortly after taking office, Governor La 
Jonquiere decided that the Desauniers sisters and* Father 
Tournois, the Jesuit priest at Kahnawake at the time, were to 
be tolerated no more in their flagrant violation of the law. 
He succeeded in having them removed from the village and 
deported to France.108 The Jesuit order protested his 
removal, and the Desauniers women rallied forces to protest 
their removal as well. The ship which the women boarded for 
France overturned on the way back across the Atlantic, but 
they survived, having lost some of their belongings.109
107C11A 95:145-147, 157-161.
108Jesuit Relations 69:237. 286? CllA 95:131-144, 97:191- 
201; RAPO 1934-35, pp. 132, 145, 147. Despite Father
Tournois' involvement with illegal commerce, it was evident 
that he was an effective missionary, as colleagues commended 
him (Father Nau told his mother in a personal letter in 1743 
that Tournois "had much merit and [was] very amiable." RAPO 
1926-27, p. 328). A contemporary account claimed that "they 
say it's a pity to see that village [now that he is gone]: 
there is no more mass and no sermons. One only knows that 
liquor is given in abundance." (RAPO 1934-35, p. 145.) 
Governor Duquesne, La Jonquiere's successor, petitioned the 
French minister to allow the return of Father Tournois to 
Kahnawake, "because no one of his successors there had been 
able to manage the Indians of that mission as he had done." 
This appeal was unsuccessful, fJesuit Relations 69:286? CllA 
99:286-287, 316-317.) Duquesne claimed that Tournois ran the 
mission very well —  better than anyone else —  and that they 
needed him back, particularly because the mission was growing 
rapidly. Duquesne also told the Minister of Marine that he 
believed that La Jonquiere had made a bad judgment about 
Father Tournois. (For a biography of Tournois, see Jean-Marie 
LeBlanc, "Jean-Baptiste Tournois," Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography Vol. 3, pp. 627-628.)
109RAPO 1934-35, pp. 145, 147. The Desauniers women
gathered six witnesses, some of whom were prominent members of 
the Montreal elite, to testify to their good character. (CllA
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Nevertheless, their bad luck continued, matched by their 
nerve. They returned to New France not long after having been 
expelled, and attempted, by sneaking past the notice of the 
governor and the intendant, to return to Kahnawake. They even 
resorted to claiming that they had the king's permission to 
re-open their store, but could furnish no proof of this claim. 
After La Jonquiere died in office in 1752, they convinced the 
interim governor to allow them to visit the village for 
twenty-four hours, but so blatantly took advantage of this 
allowance that finally they were physically removed.110
The Indians at Kahnawake, it seems, were not at all happy 
about the turn of events, as they told La Jonquiere flatly 
that they would rather be dead than go without English 
goods.111 This was brazen behavior, since La Jonquiere had 
warned them that Indians found to be involved in the smuggling 
trade would also be banished from the village.112 But the 
threat was not carried out and the Kahnawakes who wanted to, 
continued their involvement in the transport business between
97:289-295.)
110C11A 97:191-196,277-281, 282-286, 98:36-39.
111C11A 97:139.
112Collections of the State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin 18:62. This indicates that the number of Sault 
Indians directly involved in the trade may have been small. 
(Sanders mentioned only five or six carriers by name.) 
(Also, other French officials had tended to blame the 
Kahnawakes' involvement in the trade on the Desauniers women 
or the Jesuits, absolving the Indians themselves. (See for 
example, NYCD 9:1071; CllA 97:191-201.)
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New France and New York, trading at Oswego as well as Albany 
on a regular basis, and casting their net even wider to 
procure the furs to be sent to the English. They travelled 
all the way up to Lake Huron for shipments of peltries in the 
years after the Tournois-Desauniers fiasco.113 These were 
self-sufficient, highly motivated people. They also became 
agents for Robert Sanders of Albany and various merchants in 
Montreal who needed Indians to carry their shipments and make 
the connections. Sanders' trade records indicate that he 
became involved in this commerce just after the demise of the 
Desauniers women, and had direct connections with Montreal 
merchants. But women remained prominent in the trade, since 
about half, and some of Sanders' most frequent, carriers were 
women from Kahnawake. Relations were close enough between 
this Albany wholesaler and the Kahnawake community for one of 
the Jesuit missionaries in charge at the reserve community in 
1754 to request Sanders' help in purchasing a bell for the 
church at Kahnawake.114
By the 1750s, men such as Sanders were an exception. Not 
nearly as many Albanians were involved in the trade with 
Indians as had been formerly. Albany was no longer the fur 
mecca it had been before Oswego was established. Instead, it
113NYCD 9:953? New York Colonial Manuscripts 80:51.
114Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 26, 31, 44, 51, 62. 
About half of his Sault carriers were women. In 1753, a woman 
named Susanna from Kahnawake was visiting Albany by herself. 
She knew Sanders and may have been a carrier. (NYCD 6:795- 
796.)
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had become primarily a wholesale clearing house for strouds 
and other English woolens, sold to Kahnawakes or Montreal 
merchants.115 The few Indian Commissioners who were still 
involved in the fur trade dealt almost solely with 
Kahnawakes.116 The presence of these mission Indians in the 
town was so commonplace as not to arouse any particular 
concern; it did not seem unusual for them to be there, as a 
group of them casually mentioned to William Johnson on one 
occasion that they had stopped by his house in Albany to speak 
with him.117 Larger numbers of them could be a problem, 
however. In the summer of 1751, sixteen large canoes brought 
almost two hundred Kahnawakes to Albany, an indication that 
the trading ties between these Indians and the people of this 
city had grown to outsized proportions. The booming nature of 
this wholesale trade became a problem in the 1750s, as the 
number of Kahnawakes visiting the city became unwieldy.118
The situation also became a problem in New York-Six 
Nations relations, since the latter were jealous that their 
Catholic cousins had usurped such a profitable aspect of the
115By 1731, some trading houses of Montreal were
"Considerable Indebted" to Albany merchants. (Minutes of the 
Indian Commissioners 1:332a.)
116NYCD 10:19.
117Johnson Papers 1:634. Johnson mentioned to some Cayuga 
Indians in 1755 the casual and regularized nature of relations 
between Kahnawakes and Albanians. (NYCD 6:980).
118New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 21, pp. 430, 436; 
Norton, Fur Trade, p. 185.
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fur trade. The League Iroquois resented the Albany 
commissioners for their cultivation of close relations with 
the Kahnawakes, and for New York’s hypocritical policy of 
discouraging them from developing ties with the French. Some 
Mohawks pointed out to Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian 
agent, that it was unfair for New York to allow close 
relations between Kahnawakes and New Yorkers, while censuring 
League Iroquois delegations from visiting Montreal.119 Peter 
Wraxall noticed this problem in New York-Six Nations relations 
as well, blaming the Albany commissioners for wrecking the 
province's good working relationship with their western 
neighbors because of their greed in promoting the trade with 
Canada. (He even claimed that they lost control of Indian 
affairs to Johnson because of their single-minded pursuit of 
the trade with Kahnawakes.)
Indian ill will toward New York could have serious 
consequences in 1755 and after because the colony needed 
Iroquois military support in the unfolding conflict with the 
French. Acting as William Johnson's cheerleader, Wraxall 
noted that since taking over the post of sole superintendent 
for Indian affairs in the northern colonies, the latter had 
managed to repair some of the damage done by Albanians to the 
colony's relations with the Six Nations. Johnson had managed
119Journal of Conrad Weiser's journey to Albany, 1751, 
quoted in Paul A. W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser: Friend of
Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1945), p. 326.
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to convince at least the eastern tribes of the League that 
they were more important to the New Yorkers than their mission 
counterparts and that favored status for the Kahnawakes would 
end.120
A delicate balance was required, however, because the
League people still had close ties with their Kahnawake kin, 
and there was concern in 1754 that Kahnawakes were encouraging 
large numbers of League Mohawks to emigrate to New France and 
become military allies of the French. The need for a
balancing act indicates both that relations between the two 
groups were still good, so that Johnson could not speak too 
strongly against the Kahnawakes for fear of offending Six 
Nations people, and that the English had better treat League 
Iroquois people well, so as not to encourage them to emigrate 
to a colony whose officials were wooing them with lavish gifts 
and respectful, deferential speeches. Johnson had to ensure 
some League sachems in 1755 that, although he disapproved of 
the Albany-Kahnawake stroud trade (especially since it smacked 
of disloyalty at a time when the French and English were going 
to war), the Kahnawakes who came to Albany would be treated 
well. This was also a strategy to keep the Kahnawakes neutral 
in the impending war; Johnson and others in New York did not
expect that the Kahnawakes would join the French in doing
120NYCD 7:19-20. Also Col den Papers 9:425, 430. League 
resentment against the Albany-Kahnawake trade went back as far 
back as 1712. (New York Colonial Manuscripts 58:5; Wraxall, 
Abridgment. p. 120.)
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battle with English forces, since these Indians had such firm 
and long-standing trade ties in New York.121
The Kahnawakes surprised Johnson, however, inasmuch as at 
least some of them joined the French in the Battle of Lake 
George in 1755 and in the attack on Fort William Henry two 
years later. Immediately after the 1755 battle, the reaction 
in New York was emphatically to outlaw any trade with 
Kahnawakes, a trade which was now routinely called 
"pernicious," and to scorn the Albany merchants, who were now 
labelled "mercenary."122 Arguments came out in a torrent 
about how that "pernicious" trade did nothing but support the 
French empire at the expense of the English. But at the same 
time, Johnson in particular held out the hope that the 
Kahnawakes could still be won over from the French and perhaps 
even convinced to return to live within New York.123 This 
hope, and the extreme caution which Johnson used with Indians 
who had fired on his own troops at Lake George, indicates the 
importance of the Kahnawakes to the balance of power as well 
as trade in the Northeast.
As in military affairs, in trade relations the Kahnawakes 
could make their own policy, beholden to neither the French 
nor the English, and both powers were forced to make the best
121Johnson Papers 9:127-130; NYCD 6:980.
122Johnson Papers 2:52, 76; DHNY 2:407; NYCD 6:1012, 
7:77, 278.
123DHNY 2:408; New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 25, p. 
45 (Calendar, p. 418.)
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of the situation, even if it was detrimental to their long­
term interests. The Kahnawake Iroquois had managed a position 
in which they could defy the usual laws of mercantilism and 
imperial rivalry. Seeing themselves courted by both powers, 
they realized the value of remaining independent of both.124 
But for the elimination of the French as a power in North 
America in 1760, officials in both New France and New York 
would have continued to shake their heads at the "sort of 
Republic" on the banks of the St. Lawrence outside of 
Montreal.
124Most seemed to remain independent of the profit motive 
as well. For a discussion of this and related issues, see 
Chapter VIII below.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE KAHNAWAKE IROQUOIS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The Kahnawake people diverged from the course of cultural 
and political history taken by their League Iroquois relatives 
because they inhabited a different space geopolitically in the 
Northeast. Living in a Jesuit mission village, even if they 
had complete political control (and it was not always 
complete), they were physically closer to Europeans for most 
of the first half of the eighteenth century than were their 
League counterparts. Iroquoia was a sovereign territory, even 
if the eastern boundary separating it from white settlement 
was eroded in the 1740s and after. The Kahnawake village was 
a piece of land within a European colony. The land was owned 
by the Jesuit order for the Kahnawake people; the Jesuits were 
considered the seigneurs of the land until 1762. This 
geographical reality, as well as the constant presence and 
influence of the Jesuits and their church, shaped the 
diverging paths which the League and the Sault Iroquois took.
By 1700 the Kahnawakes saw themselves as no longer part 
of the League but as a separate people, despite the League's 
insistence up to 1760 that their Catholic cousins were "a part 
of themselves.1,1 But the Kahnawakes did not see themselves
1The Sault men adopted a distinct hairstyle, perhaps to 
distinguish themselves from their League cousins, since they 
were otherwise indistinguishable in appearance and language. 
The men raised the hair of the crown in a bunch and held it 
there with mixture of wax and vermilion. They allowed three 
or four hairs to protrude above, to which they fastened a bead 
or exotic feather. (Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit
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as French, as subjects of the French king, or as subject to 
French control; they consistently demonstrated their 
independence, earning the reluctant admission by Governor 
Beauhamois that their community was "a sort of Republic." 
When Frenchmen married Kahnawake women, they were adopted into 
Kahnawake families and clans, even though their marriages took 
place in the Catholic Church. Marriage in the church did not 
preclude traditional ways of courtship and the arrangement of 
marriages by matrons, nor did it preclude traditional economic 
arrangements associated with the institution. Despite the 
Catholic character of the community and the fact that 
Christian ceremonies covered the important passages of life, 
men still went to join their wives' households and contributed 
to a communal economy within the extended family controlled
Relations and Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 
1896-1901) (hereafter cited as JR) 68:265; Paul A. W. Wallace, 
Conrad Weiser: Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 17, 398; Carl F. 
Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., The Journal of John Norton 
1816 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), p. 266; James Thomas 
Flexner, Mohawk Baronet: A Biography of Sir William Johnson 
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1989), p. 64.) 
Apart from the hairstyle, whites confused League and Sault 
people with each other because they looked and spoke so much 
alike. (New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State 
Library, Old Vol. 23, p. 104 (Calendar p. 389) ; Edmund B. 
O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History 
of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 
1853-1887) (hereafter cited as NYCD) 4:871; James Sullivan et. 
al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson 14 vols. (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1921-1965) (hereafter 
cited as JP) 2:740.)
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completely by the women, as was the extended family dwelling.2 
Every member of the community still belonged to one of the 
three clans: Turtle, Wolf, or Bear.3
Despite their proximity to whites, this situation did not 
change extensively in the eighteenth century, although by the 
later part of the century there was evidence that a few of the 
Kahnawakes were starting to change their dwelling patterns, 
abandoning the extended family longhouse built of trees and 
bark, for single-family cabins of squared timber with 
windows.4 This shift would suggest that the women of these
2Isaac Weld, Travels through the states of North America 
and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada Purina the Years 
1795. 1796. and 1797 (London: John Stockdale, 1799), p. 259; 
William Henry Atherton, Montreal. 1535-1914 2 vols. (Montreal: 
S.J. Clarke, 1914) 1:351; Louis Franquet, Voyages et Memoires 
sur le Canada J. Cohen, ed. (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974), 
p. 37; Joseph Franqois Lafitau, Customs of the American 
Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols., 
William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans. 
(Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77) 1:338-349.
3Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
4Franquet, visiting in 1752-53, saw mostly longhouses in 
the traditional style, but also indicated that some Kahnawakes 
were beginning to build "houses in the French style, with 
squared timber and even masonry," and claimed that the Jesuits 
encouraged this new trend in construction. (Franquet, Voyages 
et Memoires. pp. 37-39) Louis Antoine de Bougainville and 
Pierre Pouchot, who both visited Kahnawake during the Seven 
Years' War, spoke of longhouses, but Pouchot said that they 
also had some rooms furnished for visiting whites, implying 
European-style construction. (Louis Antoine [comte] de 
Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness; the American 
journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville. 1756-1760 Edward P. 
Hamilton, ed. and trans. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1964), p. 124; Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war 
in North America between the French and English. 1755-60 2 
vols., Franklin B. Hough, trans. (Roxbury, Ma: Woodward, 1866) 
2:186-187). When the St. Regis-Akwesasne mission was being 
organized in 1753, the king donated money for a saw-mill to
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families were no longer in control of the family economy. The 
fur trade might have had something to do with this, if the 
Kahnawakes became involved in the trade in order to make 
profits and acquire concentrated wealth, and if the trade were 
controlled by men. If as a result some Kahnawakes were no 
longer depending directly on food produced by the community, 
then they no longer depended specifically on women to be the 
economic mainstays. If profits from the fur trade meant that 
men involved in it bought corn and other agricultural products 
from the women who produced them, then they were no longer 
dependent within their family unit on women for their 
livelihood. This could have spurred a break from extended- to 
single-family living arrangements. However, women who were
help with building houses, an indication either that the 
French were strongly encouraging assimilation of the mission 
Iroquois, or that this was a logical extension of trends in 
housing style being pursued by Indians at Kahnawake. (NYCD 
10:266-267.) Curiously, John Long, an English trader who 
lived at Kahnawake for a while around 1770, reported that 
there were "about two hundred houses, chiefly built of stone" 
at the village. (Milo Milton Quaife, ed., John Long’s Vovaaes 
and Travels Tin the Years! 1768-1788 (Chicago: Lakeside Press, 
1922), p. 9) This high number of dwellings suggests single­
family units, as does stone construction, but no other 
visitors mention predominantly stone dwellings, and Long's 
description contradicts later as well as earlier accounts. In 
about 1796, Isaac Weld described the village as consisting of 
fifty log houses. (Quaife, ed., p. 259) While "log" houses is 
ambiguous —  it could have meant either log cabins or 
longhouses —  the number suggests extended family dwellings, 
since the total population was around 1,000 in the 1750s, and 
even after the Seven Years' War, with both smallpox epidemics 
and war casualties having taken their tolls, the population 
was said to be rising. (Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 119; 
Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes. p. 9; Collections of the 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin (hereafter cited as 
CSHSW) 17:175; NYCD 10:838; JP 3:291, 9:412.)
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involved in the fur trade (and there is plenty of evidence of 
their involvement) may have been able to accumulate wealth in 
the same way.5
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the fur trade 
had such an effect at Kahnawake up to 1760. One reason for 
this is that extended family longhouses remained the norm 
throughout this period. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that individuals were accumulating wealth. Property had 
always been held communally, and it seemed to continue in this 
way since extended family dwelling was still prevalent.
If there were significant profits being made in the fur
5Iroquoian women had traditionally been as active as men 
in economic (subsistence) pursuits as well as politics. 
Therefore, it was perfectly logical for them to be actively 
involved in the fur trade as carriers. The example of the 
Desauniers women running the shop at Kaihnawake probcibly did 
not seem odd there. Women at Kahnawake continued to be active 
in agriculture, in family control (since women decided which 
prisoners, and how many, would be adopted), and in politics. 
It has been mentioned earlier that observers at Kahnawake 
noticed the control of matrons over political decisions such 
as the waging of war. And a woman who was active as a 
diplomatic messenger was mentioned by Conrad Weiser. When the 
Pennsylvania Indian agent was visiting Albany in 1753, he met 
Susanna, a Kahnawake who was visiting the Albany Indian 
commissioners. (She was a personal acquaintance of Robert 
Sanders, perhaps because of involvement in trade.) She had 
brought a letter with her from a prisoner being held at 
Kahnawake, and attempted to smooth over ruffled feathers in 
New York over this captive, unfairly taken in peacetime. She 
engaged in some diplomacy, assuring Weiser and other English 
notables that virtually everyone at Kahnawake had disapproved 
of the actions of the warriors who took the Englishman 
prisoner, and was given a wampum belt to deliver to the Sault. 
Weiser mentioned that she was considered "a noted Woman" and 
was "very intelligible," as if most women were not. His 
comments may have reflected her behavior; she was probably 
confident, self-assured, and as well-spoken publicly as any 
Kahnawake man and this would have been strikingly noticeable 
to a non-native. (NYCD 6:795-796.)
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trade (and there is no way to determine this) much of it was 
being spent on liquor and on lavish dress. As early as 1718, 
Father Lafitau complained of heavy debt among the Kahnawakes 
because of their copious comsumption of alcohol. In 1732 
another mention is made of extensive Kahnawake debt to John 
Lydius, a Dutch trader living at this time on the New York 
frontier. This may also have been for liquor.6
Lavish dress and body decoration were features of pre- 
Columbian native cultures and continued to be after contact. 
The Kahnawake people were no exception; with the availability 
of new materials from Europe, they brought high fashion to a 
new level, one which was characterized by a generous mixing of 
Iroquois and European materials as well as by its lavishness. 
As early as the 1710s the Sault Iroquois had developed a 
reputation for being well-clothed; a nun commented a few years 
later that "they are as vain of dress as any Frenchman."7 
Louis Franquet, the engineer, noted that the Kahnawakes 
appeared to be wealthy because of their elaborate dress. In
6NYCD 9:882; The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden 
(New-York Historical Society Collections. L-LVI [New York, 
1917-1923]) (hereafter cited as Colden Papers) 4:202-203. 
Liquor was consumed in great quantity by some Kahnawakes, and 
it constituted the major social problem at the community 
throughout the eighteenth century. (JR 66:171, 67:39; Pouchot, 
Memoir upon the late war 2:225; Rapport de L'Archiviste de la 
Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as RAPQ) 1922-23, p. 184, 
1934-35, p. 145; Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and 
General Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. 
and trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872) 5:204; NYCD 10:232, 
301.)
7NYCD 9:887; Atherton, Montreal 1:350 (quote).
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particular, he noted that "they wear good quality fabric with 
braids of gold and silver that they usually get from 
[Albany]." And John Long concurred that the Sault people were 
"extravagantly fond of dress, and that too of the most 
expensive kind." There is no doubt that if there were profits 
being made in the fur trade, much of it was going into 
clothing.8
White observers described Kahnawake people as wearing 
bracelets of both silver and wampum, gold and silver brocade, 
necklaces of various materials, "the value whereof sometimes 
reach 1,000 francs." They wore traditional mocassins of 
smoke-dried deerskin, but also donned European-style shirts 
(only the mission Indians wore these, and it distinguished 
them from "non-domiciliated" Indians, as did the crucifixes 
they wore). Kahnawakes preferred their shirts with lace on 
the seams. They wore leggings decorated with ribbons from 
Europe, but also with flowers embroidered in dyed elk-hair. 
In cold weather or for special ceremonies they wore mantles 
which were often trimmed with eight or nine bands of lace. 
Some wore silk stockings and some French-made shoes with
8Franquet, Vovaaes et Memoires. p. 38; Quaife, ed., John 
Long's Vovaaes. p. 10. Long stated of the Sault people (in 
about 1770) that the extravagant clothing and adornment was 
financed by income from the land they leased out to 
neighboring habitants. This was a decade after the Montreal- 
Albany smuggling trade ended. (In 1762, the Kahnawake people 
had been awarded sole possession of at least a portion of the 
original 1680 royal grant of land, and evidently were renting 
out parts of it not occupied by their own people. JP 10:376- 
379.)
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silver buckles instead of mocassins.9
When Franquet made his official visit to the village, the 
sachem he met was wearing "a red outfit laced with gold and 
silver" given to him by the king. Franquet noted other 
European influences too; most of the other Indians were 
wearing "silver medals hanging from their necks," as well as 
wool blankets (strouds, no doubt) which they wore as jackets. 
But Peter Kalm, visiting only one or two years earlier, noted 
the traditional touches —  faces painted with vermilion, a dye 
which was also used to mark their shirts across the shoulders. 
Another traditional feature which struck Kalm was that "most 
of them had great rings in their ears, which seemed to be a 
great inconvenience to them.1,10 All the accounts over many 
decades indicate both the cultural mixing of styles and the 
extravagance of dress. The Kahnawake people considered it 
important to use lavish materials to adorn themselves 
properly.
Another outlet for spending surplus income was the 
tithing expected by the Catholic Church of its members and, in 
this case, collected by the Jesuit priests in the village. 
But parishioners paid in the form of pelts taken in hunting
9Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 124; 
Atherton, Montreal 1:350; JR 68:263-265; RAPO 1922-23, p. 37; 
Cadwallader Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations of 
Canada —  2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from 
the 1747 edition) 2:39.
10Franquet, Vovaaes et Memoires. pp. 36-37; Peter Kalm, 
Travels into North America John R. Foster, trans. (Barre, Ma: 
Imprint Society, 1972), p. 364.
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and c o m  from the harvest.11 Payment in commodity suggests 
that most Kahnawakes, if not all, were still tied to a 
subsistence economy wherein money did not circulate and 
surpluses were not large or converted into currency. Indeed, 
despite the Kahnawakes' continued involvement in the fur trade 
even after the British conquest of New France, they still 
tilled the soil, and to a lesser extent, raised domesticated 
animals and hunted for meat for their own consumption, as the 
main modes of maintaining the communal livelihood.
A 1757 memoir on the state of the colony claimed that the 
Kahnawakes made their living from farming and raising 
livestock and poultry. John Long recounted a decade or more 
later that they did not depend mostly on hunting to make a 
living, since there were far fewer deer in the woods than 
previously, but that the main economic occupation was sowing 
com. Long also mentioned their involvement in the fur trade, 
but clearly saw it as a secondary, even tertiary, occupation. 
The skins procured when men were out hunting were taken to 
Montreal to sell for money or barter for goods, according to 
Long, but he clearly did not characterize this as the way they 
made their living. It was an occupation undertaken as a way 
to obtain certain desired goods which they could not produce 
themselves. The predominant livelihood remained the female-
11 Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war 2:225; Franquet, 
Vovaaes et Memoires. p. 37.
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centered farming of traditional Iroquoia.12 The market 
economy of the French colony had intruded somewhat into the 
mission village; Bougainville noted that the Kahnawakes "sell, 
buy, and trade just like Frenchmen," but since at the same 
time tithe payments were being made with their subsistence 
products rather than cash or trade goods, the European trade 
nexus could not have completely overtaken the Sault 
economy.13
There was community pressure against the intrusion of the 
European economy and its values into Kahnawake as late as the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Isaac Weld, a British visitor 
to North America in the 1790s, met a Sault man named Thomas 
whose chief occupation seemed to be that of a trader. When 
Weld met him, he was on his way south to Albany with thirty 
horses and "a quantity of furs" to sell there. A French 
Canadian who knew Thomas said he was "a very rich man" and 
had "a most excellent house, in which ... he lived as well as 
a seignior." Thomas was not a typical Kahnawake resident.
12RAP0 1923-24, p. 50; Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes. 
pp. 9-10. (After 1760, with the British in charge of 
Montreal, one could take furs there to buy strouds or other 
inexpensive English goods. There was no longer a need to go 
to Albany.) Also JR 68:275; JP 3:970, 10:372-373;
Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, pp. 124-125. 
Colden's 1725 claim that the Kahnawakes made their living 
solely from the fur trade could not have been true. Colden 
never visited their village, and those who did clearly saw the 
"industrious" farming activity which went on there. (Colden, 
History 2:53). Long described the Kahnwakes as "industrious" 
(Quaife, ed., John Long's Voyages, p. 9.)
13Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 125.
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Another indication that he was not was his insistence that 
"his people ... had but very few wants." He explained to Weld 
that this was because he took care of their needs and that in 
return they kept him supplied with furs for his trading 
business, they took care of his horses, and "voluntarily" 
accompanied him on his commercial trips to Albany. (Thomas' 
emphasis on the voluntary condition of their joining him is 
curious and even suspicious.) Weld speculated that Thomas' 
profits were "immense" and he later heard that Thomas could 
get £500 worth of credit at any Montreal store.
The trader was notable also in his appearance. Weld 
noted that he "was dressed like a white man" but that all the 
other people in his party were costumed "in the Indian habit." 
Thomas was different from those accompanying him in another 
respect; while "not one of his followers could speak a word of 
English or French," Thomas could speak both languages fluently 
and appeared as much at ease in French as in his own Mohawk 
language. Thomas instantly befriended Weld as he had the 
Frenchman from whom Weld had first heard of him and invited 
Weld and his party to stay with him at his home. Thomas even 
indicated that there were many beautiful Indian women at his 
village who would make good wives for Weld and his travelling 
companions. While some of these traits appear consistent with 
the profile we have seen of Kahnawake people who were adept at 
dealing with outsiders and learning their languages, the 
individual accumulation of wealth and unequal power
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relationships between Thomas and his "followers" or 
"attendants" does not seem consistent with Kahnawake behavior 
up to 1760 •.
But even in the late 1790s when Thomas and Isaac Weld 
met, the Kahnawake people had not yet given up their 
traditional communal values and equitable power relationships. 
Weld later found out that his new friend from the Sault was 
"not a man respected among the Indians in general.” The 
Indians, Weld discovered, "think much more of a chief that is 
a good warrior and hunter, and that retains the habits of his 
nation, than of one that becomes a trader, and assimilates his 
manners to those of the whites."14
It is all the more remarkable that the Kahnawakes 
retained as many traditional ways and mores as they did with 
the large influx of white adoptees they absorbed. Numerous 
captivity narratives, observations by visitors to the 
community, and accounts by Jesuits attest to the significant 
white additions to the families and clans of Kahnawake. Names
14Weld, Travels through the states.... p. 170-171. In the 
1750s the Mountain mission Indians reacted similarly to a 
Nipissing Indian who set up shop there. He was "dishonored" 
in the eyes of his brethren at the mission because he dressed, 
ate, and slept life a Frenchman. He went "neither to hunt nor 
to war," which further discredited him in native eyes, and 
they scorned him because he carried on a lucrative business at 
his shop. (Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 
123.) Both Mountain and Sault Indians saw nothing wrong with 
involvement in the fur trade, when it was pursued within 
certain parameters, namely, the desire to obtain certain trade 
goods by bartering furs for them. But to set up shop oneself 
crossed a line in behavior which most had not embraced —  
undertaking the trade for the purpose of making profit, for 
accumulating wealth.
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such as Powell, Cook, Williams, Tarbell, Naim, Yort, 
Philipson, Suitzer, and Volmer contributed to the population 
of the community, although they were given Iroquois names and 
identities in adoption ceremonies.15 White influences were 
also introduced at Kahnawake from the troops garrisoned there, 
whose commandants often had much to do with the Indians.16 
Traders such as the Desauniers women and Monsieur Musseaux, to 
whom the sisters' shop was subsequently leased, had frequent 
contact with their customers and carriers in the village. 
Periodically, whites came to live at the village; John Long 
lived there for a time in order to learn the Mohawk language. 
About the same time, a Frenchman named Clingancourt bought a 
house at Kahnawake and probably lived in it.17 Even hostages 
or prisoners who were not adopted into famil ies had an 
influence as well. In the early 1750s, two prisoners from 
English colonies, Captain Robert Stobo and Jan Van Braam, "had
1sEmma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives Carried to 
Canada between 1677 and 1760 during the French and Indian Wars 
2 vols. (Portland, Me: 1925-26) 2:37; Samuel G. Drake, ed., 
Indian Captivities or Life in the Wigwam (Buffalo, N.Y.: 
1854), pp. 110-112; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 38; 
Lafitau, Customs —  2:171-172; JP 3:191; New York Colonial 
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library,
78:115, 79:51; NYCD 10:214-215; Weld, Travels through the
states.... p. 259; John G. Shea, History of the Catholic 
Missions Among the Indian Tribes of the United States. 1529- 
1854 (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1854), p. 332; E.J. Devine, 
Historic Caughnawaga (Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p. 
246.
16Commandant Douville was heavily involved in daily life 
and political events at the Sault.
17NYCD 8:238.
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the run of our [mission Indian villages] with whom they have 
had conferences," according to French officials.18
And of course, the Jesuits were a great influence, or 
attempted to be, but they stopped short of demanding 
widespread cultural change. Indeed, they conformed to 
Iroquoian ways of doing things. Any Jesuit who did not 
succeed in learning the Mohawk language within a year would 
not stay long at the Sault. Priests who wanted to be taken 
seriously by the Indians had to agree to be adopted, becoming 
a member of the tribe. Once that happened, the Jesuit would 
use only his adoptive name within the village, and the 
Kahnawake people would not recognize any other name for 
him.19 Conversely, many Kahnawakes took baptismal names 
along with their Iroquois names, showing the hybrid Iroquois- 
Catholic nature of the community. Many men took the name 
Francois-Xavier and many women names such as Marie, Madeleine, 
and Marguerite.
Catholic Christianity became part of the Kahnawake 
culture in many ways, despite the lack of piety among some of 
the people there. Father Nau claimed that although they were 
not perfect, the Kahnwakes were much more virtuous in their 
religious belief and practice than most other Indians, and 
indeed than most Frenchmen. Accounts of devout Kahnawake
18NYCD 10:308.
19JR 68:269? RAPO 1926-27, p. 268; Pouchot, Memoir upon 
the late war 2:226; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
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worshippers in the church singing hymns, saying prayers, and 
participating in mass were common.20 The village was much 
better equipped for Christian worship than most surrounding 
parishes. In the 1720s Kahnawake was at the southwestern edge 
of settlement in New France, but even the habitant 
parishioners on their eastern side had to come to the church 
at the Sault for mass on Sunday after the priest had said mass 
for the Kahnawake people. Three quarters of the white 
population of the Montreal area heard mass said only four 
times per year, and often without the sacraments; they were 
not as well versed in their religion as were their native 
counterparts. Those who were often came to the Sault village 
to pay homage to Kateri Tekakwitha, the saintly Kahnawake who 
modeled herself after the Virgin Mary and inspired worship of 
the mother of Jesus at Kahnawake for decades to come.21
There seemed to be many pious Sault Iroquois. For 
instance, a Protestant Deerfielder captured by Kahnawakes in 
1704 was forced to cross himself and to kiss a crucifix which 
his captor wore around his neck. This prisoner reported that 
other Puritan Deerfielders who were captured by Kahnawakes 
were forced to say Catholic prayers and to attend mass rather
20JR 68:267-279; Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and 
Emma Edith Woods, eds., Travels in New France by J.C.B. 
(Harrisburg, Pa; Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), p. 
24; Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes. p. 10.
21Louise Dechene, Habitants et Marchands de Montreal au 
XVIIe siecle (Montreal and Paris: Plon, 1974), pp. 452-453; 
Devine, Historic Cauahnawaaa. p. 167; JR 68:271; Weld, Travels 
through the states.... p. 259.
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than remain in the longhouses when the Kahnawake villagers 
attended the daily ritual.22 And in 1770 a Sault sachem sent 
wampum belts to Sir William Johnson, asking him to ensure that 
the Kahnawakes could practice their Catholic faith without 
disturbance by intruders in their village.23
However, not all Sault people felt this way. Some were 
said to be indifferent to the Christian belief. While devout 
Kahnawakes were walking the streets of Montreal with 
crucifixes and rosaries, others were "constantly abandoning 
the mission" for reasons associated with religion. Pierre 
Pouchot observed this in the 1750s, adding that those who 
remained were practicing Christians.24 In the same decade, 
Franquet cynically surmised that the Kahnawake people were 
attached to Catholicism only "in as much as their interests 
dictate."25 Pouchot noted that even those who nominally 
adhered to the faith and revered the priests, calling them 
"Praying Fathers," still "have no very distinct idea of this 
Infinite Being," the Christian God. "They render to him no
22 John Williams, The Redeemed Captive returning to Zion 
Edward Clark, ed. (Amherst, Ma: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1976, first published 1707), pp. 62, 66, 69.
23NYCD 8:238.
24Quaife, ed., John Long's Voyages, p. 9; Pouchot, Memoir 
upon the late war 2:224. No doubt many who left the mission 
headed for the Kahnwake settlements in the Ohio country, since 
James Smith told of Kahnawakes on the banks of the Muskingum 
who were disillusioned with Catholicism. (Drake, ed., Indian 
Captivities, p. 206)
25Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
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homage, and only designate him as the Master of Life." 
Pouchot witnessed the persistence of traditional spiritual 
practices such as juggling, a type of vision guest in which a 
person heated his or her body in order to receive visions and 
prophesy coming events. Pouchot concluded that the Kahnawake 
people had not assimiliated to any great degree, claiming that 
they "have lost none of their customs."26
Despite their proximity to and frequent contact with 
whites, the Sault people had adapted Iroquoian material 
culture, life ways, and religious beliefs to a new situation 
but had not assimilated. They had changed but chose what to 
change and consciously avoided some adaptations. They were 
distinct from the French-Canadian society around them while 
finding ways of developing beneficial economic ties with the 
surrounding whites into the nineteenth century.27 And much 
more than their southern brethren, they managed throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to find new ways of making 
a living from their considerable skills, but always on their 
own terms, maintaining their independence from their white 
neighbors. By the turn of the nineteenth century, they were 
hiring themselves out as river pilots on the upper St. 
Lawrence and points west because of their skill in passing 
rapids and rafting timber. Some travelled as far as the Rocky
26Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war 2:226-228, 186.
27See David Blanchard, "Patterns of tradition and change: 
the re-creation of Iroquois culture at Kahnawake" (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), p. 171.
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Mountains and the west coast, and later to the Middle East, as 
skilled boatmen. In a late-nineteenth century stint in Egypt, 
a group of fifty Kahnawake boatmen showed the natives how to 
maneuver around the dangerous cataracts of the Nile River. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, with tall steel bridges 
being built in their own backyard across the St. Lawrence 
river, they found that unlike most workers, they could walk 
fearlessly on construction scaffolding hundreds of feet from 
the ground. Many took advantage of this skill and became high 
steel workers, starting a tradition still alive today at 
Kahnawake. Such work enabled them to take individual jobs all 
over North America when they wanted to, always maintaining 
independence from an employer and from the political 
boundaries of Canada and the United States. Kahnawake men 
could leave the village for a few months at a time, perform 
tasks of skill and courage, and return home with money in 
pocket and feats of bravery of which to brag. In doing so, 
they maintained the traditional rhythm and temperament of the 
Iroquois warrior-hunter.28 Not all native groups were as 
successful at finding occupations with which they could relate
28See Joseph Mitchell, "The Mohawks in High Steel," in 
Edmund Wilson, Apologies to the Irocruois (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Cudahy, 1959) esp. p. 281; Blanchard, "Patterns of 
tradition and change," pp. 211-214, 403; Bruce Katzer, "The 
Caughnawaga Mohawks: Occupations, Residence, and the
Maintenance of Community Membership" (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), pp. 48, 53, 61;
Devine, pp. 416-418; Louis Jackson, Our Caughnawaga Indians in 
Egypt (Montreal: Drysdale, 1885); Alexander Chamberlain,
"Iroquois in northwestern Canada," American Anthropologist VI 
(1904), pp. 459-463.
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traditional patterns of work and values. Today, as a measure 
of their success in surviving as a people, the Kahnawakes have 
more native Mohawk speakers than any other Iroquois reserve or 
reservation and the lowest unemployment rate, and they were 
among the first to establish their own schools with a native 
curriculum. They also have the first and only fully 
functioning hospital on a reserve in Canada.29
The modem success of the Sault Iroquois had its roots in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when they learned to 
take advantage of their importance to both the English and 
French colonial powers. Although both powers tried to own 
them and they were at times placed in a subordinate position, 
particularly to the French, they used what leverage they could 
to steer their own course. In trade, they took advantage of 
their unique position to be involved in a contraband commerce 
by their own choice and maintained only as much involvement in 
it as they wished. The smuggling trade between Albany and 
Montreal would not have existed without them.
In diplomacy and warfare, the Kahnawakes sustained a 
variety of opinions, but the net effect was almost always to 
make the French and the English come running to them for 
support. This usually worked, as in the Seven Years' War when 
their decision on whether or not to go to war for the French
29Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks," pp. 69, 172, 176; 
Blanchard, "Patterns of tradition and change," p. 273; John 
Beatty, Mohawk Morphology (Greeley, Co: University of Northern 
Colorado Museum of Anthropology, 1974), pp. 4-8.
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determined whether Indians would fight on the English side. 
Even if coerced into joining a war party, they could and did 
sabotage war efforts which went against their interests 
(particularly the desire not to fight against fellow Iroquois 
warriors). From Denonville to Dieskau, French military 
leaders were duped and dumped by the Kahnawakes. Although 
many times they seemed to have become subordinate to the 
French, they never gave up their autonomy and, within the 
sometimes narrow framework in which to maneuver, they did so 
with consummate skill. They retained ties with the Albanians 
so as to remind the French of their freedom to make policy. 
The European powers had to consider what the Kahnwakes would 
do when they were attempting to influence what the Iroquois 
League would do, and the Five/Six Nations hesitated to make 
policy without first consulting with their Kahnawake kin. 
Their role in this struggle made it a much more complex 
struggle than would at first appear. The Sault Iroquois were 
yet another variable in the equation of English, French, and 
Iroquois Indians, often seen as a triangular power struggle. 
But none of these three belligerents made policy without first 
considering what effect the policy would have on Kahnawake 
motivation. The Sault Iroquois forced the French, English, 
and the Iroquois League to deal with them as an independent 
power, ever complicating the diplomatic machinations of the 
colonial struggle for control of the Northeast.
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